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ABSTRACT
The genes is  o f  f e d e ra l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  can be t r a c e d  back to  the 
Northwest Ordinances o f  1785 and 1787. From those  e a r l i e r  y e a r s  to  
the  p r e s e n t ,  g ran t s  have been in troduced  in response to  in d iv idua l  
needs t h a t  have e x i s t e d  a t  p a r t i c u l a r  p o in t s  in  t ime.  As a r e s u l t  
o f  the  bas ic  r e a c t io n  n a tu r e  o f  g r a n t s , only a very n e g l i g i b l e  con­
s i d e r a t i o n  has been given to  developing the  ind iv idua l  g ran t s  in to  
an i n t e g r a t e d ,  n o n - c o n f l i c t i n g  system. As could be expec ted ,  the 
consequence o f  t h i s  approach to  g r a n t  development has been an unco­
o rd in a te d  g ra n t  program con ta in in g  over lapp ing  g ran ts  in  some cases  
and c o n f l i c t i n g  ones in o th e r s .  In f a c t ,  th e  unsystematic  approach 
to  g ran ts  taken in  t h i s  country  has made i t  v i r t u a l l y  im poss ib le  to  
o b ta in  an a ccu ra te  count  o f  the  number o f  d i f f e r e n t  g r a n ts  which 
e x i s t .
This paper  approaches th e  s tudy o f  g r a n t s  from th e  p e r sp e c t iv e  
of  enhancing coopera t ion  among governmental u n i t s  which produce goods 
with s p i l l  ou t  e f f e c t s .  To accomplish t h i s  t a s k ,  a model was developed 
to  demonstrate the  e f f e c t s  o f  r e c ip ro c a l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  genera ted  by 
two communities under severa l  d i f f e r e n t  assumptions.  Welfare cha rac ­
t e r i s t i c s  were e v a lu a ted  under c o n d i t io n s  o f  coopera t ion  and non-coop­
e r a t i o n  to  determine whether  o r  not coopera t ion  would l i k e l y  take
v i i i .
place  between the  communities.  In those  cases  in  which coopera t ion  was 
l i k e l y  to  occur ,  g ran ts  were found to  p lay  a p o s i t i v e  r o l e  in  promoting 
coopera t ion .
F i n a l l y ,  in d iv id u a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  g ran ts  were i n v e s t ig a t e d  to  
determine t h e i r  p o s s ib le  e f f e c t s  on coopera t ion  among governments.
1x.
AN EXTERNALITIES APPROACH TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID EMPHASIZING 
THE EFFECT OF GRANTS ON COOPERATION AMONG 
LOCAL UNITS OF GOVERNMENT
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The t r i p a r t i t e  f e d e ra l  form o f  government which e x i s t s  in the  
United S ta te s  was born ou t  o f  a compromise between a n ta g o n i s t s  ad­
vo ca t in g ,  on the  one hand, an a l l  powerful c e n t r a l  government and, 
on the  o t h e r ,  s t a t e  so v e re ig n ty .  Formal d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
between the  n a t iona l  and s t a t e  l e v e l s  o f  government i s  found in  the  
C o n s t i tu t io n  o f  the United S ta te s  under A r t i c l e  I ,  Sect ion 8 and the  
Tenth Amendment. A r t i c l e  I ,  Sect ion 8 begins:  "The Congress w i l l
have power to  lay  and c o l l e c t  t a x e s ,  d u t i e s ,  im por ts ,  and e x c i s e s ,  
to  pay f o r  the  common defense  and general  w e l fa re  o f  the  United 
S t a t e s ; . . . "  and then proceeds t o  enumerate seventeen o th e r  p re -  
ro g a t iv e s  o f  the  ce n t r a l  government. All r e s id u a l  powers a re  granted  
to  s t a t e  governments by th e  Tenth Amendment which d e c l a r e s :  "The
powers not d e lega ted  to  t h e  United S t a t e s  by the  C o n s t i tu t io n  nor 
p ro h ib i t e d  by i t  t o  the  S ta t e s  a re  re se rved  to  the  s t a t e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
o r  to  th e  peop le ."  Through t h i s  amendment, p o l i t i c a l  autonorny was 
e x p l i c i t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  s t a t e  governments enab l ing  them to  enact  
laws r e g u la t in g  a c t i v i t i e s  w i th in  t h e i r  boundar ies  as long as the  laws 
did  not  i n f r i n g e  on the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  na t io n a l  government.
I
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No s i m i l a r  e x p l i c i t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d iv i s io n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  s ep a ra te s  
loca l  governmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  from those  o f  n a t iona l  or  s t a t e  gov­
ernments.  Rather ,  in an important  e x e rc i s e  o f  the  r i g h t s  gran ted  to  them 
by the  C o n s t i t u t io n ,  s t a t e  governments have pe rm it ted  the  c r e a t i o n  of 
loca l  governing bodies .  These loca l  governments a re  inco rpo ra ted  under 
p ro v is io n s  o f  s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  and have only the  de lega ted  a u t h o r i t y  
which i s  provided by th e  r e s p e c t iv e  s t a t e s .  With t h i s  e x t r a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p rov is ion  f o r  loca l  government,  the  governmental t r i l o g y  o f  the  United 
S t a t e s '  f e d e ra l  system i s  complete.
The advantages o f  a f e d e ra l  system over  a u n i t a r y  one have been
enumerated by Arthur  W. Macmahon a s :
F i r s t ,  f ed e ra l i sm  i s  a means, in c o u n t r ie s  where 
d i v e r s i t y  i s  pronounced, o f  acconmodating govern­
ment to  the  consent  o f  the  governed. Second, f e d ­
e r a l  sim i s  a d ev ise  f o r  a l lowing f l e x i b i l i t y  where 
th e  t o t a l  a rea  i s  l a r g e .  Th i rd ,  a f ed e ra l  system 
i s  l i k e l y  to  make exper im enta t ion  e a s i e r .  To be 
s u r e ,  c e n t r a l  governments in u n i t a ry  systems engage 
in much ex p e r im en ta t ion ,  but  the  e x i s t e n c e  of  a 
fed e ra l  system he ightens  the  o p p o r tu n i ty  and encour­
ages the  p r a c t i c e .  Fourth ,  f ed e ra l i sm  widens the  
o p p or tun i ty  f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in government .*
Yet, advantages such as th ese  a re  in danger o f  being l o s t  in the 
United S t a t e s .  Although the  C o n s t i tu t io n  bo ld ly  enumerates the  powers 
o f  the  n a t iona l  government and r e se rv es  a l l  r e s id u a l  powers to  the  s t a t e s ,  
the  d i v i s i o n  o f  fu n c t io n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  between the  two l e v e l s  of 
government and, hence,  between the  na t io n a l  and loca l  l e v e l s  has under-
*Arthur,  W. Macmahon, Administer ing Federal ism in a Democracy (New York: 
Oxford P re s s ,  1972), p. 5.
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gone continuous change s in c e  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  C o n s t i tu t io n  in
1 7 8 9 . 2  T h j s  change i s  no t  unique to  America, however, f o r  as i d e n t i f i e d
by Richard H. Leach, one major  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  f ed e ra l i sm  i s  t h a t :
Sovere ign ty ,  in  t h e  c l a s s i c  sense ,  has no t  meaning; 
d iv ided  as power i s ,  the  element of  abso lu teness  
which i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  the  concept o f  sovere ign ty  
i s  not  p re se n t .  Federal ism i s  concerned with p ro ­
cess  and by i t s  very n a tu re  i s  a dynamic, not a
s t a t i c ,  concept .
When dynamic s o c i a l ,  economic, and p o l i t i c a l  v a r i a b l e s  change, r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t i e s  among governmental l e v e l s  a l s o  change. As exper ienced wi th in  
the  American f ed e ra l  system, the  rea l ignment  Of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and 
fu n c t io n s  has e f f e c t e d  an in c r e a se  in the  sphere  o f  in f lu en c e  o f  the 
n a t iona l  government a t  th e  expense o f  s t a t e  and loca l  governments.  Com­
menting on th e  reasons  f o r  t h i s  change, th e  Committee f o r  Economic Devel­
opment i d e n t i f i e d  the  fo l lowing  c o n t r ib u t in g  f a c t o r s :
1. Inte rdependence has grown among i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
loca l  communities,  and th e  va r ious  reg ions  of  
th e  na t ion  as a r e s u l t  o f  in c r ea s in g  i n d u s t r i a l ­
i z a t i o n  and u r b an iza t io n  and a rap id  popula t ion  
growth and heightened m o b i l i ty .  Problems t h a t  
were once regarded l a r g e l y  as loca l  a re  now of 
s t a t e  and n a t io n a l  concern.
^For a p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  changing balance of  power between 
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  government in a f e d e r a t i o n ,  see John H. Ferguson and 
Dean E. McHenry, The American System o f  Government (13th e d . ; New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, I n c . ,  1977),  Chapter  5;  f o r  an economic a n a ly s i s  
o f  the  changing balance o f  power, see Bernard P. Herber,  Modern Publ ic  
Finance (3rd e d , ;  Homewood, 111.:  Richard D. I rwin ,  I n c . ,  1975),  Chapter 16;
f o r  a summary of  the  United S t a t e s '  expe r ience ,  see James A. Maxwell and 
J .  Richard Aronson, Financing S t a t e  and Local Governments (3rd e d . ,  Wash­
in g to n ,  D. C.:  The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1977), Chapter 1.
^Richard H. Leach, American Federal ism (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, I n c . ,  1970),  p. 1.
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2. Demands f o r  more and b e t t e r  s e rv i c e s  have a c c e l ­
e r a t e d  s in ce  World War I I ,  s t im u la ted  by a rapid  
and s u s ta in e d  in c re a se  in r e a l  n a t io n a l  ou tpu t  
and personal incomes. S t i l l  l a r g e r  demands can 
be expected in  the  f u tu r e  as the  popula t ion  con­
t i n u e s  to  grow and the  s tandard  o f  l i v i n g  cont inues  
to  improve.
3. The n a t iona l  government has developed a tax  system 
more respons ive  t o  economic growth and more e a s i l y  
adm in is te red  than those  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  govern­
ments,  which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  had th e  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  f o r  supply ing a l a rg e  p ropor t ion  o f  domestic
pub l ic  s e r v i c e s . ^
Two a d d i t io n a l  non-economic f a c t o r s  which have played an important  r o l e  in 
the  tendency toward c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  power should be mentioned. The f i r s t  
i s  a so c ia l  phenomenon involv ing  th e  demand f o r  equal r i g h t s  by groups 
which b e l iev e  t h a t  they have been precluded from f u l l  and equal p a r t i c i ­
pa t ion  in a l l  a spec ts  o f  s o c i e ty .  Turning to  th e  f ed e ra l  government fo r  
r e l i e f ,  t h e se  groups have been well r ece ived  and the  successes  made pos­
s i b l e  through f ed e ra l  involvement have led  o th e r  groups,  inc lud ing  c i t y  
and s t a t e  government,  to  r e l y  more and more on f e d e ra l  s o lu t io n s  fo r  
t h e i r  problems. The second f a c t o r  l i e s  in th e  a rea  o f  p r a c t i c a l  p o l i t i c s .  
Incumbent l e g i s l a t o r s  seeking r e - e l e c t i o n  and a s p i r i n g  l e g i s l a t o r s  seeking 
e l e c t i o n  f o s t e r  o r  a t  l e a s t  do not  d iscourage  the  p rov inc ia l  a t t i t u d e s  of 
t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  This  lack  o f  r e s i s t a n c e  a t  the  f ed e ra l  level  has
encouraged in c re a s in g  r e q u e s t s  f o r  a id  by s t a t e  and local  governments.
^Committee f o r  Economic Development, A F isca l  Program f o r  a Balanced 
Federal ism (New York: Committee f o r  Economic Development, 1967), p. 8.
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The Problem
The essence o f  the  f i s c a l  c r i s e s  fac ing  America's f ed e ra l  form o f  
government was c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  by L. L. Ecker-Racz in the  following 
t e rm s :
When t h e  s t a t e s  formed the  Union, they  r e ta in e d  
most fu n c t io n s  o f  domestic government f o r  them­
se lv e s  and f o r  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  su b d iv i s io n s .
They f e l t  secure  in  r e t a i n in g  th e se  r e s p o n s i b i l ­
i t i e s ,  not a n t i c i p a t i n g  t h a t  the  c o s t  o f  e duca t ion ,  
w e l f a re ,  h e a l t h ,  and some o f  the  o th e r  s e rv ic e s  
would some day swamp t h e i r  f i s c a l  system. Neither  
d id  they  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  economic development and 
the  m o b i l i ty  o f  people  would b r i d l e  s t a t e  and loca l  
tax in g  freedom a t  the  same time t h a t  i t  made the  
q u a l i t y  o f  government 's  performance c r i t i c a l  to  
th e  p e o p le ' s  cont inued  p r o s p e r i t y .  In s h o r t ,  they  
d id  not  fo re s e e  t h a t  u n r e s t r a in e d  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
o f  governmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  would some day j e o p ­
a r d i z e  the  very ends o f  the  Union they  were in  the  
p rocess  o f  c r e a t i n g . ^
Thus, f i s c a l  imbalance between expend i tu re  requirements  and revenue sources
a t  the  s t a t e - l o c a l  and n a t io n a l  l e v e l s  has caused s e r io u s  concern over  the
a b i l i t y  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  governments t o  con t inue  to  func t ion  in t h e i r
t r a d i t i o n a l  r o le s  in th e  f e d e ra l  system.
To demonstrate  th e  dependency o f  s t a t e  and loca l  governments on i n f l e x ­
i b l e  revenue sou rces ,  co n s id e r  the  da ta  contained  in Table I .  For f i s c a l  
y ea r  1976-77, t o t a l  taxes  c o l l e c t e d  by a l l  governments amounted t o  $419,778 
m i l l i o n .  Of t h i s  t o t a l ,  income taxes  accounted f o r  60 p e rc e n t ,  s a l e s  and 
gross  r e c e i p t s  taxes  f o r  20 p e r c e n t ,  p roper ty  taxes  f o r  15 p e rc e n t ,  and a l l  
o th e r  tax es  f o r  5 p e rc e n t .  The s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  the  t a b l e ,  though, i s
^George F. Break, Intergovernmental  F isca l  Re la t ions  in the  United 
S t a t e s  (Washington, D. C7i The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1967), p. v i i .
the  high degree o f  r e l i a n c e  by each leve l  o f  government on a p a r t i c u l a r  
tax  source .  For th e  f ed e ra l  government,  income taxes  accounted f o r  87 
pe rcen t  o f  a l l  t a x e s ,  loca l  governments ga thered  81 pe rcen t  o f  t h e i r  
taxes  from proper ty  l e v i e s ,  and s t a t e  governments used s a le s  and gross  
r e c e ip t s  taxes  to  c o l l e c t  52 pe rcen t  o f  t h e i r  revenues . Considering the 
income t a x ,  which i s  the  most income e l a s t i c  of  the  t a x e s ,  85 percen t  
was c o l l e c t e d  by th e  f ed e ra l  government,  14 pe rce n t  by s t a t e  governments 
and only 1 pe rcen t  by loca l  governments. By c o n t r a s t ,  f o r  the  p roper ty  
t a x ,  which i s  the  l e a s t  income e l a s t i c  o f  the  t a x e s ,  96 pe rcen t  o f  the 
revenues were c o l l e c t e d  by loca l  governments and 4 pe rcen t  by s t a t e  gov­
ernments.
TABLE I
TAXES COLLECTED BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1976-77 
(m i l l io n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
ALL LEVELS OF FEDERAL STATE LOCAL
TAX GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT
Income 250,037 211,617 34,666 3,754
Sales  & Gross 
Receipts 83,821 23,180 52,362 8,278
Property 62,527 2,260 60,267
Other 23,393 6,088 9,897 2,167
TOTAL 419,778 243,842 101,085 74,852
SOURCE: U. S. Department o f  Commerce, Bureau o f  Census, 1977 Census of
Governments (Washington, D. C . : ... U. S. Government-Printing Offi 
1979), p. 24.
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Considering the  o th e r  s id e  o f  the  revenue-expendi tu re  problem, Table II 
p re sen ts  d i r e c t  expend i tu res  by l e v e l s  o f  government f o r  F isca l  1976-77. 
Comparing th ese  da ta  with taxes  c o l l e c t e d  during th e  same period c l e a r l y  
i l l u s t r a t e s  the  f i s c a l  c r i s e s  o f  loca l  governments.  For the  p e r io d ,  local  
governments ' d i r e c t  spending amounted to  $194,403 m i l l io n  o r  28 pe rcen t  o f  
$682,492 m i l l io n  o f  d i r e c t  spending by a l l  l e v e l s  o f  government.  Concur­
r e n t l y  local  tax  revenues were only $74,852 m i l l io n  f o r  a t ax -ex p en d i tu re  
d i f f e r e n c e  o f  $119,551 m i l l i o n .  More and more, loca l  governments a re  
being c a l l e d  upon to  supply  g r e a t e r  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  i n c r e a s in g ly  s o p h i s t i ­
ca ted  and c o s t l y  s e r v i c e s .  The tax  base to  which they a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  by 
s t a t e  p r o h i b i t i o n s ,  t r a d i t i o n s ,  o r  p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  has not  been 
ab le  to  genera te  revenues f a s t  enough to  keep up with th e  r a p id ly  expand­
ing demand f o r  s e r v i c e s .  This problem has not been ignored by h igher  l e v e l s  
o f  government, but  has been the  o b je c t  o f  severa l  types  o f  intergovernmental  
a id  programs. These programs inc lude :  tech n ica l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  lo an s ,  shared
revenues ,  and g r a n t s - i n - a i d .
This t h e s i s  i s  an in tergovernmenta l  f i s c a l  r e l a t i o n  study o f  the  l a t t e r  
p ro g ra m - -g ra n t s - in -a id .  I t s  purpose i s  to  analyze a l a r g e l y  neg lec ted  a s ­
pect  of  fede ra l  g r a n t s ;  namely, the  i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n  o f  local  government 
generated e x t e r n a l i t i e s  through g ra n t  induced coopera t ion  among a f fec ted  
local  governments.  The argument w i l l  be developed in t h i s  study t h a t  a 
lack of  coopera t ion  among local  governments has r e s u l t e d  in  an i n e f f i c i e n t  
use o f  a v a i l a b l e  funds ,  and t h a t  g r e a t e r  coopera t ion  cou ld ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  ease 
the  e x i s t i n g  " f i s c a l  c r i s e s "  o f  local  governments.
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TABLE I I
DIRECT EXPENDITURE BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
FISCAL YEAR 1976-77 






S ta t e 128,765
Local 194,403
TOTAL 682,492
SOURCE: U. S. Department o f  Commerce, Bureau o f  Census,
1977 Census o f  Governments (Washington, D. C.:  U. S. 
Government P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1979), p. 26.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental  R e la t ions  (ACIR) recog­
nized th e  importance o f  coopera t ion  in  the  fo l lowing:
. . . the  growing s tak e  of  th e  Federal government 
in the  g r a n t  system, in h e re n t  in the  expansion of  
Federal g r a n t  o u t l a y s  from $3.2 b i l l i o n  in  1955 to  
$59.8 b i l l i o n  in  1976, has i n t e n s i f i e d  the  Federal 
government 's  i n t e r e s t  in a s su r in g  t h a t  g r a n t  d o l ­
l a r s  a re  spen t  with  the  maximum e f f i c i e n c y  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  And, s in ce  s t a t e  and loca l  govern­
ments a re  a t  th e  p o in t  o f  s e rv i c e  d e l iv e r y  in the  
expend i tu re  o f  th e se  funds ,  t h i s  means t h a t  the  
Federal government i s  a c c u te ly  concerned over the  
c a p a c i ty  o f  those  governments to  spend and ad m in is te r  
e f f e c t i v e l y .  I t  now i s  concerned not  only with ad-  
voiding f raud and incompetence in  th e  use o f  Federal 
g r a n t  funds,  but  a l s o  in improving th e  management 
c a p a c i ty  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  g r a n t  r e c i p i e n t s . 6
6Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental R e la t io n s ,  Improving Federal 
Grants  Management (Washington, D. C.:  U. S. Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,
1977); p. m :
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As a m a n i fe s t a t io n  o f  Federal concern over  coopera t ion  in g ra n t  management, 
th e  O ff ice  o f  Management and Budget publ ished  " C i r c u la r  A-95"7 as  a s t a t e ­
ment o f  i t s  p o l ic y  g u id e l in e s .  Commenting on th e  b e n e f i c i a l  r e s u l t s  of  
" C i r c u la r  A-95," th e  ACIR s t a t e d :
The general  t h r u s t  o f  th e  A-95 response to  th ese  
problems was, and i s ,  to  promote communication and co­
o rd in a t io n  between g e n e r a l i s t s  and s p e c i a l i s t s  a t  a l l  
t h e se  governmental l e v e l s  and to  encourage an expanded 
d e c i s io n  making process .  " I t  s u b s t i t u t e s  the  p o l i t i c s  
o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  f o r  the  p o l i t i c s  of  bypass ing ,"  which 
had been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by " v e r t i c a l  fu n c t io n a l  au to -  
c r a c i e s "  and d e b i l i t a t e d  general  purpose governments.
Importance o f  the  Study
Since the  1950's  f ed e ra l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  to  s t a t e  and loca l  governments 
have developed in to  a s i g n i f i c a n t  f i s c a l  ins t rum ent  in  the  United S t a t e s .
In 1951, f o r  example, a id  t o t a l e d  only $2.2 b i l l i o n ;  but by 1977 t h i s  
f i g u r e  inc reased  by about  t h i r t y - f o l d  t o  exceed $68 b i l l i o n .  As revealed  
in Table I I I ,  the  i n c re a se  cannot  simply be a t t r i b u t e d  to  normal expansion 
in a growing economy f o r  g ran ts  have increased  in r e l a t i v e  as well as abso­
l u t e  importance. On a percentage  b a s i s ,  GNP grew by 404 pe rcen t  whereas 
g ran ts  grew by 3009 p e rc e n t .  The g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  i n c re a se  in g r a n ts  caused 
g ra n t s  as a percentage  o f  GNP to  in c rease  from 0 .6  pe rcen t  in 1951 to  3.7 
pe rcen t  in  1977.
70 f f i c e  o f  Management and Budget, "C i rcu la r  A-95," Federa l  R eg is te r  
(Washington, D. C.:  U. S. Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  January  12, 1976),
pp. 2051-2065






















TABLE I I I
FEDERAL GRANTS, EXPENDITURES 
AND RECEIPTS, 1951-1977 
( b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
Grants GNP
Grants as a 
% o f  GNP
Federal
Expenditure
Grants as a 




2.2 363.6 .6 45.8 4 .8 53.4
2.4 380.0 .6 68.0 3.5 68.0
2.8 411.0 .7 76.8 3.6 71.5
3 .0 363.6 .8 70.9 4.2 69.7
3.2 380.0 .8 68.5 4.7 65.5
3.8 411.0 .9 70.5 5.4 74.5
4.1 432.7 .9 76.7 5.3 80.0
4 .9 442.1 1.2 82.6 5.9 79.6
6.7 473.3 1.4 92.1 7.3 79.2
7 .0 497.3 1.4 92.2 7.6 92.5
7.1 508.3 1.4 97.8 7.2 94.1
7 .9 546.9 1.4 106.8 7.4 99.7
8 .6 576.3 1.5 111.3 7.7 106.6
10.1 616.2 1.6 118.6 8.5 112.7
10.9 657.1 1.6 118.4 9.2 116.8
13.0 721.1 1.8 134.7 9.6 130.9
15.2 775.4 2.0 158.3 9.6 149.6
18.6 829.1 2.2 178.8 10.4 153.7
20.3 903.7 2.2 184.5 11.0 187.8
24.0 959.0 2.5 196.6 12.2 193.7
TABLE Ill-continued
Year Grants GNP
Grants as a 
% o f  GNP
Federal
Expenditure
Grants as a 




Grants  as a 
% o f  Federal 
Receipts
1971 28.1 1019.3 2.8 211.4 13.3 188.4 14.9
1972 34.4 110.5 3.1 232.0 14.8 208.6 16.5
1973 41.8 1237.5 3.4 247.1 16.9 232.2 18.0
1974 43.4 1359.2 3.2 269.6 16.1 264.9 16.4
1975 49.8 1457.3 3.4 326.1 15.3 281.0 17.7
1976 59.1 1621.7 3.6 365.6 16.2 299.2 19.7
1977 68.4 1834.0 3.7 401.9 17.0 356.9 19.2
*1978 77.9 2043.4 3.8 462.2 16.9 400.4 19.5
*1979 82.1 2289.4 3.6 500.2 16.4 439.6 18.7
♦Estimates
Source: Off ice  o f  Management and Budget,  Special  Analyses Budget o f  th e  United S ta t e s  Government
(Washington, D. C.: United S ta t e s  Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1968-1974) and U. S. Depart-
ment o f  Commerce, Bureau o f  Census, H i s to r i c a l  S t a t i s t i c s  of  th e  United S t a t e s ,  Colonial 
Times to  1970 (Washington, D. C.:  United S ta t e s  Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1975).
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Data r e v e a l in g  a more dramatic  growth in the  importance o f  g ran t s  a re  
those  which provide  a comparison with d i r e c t  f ede ra l  expendi tu res  and f e d ­
e ra l  r e c e i p t s .  Refe r r ing  to  Table I I I ,  in 1951, g ran ts  amounted to  4 .8  
pe rcen t  o f  fede ra l  expend i tu res  and 4 .1  pe rcen t  o f  revenues . Even with 
the  monetary value o f  th e se  two c a t e g o r i e s  in c reas in g  from $45.8 b i l l i o n  
to  $401.9 b i l l i o n  and $53.4 b i l l i o n  to  $356.9 b i l l i o n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  in 
1977, g r a n ts  in the  l a t t e r  y e a r  amounted to  17.0 pe rc en t  o f  f ed e ra l  ex­
pen d i tu re s  and 19.2 pe rcen t  o f  f ed e ra l  r e c e i p t s .  I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
th en ,  t h a t  by 1977, about $0.20 out  o f  every $1 in f e d e ra l  revenue was 
being r e tu rned  to  s t a t e  and loca l  governments to  be spent  on programs 
under t h e i r  c o n t r o l .
The growing importance o f  th ese  g ra n t s  to  s t a t e  and local  governments 
i s  demonstrated in Table IV. Consider ing f i r s t  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
g ran t s  and s t a t e  and loca l  t a x e s ,  i t  may be seen t h a t  in 1951, g ran ts  
from the  fede ra l  government amounted to  8 .5  pe rcen t  o f  s t a t e  and local  
tax  revenues . From t h a t  t im e ,  g ran ts  s t e a d i l y  rose  as a percentage  o f  
t a x e s ,  f i n a l l y  reaching  24.0 pe rcen t  in 1977. Following the  same p a t t e r n ,  
but r e f l e c t i n g  the  excess  o f  expend i tu re  requirements  over  tax  revenues,  
g ran t s  as a percentage o f  s t a t e  and loca l  d i r e c t  expend i tu res  amounted 
to  7 .6  pe rcen t  a t  the  beginning o f  th e  per iod  and rose  s t e a d i l y  to  21.0 
percen t  by 1977. F i n a l l y ,  even with f in a n c i a l  a id  from th e  fede ra l  gov­
ernment ,  the  twenty-seven y e a r  per iod  covered in the  t a b l e  witnessed a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  in c rea se  in s t a t e  and loca l  governmental debt .  S t a r t i n g  a t  
$27.0 b i l l i o n  in 1951, aggrega te  debt  o f  sub -na t iona l  u n i t s  o f  government 
exceeded $100 b i l l i o n  in 1966 and inc reased  f u r t h e r ,  to  $257.5 b i l l i o n ,  by 
1975.
TABLE IV
STATE-LOCAL REVENUES, EXPENDITURES, 
DEBT & FEDERAL GRANTS, 1951-1977 
( b i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s )
Grants  as a
Grants as a D i re c t  % o f  D irec t
Year Grants
Revenue o f  
S ta t e  & Local 
Governments
% o f  Revenue 
o f  S t a t e  & Local 
Governments
Expenditure 
o f  S t a t e  & Local 
Governments
Expenditure  of  
S ta t e  & Local 
Governments
S t a t e  
& Local 
Debt
1951 2.2 26 8 .5 29 7.6 27.0
1952 2.4 28 8 .6 31 6.6 30.1
1953 2.8 31 9.0 33 8.5 33.8
1954 3.0 32 9.4 37 8.1 38.9
1955 3.2 34 9.4 40 8.0 44.3
1956 3.8 38 10.0 43 8 .8 48.9
1957 4.1 42 9.8 48 8.5 53.0
1958 4 .9 44 11.1 54 10.9 58.2
1959 6.7 48 14.0 59 11.4 64.1
1960 7.0 53 13.2 61 11.5 70.0
1961 7.1 57 12.4 67 10.6 75.0
1962 7.9 62 12.7 71 11.1 81.3
1963 8.6 66 13.0 75 11.5 87 .5
1964 10.1 71 14.2 81 12.5 92.2
1965 10.9 77 14.2 87 12.5 99.5
1966 13.0 84 15.5 95 13.7 107.1
1967 15.2 91 16.7 106 14.3 113.7
1968 18.6 100 18.6 116 15.8 121.2
1969 20.3 113 18.0 132 15.4 133.5
1970 24.0 128 18.8 148 16.2 143.6
TABLE IV-continued
Year Grants
Revenue o f  
S ta te  & Local 
Governments
Grants as a 
% o f  Revenue 
of S ta t e  & Local 
Governments
Di r e c t  
Expenditure 
o f  S ta t e  & Local 
Governments
Grants as a 
% o f  D irec t  
Expenditure  o f  
S ta te  & Local 
Governments
S ta te  
& Local 
Debt
1971 28.1 140 20.1 171 16.4 158.8
1972 34.4 158 21.8 189 18.2 174.5
1973 41.8 178 23.5 205 20.4 188.5
1974 43.4 196 22.1 226 19.2 206.6
1975 49.8 215 23.3 265 18.8 221.1
1976 59.1 249 23.7 304 19.4 240.2
1977 68.4 285 24.0 325 21.0 257.5
1978 77.9 195 26.4 327 23.8 295.1
1979 82.1 N.A. N.A. 336.6
Source: Off ice  o f  Management and Budget,  Special  Analyses Budget o f  the  United S t a t e s  Government
(Washington, D. C.: United S t a t e s  Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1968-1975) and U. S. Depart-
ment o f  Commerce, Bureau of  Census, H i s to r i c a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  the  United S t a t e s  Colonial 
Time to  1970 (Washington, D. C . : United S ta t e s  P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1975).
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In a d d i t io n  to  the  general  growth t re n d s  in d ic a te d  in  the  previous  
t a b l e s ,  two very im portan t  conclus ions  can be drawn r e l a t i v e  to  g r a n t s .  
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  the  f e d e ra l  government has developed over  a number of  
yea rs  a s t rong  commitment to  fund a programs o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  a t  high 
l e v e l s .  In r e f e r e n c e  to  1977, the  $68.4 b i l l i o n  a l l o c a t e d  to  g ran ts  
rep re sen ted  over  o n e - s ix th  o f  f ed e ra l  expend i tu res  and almost  o n e - f i f t h  
o f  f ed e ra l  r e c e i p t s .  As i s  t r u e  in any in s ta n c e  when a choice  i s  made 
from among a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  o p p o r tu n i ty  co s t s  were in c u r re d .  The c o s t s  
co n s i s t e d  o f  c u r t a i l e d  o r  even z e ro - le v e l  funding f o r  programs competing 
with g ra n t s  in  the  f e d e ra l  budgeting process  o r ,  perhaps ,  h igher  taxes  
than would have been l e v ie d  without  the  g ra n t  program. The second con­
c lu s io n  i s  the  growing dependence o f  lower l e v e l s  o f  government on f e d ­
e ra l  g ran ts  t o  help  them f inance  t h e i r  eve r  in c re a s in g  expendi tu re  
requirements .  I m p l i c i t l y ,  the  f ed e ra l  government recognizes  t h a t  a 
need f o r  the  subs id ized  fu nc t ion  e x i s t s  and chooses to  provide a id  
i n d i r e c t l y  r a t h e r  than by o u t r i g h t  assumption of  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  the  fu n c t io n .
Through i t s  system o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  t h e n ,  the  f ed e ra l  government 
has undertaken heavy f in a n c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  i n d i r e c t  p rov is ion  
o f  a wide-range o f  s t a t e  and loca l  governmental goods and s e r v i c e s .  In 
a program o f  t h i s  magnitude the  ques t ion  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  v i t a l .  Recog­
n iz in g  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  over  78,000 loca l  governments and 50 s t a t e  gov­
ernments,  the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  mutual ly  c a n c e l l in g  programs looms l a rg e .  
Given the  independence o f  t h i s  la rg e  number o f  governmental u n i t s ,  e f f -  
c iency  in the  p rov is ion  o f  s e rv ic e s  would be enhanced i f  the  e x t e r n a l i t y
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genera t ing  governments could be induced to  coopera te .  I t  i s  the  func­
t i o n  of  t h i s  paper ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  cons ide r  no t  only the  income t r a n s f e r  
from the  na t io n a l  government to  s t a t e  and loca l  governments in th e  form 
o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  but  t o  a l s o  cons ide r  the  b e n e f i t s  o f  g r a n t s  which r e ­
s u l t  through induced coopera t ive  e f f o r t s  among governments.
Organizat ion o f  the  Study
In the  development o f  t h i s  s tudy ,  Chapter II  serves  the  important  
func t ion  o f  p rov id ing  the  rea d e r  with a survey o f  the  l i t e r a t u r e  r e l e ­
vant to  to p ic s  d iscussed  in l a t e r  c h a p te r s .  While primary emphasis 
w i l l  be placed on th e  review of  g r a n t - i n - a i d  l i t e r a t u r e ,  coverage w il l  
a l so  be accorded to  e x t e r n a l i t y  theory .
Chapter I I I  w i l l  d i scuss  the  independent  adjustment  process  o f  local 
government to  reach a p o s i t i o n  o f  equ i l ib r iu m  in the  p rov is ion  o f  publ ic  
and p r iv a t e  goods. The simple model o f  independence w i l l  then be ex­
panded to  inc lude  dependence. A geometric  r e a c t io n  model o f  loca l  gov­
ernments provid ing  goods with s p i l l o u t  e f f e c t s  w i l l  be p resen ted  to  
demonstrate  the  a t t a in m e n t  o f  coopera t ive  and non-coopera t ive  equ i l ib r ium .  
The geometr ic model w i l l  be used in a l a t e r  ch ap te r  to  e v a lu a te  g r a n t s - i n -  
a id  under the  c r i t e r i o n  o f  t h e i r  e f f e c t  on coopera t ion  among u n i t s  o f  
loca l  government.
Chapter IV w i l l  p re sen t  a d iscu ss io n  o f  the  h i s t o r y  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  g r a n t s .
A c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  g r a n ts  w i l l  be made in Chapter  V,
CHAPTER II  
SURVEY OF LITERATURE
The primary o b je c t iv e  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  in q u i ry  i s  to  expand the 
f r o n t i e r s  o f  knowledge in the  s u b je c t  a rea  chosen f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
Researchers  may approach t h i s  t a sk  by accep t ing  e x i s t i n g  dogma and 
methodology and branching ou t  i n to  new a reas  o f  d iscovery  o r  they may 
r e j e c t  e x i s t i n g  dogma and methodology and seek to  rep lace  i t  with new 
cannons. In th e  main, t h i s  s tudy w i l l  fo l low  the  former approach. 
S t r u c t u r a l l y ,  the  purpose of  the  p re se n t  c h a p te r  i s  t o  p re se n t  a body 
o f  l i t e r a t u r e  con ta in in g  concepts  and a n a l y t i c a l  techniques  t h a t  w i l l  
serve  as a background t o  the  major a n a ly s i s  which i s  to  fo l low.  The
l i t e r a t u r e  reviewed in  t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be drawn from the  th re e  d i s ­
t i n c t ,  but  no t  mutual ly  e x c lu s iv e ,  a reas  o f  E x t e r n a l i t y  Theory, Pol icy
P r e s c r ip t io n s  f o r  E x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  and F isca l  Federal ism.
E x t e r n a l i t y  Theory 
E x t e r n a l i t i e s  have long been recognized as important  agents  in 
the  process  o f  economic d ec i s io n  making.* The f i r s t  formal a n a ly s i s
* Examples of  e a r l i e r  works which recognized the  e x i s te n c e  of  
e x t e r n a l i t i e s  inc lude :  Henry Sidgewick, The P r in c ip l e s  o f  P o l i t i c a l
Economy (3rd .  e d . ;  New York: MacMillan and Company, 1901) and Ju le s  
Dupuit,  "De l a  Mesure de 1'  U t i l i t e  des Travaux P u b l i c s , "  A rna l is  des 
Ponts e t  Chaussees, VIII  (1844), t r a n s .  R. H. Barback, "On the  Meas- 
urement o f  the  U t i l i t y  o f  Public  Works," I n te rn a t io n a l  Economic 
Papers , XXVI (1952).
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of  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  was conducted by Alfred  Marshall  in h i s  P r in c ip le s  
o f  Economics.^ In t h i s  nonr igorous3 t re a tm en t  o f  the  t o p i c ,
M arsha l l ,  as p a r t  o f  h i s  d i sc u s s io n  on the  c o s t s  o f  p roduc t ion ,  
in troduced:
. . . two te ch n ic a l  terms.
We may d iv id e  the  economies a r i s i n g  from an 
i n c re a se  in the  s c a l e  o f  p roduct ion  o f  any kind 
o f  goods, i n t o  two c l a s s e s —f i r s t l y ,  those  depen­
dent  on the  general  development o f  the  i n d u s t r y ;  
and, secondly ,  those  dependent on the  resources  
o f  the  in d iv id u a l  houses o f  bus iness  engaged in 
i t ,  on t h e i r  o rg a n iza t io n  and the  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  
t h e i r  management. We may c a l l  th e  former ex te rn a l  
economies, and th e  l a t t e r  i n t e r n a l  economies .4
Although Marshall  d id  no t  make the  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  f u r t h e r  development
has a s s o c i a t e d  ex te rna l  economies with an i n d u s t r y ' s  long-run supply
curve, g iv ing  r i s e  t o  in c re a s in g  and decreas ing  c o s t  i n d u s t r i e s ,  while
i n t e r n a l  economies have been a s so c ia t ed  with an in d iv id u a l  f i r m ' s
long-run average c o s t  c u rv e ,  g iv ing  r i s e  t o  economies and diseconomies
o f  s c a l e . 5
From t h i s  e a r l y  t r e a tm e n t ,  which was concerned p r im a r i ly  with ex­
p la in in g  th e  phenomena o f  in c r e a s in g ,  d e c re a s in g ,  and c o n s t a n t  c o s t
2Alfred  M arsha l l ,  P r in c ip l e s  o f  Economics (8 th .  e d . ;  New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1948).
^Jacob Viner has commented t h a t ,  "Marshal ls '  a n a ly s i s  was exces­
s iv e l y  simple even on th e  b a s i s  o f  h is  own s im p l i fy ing  assumptions,  
and inadequa te ly  p r e c i s e  in formulat ion  . . . "  Jacob Viner ,  "Cost 
Curves and Supply Curves," Readings in  P r ice  Theory, ed. George V. 
S t i g l e r  and Kenneth E. Boulding (Chicago: Richard D. I rwin,  1952),
p. 169. Reprinted from Z e i t s c h r i f t  f u r  Nationalokomomie, I I I  (1931).
^Marshal l ,  op. c i t . , p. 266.
^Viner,  op. c i t . , pp. 205-226.
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i n d u s t r i e s ,  an ever  expanding body o f  e x t e r n a l i t y  l i t e r a t u r e  began to  
develop.  An e a r l y  a t tem pt  to  c l a s s i f y  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  i n to  broad fam­
i l y  groups was made by J .  E. Meade.6 Meade's purpose was to  d i n s i n -  
guish  between two e x t e r n a l i t i e s  which he termed:
. . ."unpaid  f a c t o r s  o f  product ion"  and th e  second 
the  " c r e a t io n  o f  atmosphere."  The e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r ­
ence between th e se  two types  o f  ex te rn a l  economy or  
diseconorny i s  t h a t  in the  f i r s t  case  t h e r e  a re  s t i l l  
co n s ta n t  r e tu rn s  to  s c a l e  f o r  s o c ie ty  as a whole, 
though no t  f o r  th e  ind iv idua l  i n d u s t r y ,  whereas in 
the  second case  th e re  a re  s t i l l  c o n s ta n t  r e tu rn s  to  
sc a le  f o r  each ind iv idua l  in d u s t ry  but  no t  fo r  
s o c ie ty  as a whole .7
While Meade's a r t i c l e  provided a r igorous  mathematical d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  d i r e c t  interdependence among producers ,  i t  was narrow in  scope and 
did  not  provide a s u i t a b l e  framework f o r  general  e x t e r n a l i t y  a n a ly s i s .  
In f a c t ,  th e  t echno log ica l  type o f  e x t e r n a l i t y  which Meade's work d i s ­
cussed was o f  such l im i te d  importance t h a t  Tibor Sci tovsky commented:
The examples o f  ex te rn a l  economies given by 
Meade a re  somewhat buco l ic  in  n a tu r e ,  having to  
do with bees ,  o rc h a rd s ,  and woods. This however 
i s  no a c c id e n ts  i t  i s  not  easy to  f in d  examples 
from in d u s t r y .  » 9
6 j .  E. Meade, "External  Economies and Diseconomies in a Competi­
t i v e  S i t u a t i o n , "  The Economic J o u r n a l , LXII (March, 1952), pp. 54-67.
^ I b i d . p. 56.
6Tibor Sc i tovsky ,  "Two Concepts o f  External  Economies," American
Economic Review, LXIV (A p r i l ,  1954),  p. 143rl51.
9David B. Johnson has a l s o  l ev ied  a c r i t i c i s m  a t  Meade's choice 
o f  examples d e p ic t in g  techno log ica l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  His argument de­
monstrated t h a t  bees and apple  orchards  r ep re sen ted  a t r i v i a l  and i n ­
c o r r e c t  example o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  I t  was shown t h a t  Meade's a n a ly s i s  
was d i f i c i e n t  in t h a t  i t  d id  not  i n v e s t i g a t e  the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  causes  
o f  th e  divergence between marginal so c ia l  c o s t  and marginal so c ia l
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Genera l iz ing  h i s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  Meade to  inc lude  a l l  o f  the  c o n t r ib u to r s
to  the  e x i s t i n g  body o f  e x t e r n a l i t y  l i t e r a t u r e ,  Sci tovsky wrote:
D e f in i t i o n s  o f  e x te rn a l  economies a re  few and 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  I t  i s  agreed t h a t  they  mean 
s e rv ic e s  (and d i s s e r v i c e s )  rendered f r e e  (w i th ­
ou t  compensation) by one producer  to  an o th e r ;  
but  t h e r e  i s  no agreement on th e  n a tu re  and form 
o f  th e se  s e rv i c e s  o r  on the  reasons  f o r  t h e i r  
being f r e e  . . . The l i t e r a t u r e  co n ta in s  many 
examples o f  ex te rn a l  economies; but they  a re  as 
v a r ie d  and d i s s i m i l a r  as  a re  d i sc u s s io n s  o f  the  
s u b j e c t . 10
As perceived  by Sc i tovsky ,  the  source of  d i s a r r a y  and lack  o f  
c l a r i t y  in e x t e r n a l i t y  l i t e r a t u r e  was th e  f a i l u r e  o f  w r i t e r s  to  recog­
n ize  t h a t :
. . . t h e r e  a r e  two e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  d e f i n i t i o n s  
o f  ex te rn a l  economies, one much wider than  the  
o t h e r ;  and t h a t  e x te rn a l  economies as de f ined  in 
the  theo ry  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n s  inc lude  but  go 
f a r  beyond, t h e  e x te rn a l  economies o f  equ i l ib r iu m  
theory .  “
He explained  t h a t  in both u sages ,  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  were i n v e s t ig a t e d  in 
th e  con tex t  o f  t h e i r  e f f e c t  on the  eq u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t i o n s  o f  p e r f e c t  
compet i t ion .  In the  narrow d e f i n i t i o n - - e q u i l i b r i u m  th e o ry —e x t e r ­
n a l i t i e s  take  the  form o f  in te rdependenc ies  which do not  opera te  
through the  market mechanism. Because th ese  in te rdependenc ies  a re
b e n e f i t  and t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  p r e s c r i p t i o n  to  remedy the  problem was 
based on an asym etr ica l  c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  o f  t h e  p r iv a t e  and pub l ic  
market,  i .  e . , t h a t  th e  p r a c t i c a l ,  r ea l  workings o f  the  p r iv a t e  mar­
ke t  were compared with the  idea l  workings of  t h e  pub l ic  market .  See: 
David B. Johnson, "Meade, Bees, and E x t e r n a l i t i e s , "  Journal  o f  Law 
and Economics, XVI ( A p r i l ,  1973),  pp. 35-53.
^ S c i t o v s k y ,  op. c i t . , p. 143.
U Ibid .
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not  " p r i c e d , "  a d ivergence w i l l  e x i s t  between p r iv a t e  and so c ia l  ben­
e f i t s / c o s t s  and the  economy w i l l  f a i l  t o  reach a Pare to  optimum. In 
the  broader  a rea  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  th e o r y ,  the  na tu re  o f  investment 
goods evokes a d d i t io n a l  impediments t o  t h e  e s ta b l i sh m en t  o f  a Pareto  
optimum. Because investment  goods a re  (1) im p er fec t ly  d i v i s a b l e ,
(2) determined in  a dynamic framework r a t h e r  than  the  s t a t i c  framework 
o f  general  e q u i l ib r iu m ,  and (3) s u b je c t  t o  d i f f e r e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  c r i ­
t e r i a  on th e  na t io n a l  versus  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l , in terdependen-  
dencies  which were marketable  and, hence,  had no e f f e c t  on Pareto  
o p t im a l i ty  in general  e q u i l ib r iu m  theo ry  become fu l l -b low n  e x t e r ­
n a l i t i e s  in  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  theo ry .  In c l a s s i f y i n g  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  
found in th e  l i t e r a t u r e  i n to  th ese  two groups,  Sci tovsky placed t e c h ­
nolog ica l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  i n to  the  eq u i l ib r iu m  theo ry  group and pecuniary  
e x t e r n a l i t i e s  i n to  the  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  theory  group.
This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme, though, as demonstrated in  E. J .
Mishan's c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s , 12 and conceded by Sc i tovsky ,  d id  not  
prove to  be meaningful.  For th e  major innovat ion  o f  the  a r t i c l e ,  
i .  e . , a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  pecuniary  economies with i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  
th eo ry ,  was not new but  "seem{s} to  f a l l  r e a d i l y  i n to  a l ready  
f a m i l i a r  c a t e g o r i e s , "13 Yet,  d e s p i t e  t h i s  f a i l u r e  to  achieve h is
l^E. J .  Mishan, "R e f le c t io n s  on Recent Developments in  th e  Concept 
o f  External E f f e c t s , "  Canadian Journal  o f  Economics and P o l i t i c a l  
S c ience , XXI (February,  1965), pp. 3-34.
13i b f d . , p. 12.
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major g o a l ,  Sci tovsky d id  make a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t i o n  by d i s t i n ­
gu ish ing  between e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  per  s e ,  and Pare to  r e l e v a n t  e x t e r ­
n a l i t i e s .
In t h e i r  seminal paper  e s t a b l i s h i n g  meaningful o p e ra t io n a l  de­
f i n i t i o n s  f o r  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  James Buchanan and Craig S u b b le b in e ^  
e l a b o ra ted  on th e  concept  o f  Pareto  r e l e v a n t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  by d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i n g  between marginal and in framarg ina l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and between 
p o t e n t i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  and p o t e n t i a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  To 
e x p l i c a t e  th e se  terms,  Buchanan and Stubblebine  cons ide red  a s o c ie ty  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  two pe rso n s ,  A and B, who owned ad jo in in g  r e s id en ces .  
Both A and B had d i f f e r e n t  value  fu n c t io n s  f o r  t h e i r  p r ivacy  which 
was expressed in  terms o f  the  h e ig h t  o f  a fence which only  B could 
b u i ld .  For ind iv idua l  B, i t  was assumed t h a t  u t i l i t y  in c re a se s  with 
th e  he igh t  o f  th e  fence up to  some reasonab le  l i m i t .  Due to  h is  c i r ­
cumstances,  however, A had a more complicated p a t t e r n .  This u t i l i t y  
p a t t e r n  c o n s is ted  of :
(1) Range 1: As B i n i t i a l l y  in c re a se s  the  he ig h t  o f  the  fen ce ,  
A's u t i l i t y  i s  inc reased  u n t i l  th e  fence reaches  a minimum he igh t  
which s a t i a t e s  A's  d e s i r e  f o r  p r ivacy .
(2) Range 2: A's  d e s i r e  f o r  p r ivacy  i s  f u l l y  s a t i a t e d  so t h a t  
an i n c re a se  in the  h e ig h t  o f  the  fence has no e f f e c t  on h is  u t i l i t y .
^ Jam es  M. Buchanan and William Craig S tubb leb ine ,  " E x t e r n a l i t y , "  
Economica, XXIX (November, 1962), pp. 371-384.
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(3) Range 3: As B cont inues  to  b u i ld  the  fence h igher  and 
h ig h e r ,  A's  view o f  a mountain i s  o b s t ru c te d  so t h a t  each a d d i t io n a l  
in c rea se  in  he igh t  decreases  A's u t i l i t y .
(4) Range 4: The fence i s  so high t h a t  A's  view o f  th e  moun­
t a i n  i s  complete ly o b l i t e r a t e d .  The re fo re ,  any a d d i t io n a l  in c re a se  
in he igh t  does not  a f f e c t  A's u t i l i t y .
In the  formal development o f  the  paper ,  an e x t e r n a l i t y  was sa id  
to  e x i s t  when an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  (A 's )  u t i l i t y  fu nc t ion  depended on h is  
own a c t i v i t i e s ,  (x^, Xg, . . . xn ) ,  p lus  th e  a c t i v i t y ,  y ^ ,  o f  ano ther  
i n d i v i d u a l ,  B. Given t h a t  A faces  the  u t i l i t y  func t ion  (x^,
X2» . . . xn , y ^ ) ,  A's  u t i l i t y  i s  c o n t in g e n t  on the  e x t e r n a l i t y  ex­
e r t e d  by B. By a l lowing small u ' s  to  r e p re s e n t  p a r t i a l  d e r iv a t iv e s  
o f  u t i l i t y  f u n c t io n s ,  a marginal e x t e r n a l i t y  i s  imposed on A by B i f  
Vy^ f  0.  Moreover, i f  p ^  > 0, the  marginal e x t e r n a l i t y  i s  an economy, 
i f  p ^ < 0 ,  the  marginal e x t e r n a l i t y  i s  a diseconomy.
In c o n t r a s t i n g  marginal e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and in framarg ina l  e x t e r ­
n a l i t i e s ,  i t  can be s a id  i f  = 0,  no marginal e x t e r n a l i t y  e x i s t s .
Yi
Y i  AI f ,  a t  the  same t im e ,  j-1 uv, dy f  0 so t h a t  B's  t o t a l  a c t i v i t y  a f f e c t s
0 Y1 AA's  u t i l i t y ,  an in fram arg ina l  e x t e r n a l i t y  e x i s t s .  I f  /  uO > 0 ,  B
Y o T1
e x e r t s  an economy on A; i f  /  ub < 0,  B e x e r t s  a diseconomy on A.
o T1
I f  an e x t e r n a l i t y  ( e i t h e r  marginal or  in f ram arg in a l )  e x i s t s ,  i t  
may be p o t e n t i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  o r  i r r e l e v a n t  depending on whether  i t  
". . . gene ra te s  any d e s i r e  on the  p a r t  o f  the  e x t e r n a l l y  b en e f i t e d  
(damaged) p a r ty  (A) to  modify the  behavior  o f  the  p a r ty  empowered to  
take  a c t io n  (B) through t r a d e ,  p e r su as io n ,  compromise, agreement,
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convent ion ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  e t c . " 15 Furthermore,  the  e x t e r n a l i t y  
i s  Pare to  r e l e v a n t  i f  . . the  e x t e n t  o f  th e  a c t i v i t y  may be modified 
in  such a way t h a t  the  e x t e r n a l l y  a f f e c t e d  p a r t y ,  A, can be made b e t t e r  
o f f  without  th e  a c t in g  p a r t y ,  B, being made worse o f f . " 15
In r e l a t i n g  th e se  terms to  the  fou r  ranges  o f  A's  u t i l i t y  p r e ­
sented  above,  i t  i s  seen t h a t :
(1) A marginal ex te rn a l  economy e x i s t s  in Range 1;
(2) A marginal ex te rn a l  diseconomy e x i s t s  in Range 3;
(3) An in framarg ina l  economy e x i s t s  in Range 2;
(4) An in fram arg ina l  economy o r  diseconomy may e x i s t  in Range 4 
depending on th e  r a t i o  between the  u t i l i t y  o f  p r ivacy  and the  d i s u t i l ­
i t y  o f  an o b s t ru c te d  view;
(5) A p o t e n t i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  marginal ex te rn a l  economy e x i s t s  in 
Range 1;
(6) A p o t e n t i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  marginal ex te rn a l  diseconomy e x i s t s  
in Range 3;
(7) P a r e to - r e l e v a n t  and i r r e l e v a n t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a re  determined 
by the  e x t e n t  o f  B's performance. I f  th e  n e t  marginal r a t e  o f  s u b s t i ­
t u t i o n  between th e  a c t i v i t y  ( fence  bu i ld ing )  and a numeraire a c t i v i t y  
f o r  B i s  not  equal to  th e  marginal r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between the  
a c t i v i t y  and a numeraire  a c t i v i t y  f o r  A, a P a r e to - r e l e v a n t  e x t e r n a l i t y  
e x i s t s .  This e x t e r n a l i t y ,  o f  co u rse ,  may be marginal o r  in f ram arg ina l .
15I b i d . , pp. 373-374.
16I b i d . , p. 374.
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P r e s c r ip t io n s  f o r  the  E f fe c t s  o f  E x t e r n a l i t i e s
The r eco g n i t io n  t h a t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  could preven t  a Pareto  e q u i ­
l ib r iu m  from being e s t a b l i s h e d  led  to  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  in to  the  
a t te n d in g  problem o f  how b es t  to  cope with and overcome the  e f f e c t s  
o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  While a consensus as to  th e  b e s t  s o lu t io n  to  t h i s  
problem does not e x i s t ,  the  range of  c o n f l i c t i n g  opinion inc ludes  only 
two bas ic  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  On th e  one hand, i t  i s  held t h a t  a so lu t io n  
must be determined o u t s id e  o f  the  e x t e r n a l i t y - a f f e c t e d  market and,
on the  o t h e r ,  t h a t  a s o lu t io n  must be determined w i th in  the  e x t e r ­
nal i t y - a f f e c t e d  market .
One o f  the  e a r l i e s t  p a r t i c i p a t e s  in the  co n t ro v e rsy ,  and th e  p e r ­
son whose name i s  most c lo s e ly  a s so c ia t e d  with the  advocacy of  an 
ex t ra -m arke t  s o lu t io n  to  the  e x t e r n a l i t y  problem i s  A. C. Pigou. 
Relying on the  government to  provide the  requ i red  remedy, Pigou 
s t a t e d :
I t  fo llows t h a t ,  under co n d i t io n s  o f  simple com­
p e t i t i o n ,  f o r  every in d u s t ry  in which the  value  
o f  marginal s o c ia l  n e t  product  i s  g r e a t e r  than 
t h a t  o f  the  marginal p r iv a t e  ne t  p roduc t ,  t h e r e  
w i l l  be c e r t a i n  r a t e s  o f  bounty, the  g ran t ing  
o f  which by th e  S ta te  would modify ou tpu t  in
such a way as t o  make the  value o f  the  marginal
s o c ia l  n e t  product  then more n ea r ly  equal to  the  
value o f  the  marginal soc ia l  n e t  product  o f  r e ­
sources in general  . . .  In l i k e  manner, f o r  
every in d u s t ry  in which the  value o f  the  mar­
g ina l  so c ia l  n e t  product  i s  l e s s  than  t h a t  o f  
the  marginal p r i v a t e  n e t  p roduc t ,  t h e r e  w i l l  
be c e r t a i n  r a t e s  o f  t a x ,  the  imposi t ion  o f  
which by the  S t a t e  would in c rea se  economic 
w e lfa re  . . .17
17a . C. Pigou, The Economics o f  Welfare (4 th .  e d . ;  London: 
MacMillan and Company, Limited, 1952).
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Simply p u t ,  P igou 's  scheme c a l l e d  f o r  a per  u n i t  subsidy equal to  the  
e x t e r n a l i ty - c a u s e d  d i f f e r e n c e  between marginal b e n e f i t s  and marginal 
c o s t s  to  induce a f i rm  to  expand i t s  ou tpu t  to  the  w e l fa re  maximizing 
l e v e l . I f  the  e x t e r n a l i t y  were nega t ive  r a t h e r  than  p o s i t i v e ,  a per  
u n i t  tax  equal to  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between marginal b e n e f i t s  and co s ts  
would be l ev ied  to  reduce ou tpu t  to  the  w e l fa re  maximizing l e v e l . ^  
Responding to  t h i s  governmental t ax - su b s id y  plan to  achieve a 
Pare to  optimum, R. H. Coase provided an a n a l y s i s ^  which i l lu m in a ted  
a c r i t i c a l  a n a l y t i c a l  o v e r s i g h t ;  namely, t h a t  the  problem was not  
u n id i r e c t io n a l  b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  was r e c ip ro c a l  in n a tu r e .  Using th e  p ro­
duc t ion  c o n f l i c t  between c a t t l e  r a i s i n g  and crop growing on a d jacen t  
land as an example, Coase po in ted  ou t  t h a t  i f  c a t t l e  were allowed to  
roam f r e e  they would undoubtedly trample  some crops  and cause harm to  
the  farmer . But i f  th e  government were to  s tep  in and fo rc e  the  c a t ­
t l e  r a i s e r  to  pay f o r  th e  damaged c rops ,  such an a c t io n  would be harm-
*% or  a d i sc u s s io n  o f  consequences a s so c ia t e d  uncorrec ted  d i s ­
t o r t i o n s  e x i s t i n g  elsewhere in the  economy, see G. C. Archibald and 
Calvin Wright,  " A l t e rn a t iv e  So lu t ions  f o r  the  Control o f  Production 
E x t e r n a l i t y  in a General Equi l ibr ium Model," Economica, XLIII (Nov­
ember, 1976), pp. 391-403.
^ R e c e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  have provided a d d i t io n a l  i n s i g h t  in to  
the  types  o f  tax - su b s id y  programs t h a t  would provide e f f i c i e n c t  s o l ­
u t io n s .  See, f o r  example, S a l ly  Holterman, "A l te rn a t iv e  Tax Systems 
to  Correc t  f o r  E x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  and the  E f f ic ien cy  o f  Paying Compensa­
t i o n , "  Economica, XLIII (February ,  1976), pp. 1-16, and L e s l i e  Young, 
"A l te rn a t iv e  Tax Systems to  Correc t  f o r  E x t e r n a l i t i e s  and the  Tech­
n ica l  Options o f  Firms."  Economica, XLIV (November, 1977), pp. 415-420.
20r . h . Coase, "The Problem o f  Social  Cost ,"  The Journal  o f  Law 
and Economics, I I I  (October ,  I960) ,  pp. 1-44.
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fu l  to  him and cause c a t t l e  product ion  to  d e c l i n e . 2 1  Whether s o c ie ty  
would be b e t t e r  o r  worse o f f  would depend on the  r e l a t i v e  value of  
crop lo s s  versus  c a t t l e  l o s s .  In Coase 's  framework, assuming no 
decis ion-making c o s t s ,  t h i s  problem would be solved e f f i c i e n t l y  
through barga in ing  between th e  farmer  and the  rancher .
In th e  event  t h a t  d ec is ion  making c o s t s  e x i s t ,  Coase recognized 
t h a t  the  conc lus ion  o f  h i s  a n a ly s i s  could change,  i .  e . , t h a t  b a r ­
ga in ing  between the  s u p p l i e r  and r e c i p i e n t  o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  may not 
r e s u l t  in a Pare to  optimum a l l o c a t i o n  of  resources  and t h a t  some 
o th e r  approach would be needed .22 i n t h i s  c a se ,  t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
e x i s t :  (1) the  e x t e r n a l i t y  a f f e c t e d  and a f f e c t i n g  e n t i t i e s  could
be organized in to  a s in g l e  f i rm  and ou tpu t  d e c i s io n s  would be made 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  r a t h e r  than through the  p r i c e  system; (2) the  gov­
ernment could s tep  in  and r e g u la t e  ou tp u t ;  o r  (3) nothing could be
2lThis  process  would involve  the  assignment  of  p roper ty  r i g h t s  on 
the  e s ta b l i sh m e n t  o f  l i a b i l i t y  r u l e s .  For a d i scu s s io n  o f  th ese  i s ­
su es ,  see ;  P e te r  H. Greenwook and Charles  A. Ingene, "Uncertain Ex te r ­
n a l i t i e s ,  L i a b i l i t y  Rules ,  and Resource A l lo c a t io n , "  The American 
Economic Review, LX (June ,  1978) pp. 300-310; Daniel W. Bromely, 
“Proper ty  Rules ,  L i a b i l i t y  Rules ,  and Environmental Economics,"
Journal  o f  Economic I s s u e s , XII (March, 1978),  pp. 43-60;  and H. E. 
Freeh, I I I ,  “The extended Coase Theorem and Long-Run Equil ibr ium: The
Non-equivalence o f  L i a b i l i t y  Rules and Proper ty  R iq h ts ,"  Economic 
I n q u i r y , XVII ( A p r i l ,  1979), pp. 254-268.
^ A r t i c l e s  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  th e  problem o f  optimum a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e ­
sources  when p o s i t i v e  barga in ing  co s t s  e x i s t  inc lude :  Richard 0.
Zerbe, "Theore t ica l  E f f i c i e n c y  in P o l lu t io n  C o n t ro l , "  Western Economic 
J o u r n a l , VIII (December, 1970), pp. 364-376; D. C. Shoup, "Theore t ica l  
E f f ic ien cy  in P o l lu t io n  Contro l :  Comment," Western Economic J o u r n a l ,
XI (September, 1973), pp. 260-269; George Daly, “The Coase Theorem: 
Assumptions, A p p l i c a t io n s ,  and A m bigui t ies ,"  Economic I n q u i r y , XII 
(June,  1974), pp. 203-213; and Hirofumi Sh iba ta ,  “Pare to  O pt im a l i ty ,  
Trade,  and The Pigovian Tax," Economica, XXXIX (May, 1972), pp. 190-202.
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done about  the  problem. Each o f  th e se  a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i l l ,  in  t u r n ,
involve  c e r t a i n  c o s t s  and i t  should be recognized t h a t :
. . .  in  choosing between so c ia l  arrangements  w i th in  
th e  c o n te x t  o f  which ind iv idua l  d ec i s io n s  a r e  made, 
we have t o  bea r  in  mind t h a t  a change in th e  e x i s t i n g  
system which w i l l  lead  to  an improvement in some de­
c i s i o n s  may well lead  to  a worsening o f  o th e r s .
Fur thermore,  we have to  take  i n to  account the  co s t s  
involved in  o p e ra t in g  the  var ious  s o c ia l  a r r a n g e ­
ments (whether  i t  be th e  working o f  a market o r  of  
a government depar tm en t ) ,  as well  as the  c o s t s  i n ­
volved in  moving to  a new system. In dev is ing  and 
choosing between so c ia l  arrangements we should have 
regard  f o r  th e  t o t a l  e f f e c t .  T h is ,  above a l l .  i s  
th e  change in  approach which I am a d v o ca t in g .23
I t  i s  on t h i s  ground t h a t  Coase c r i t i c i z e s  P igou 's  con ten t ion  t h a t ,  a
p r i o r i , th e  governmental s e c t o r  should be r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  e x t e r ­
n a l i t y  problem. He s t a t e s :
I t  i s  my b e l i e f  t h a t  economists ,  and policy-makers  
g e n e r a l l y ,  have tended to  o v e r -e s t im a te  th e  advan­
tages  which come from governmental r e g u la t io n .  But 
t h i s  b e l i e f ,  even i f  j u s t i f i e d ,  does not  do more 
than sugges t  t h a t  government r e g u la t io n  should be 
c u r t a i l e d .  I t  does not  t e l l  us where th e  boundary 
l i n e  should be drawn. Th is ,  i t  seems to  me, has 
to  come from a d e t a i l e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  th e  ac tua l
r e s u l t s  o f  handl ing  th e  problem in d i f f e r e n t  ways.
But i t  would be u n fo r tu n a te  i f  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
were undertaken with t h e  a id  o f  a f a u l t y  economic 
a n a l y s i s .  The aim o f  t h i s  a r t i c l e  i s  to  i n d i c a t e  
what the  economic approach to  the  problem should
be. 24
The a t t a c k  on a p r i o r i  acceptance  o f  governmental ta x - su b s id y  
s o lu t io n  to  th e  e x t e r n a l i t y  problem was cont inued by Otto Davis and 
Andrew Whinstonin an a r t i c l e  in  which: "We a t tem pt  to  e s t a b l i s h  both
23coase, op. c i t . , p. 44. 
24I b i d . ,  pp. 18-19.
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the  co n d i t io n s  under which t h i s  c l a s s i c a l  p o l i cy  p r e s c r i p t i o n  might 
work and i s  needed, and those  under which i t  cannot be expected to  
work ."25 D i rec t in g  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  James Meade's 
r e s ta tem en t  o f  P igou 's  p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  Davis and Whinston 's  argument 
can gen e ra l ly  be d iv ided  in to  th r e e  p a r t s .  In the  f i r s t  p a r t ,  i t  
was demonstrated t h a t  when e x t e r n a l i t i e s  e x i s t ,  market fo rces  encour­
age s u f f i c i e n t  mergers t o  take  p lace  to  e s t a b l i s h  a "na tu ra l  u n i t "  
f o r  d ec i s io n  making. As in the  case  o f  Coase 's  i n t e g r a te d  f i rm ,  the 
n a tu ra l  u n i t  would i n t e r n a l i z e  the  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and provide f o r  an 
optimum a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e sou rces .
The second p a r t  o f  the  argument d e a l t  with th e  circumstances  under 
which government taxes  o r  su b s id ie s  could provide f o r  an optimum a l l o ­
c a t io n  o f  r e so u rces .  I t  was demonstrated t h a t  when e x t e r n a l i t i e s  were 
s e p a ra b le ,  t h a t  i s ,  capab le  o f  being expressed as a d d i t i v e  func t ions  
r a t h e r  than m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  ones ,  governmental in t e rv e n t io n  cou ld ,  on 
a conceptual  b a s is  a t  l e a s t ,  provide f o r  an optimum resource  a l l o c a ­
t i o n .  The ac tua l  implementation o f  such a program, however, would be 
extremely d i f f i c u l t .  In th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  the  government would have 
to  o b ta in  s u f f i c i e n t  da ta  to  so lve  the  r equ i red  s imultaneous equat ions  
f o r  the  de te rm ina t ion  o f  s p e c i f i c  taxes  o f  s u b s id i e s .  Secondly, each 
time the  technology o f  the  involved f irms changed, the  government 
would have to  r e c a l c u l a t e  taxes  and s u b s id ie s .
250 t t o  Davis and Andrew Whinston, " E x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  Welfare,  and 
the  Theory o f  Games," Journal o f  P O l i t i c a l  Economy, LXX (June,  1962), 
p. 241-262.
30
F i n a l l y ,  the  argument was advanced t h a t  i f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  were not 
s e p a ra b le ,  the  governmental s e c to r  would f in d  i t  impossible  to  d e t e r ­
mine a ta x  o r  subsidy which would provide  f o r  welfa re  maximization.  In 
the  nonseparable  case ,  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a f f e c t  marginal c o s t  and d isa l low  
the  w e lfa re  maximizing level  o f  product ion to  be unambigously d e t e r ­
mined. Firms would a d j u s t  ou tpu t  to  maximize p r o f i t  based on t h e i r  ex­
p e c ta t io n s  o f  the  e x t e r n a l i t y  producing f i r m ' s  leve l  o f  p roduct ion .
Since th e r e  i s  no a p r i o r i way o f  determining the  p r e c i s e  amount of
e x t e r n a l i t i e s  which would e x i s t ,  t h e r e  i s  no a p r i o r i  way to  determine
26the  w e lfa re  maximizing leve l  o f  ou tpu t .  As t h i s  r e l a t e d  to  govern­
ment i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  " . . .  even assuming t h a t  the  governmental p o l i c y ­
maker knows the  r e l e v a n t  c o s t  func t ions  and d e s i r e s  to  maximize w e l f a re ,  
th e r e  seems to  be no dominant s o lu t io n  to  aim a t . "27 In the  nonsepar­
ab le  c a se ,  then ,  any governmental a c t io n  would no t  be based on know­
ledge o f  the  w e lfa re  maximizing leve l  o f  ou tpu t  but on a suppos i t ion  
as to  the  l e v e l .  Under th e se  c i rcum stances ,  i t  i s  h ighly  q u es t io n ab le  
t h a t  governmental taxes  o r  su b s id ie s  would r e s u l t  in an in c rease  in 
w e l fa re .
Lest  t h i s  d i scu s s io n  lead  to  the  f a u l t y  conclus ion  t h a t  t a x - su b ­
s id y  proponents  c a p i t u l a t e d  and r e t i r e d  from the  co n t ro v e rsy ,  i t  i s  
necessary  to  in t roduce  a work which con ta ins  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  counter  
arguments to  advocates  o f  e f f e c t i n g  a s o lu t io n  to  the  e x t e r n a l i t y
2fiS tan is law  Well isz  has argued t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  determine 
the  amount o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  i s  h is  "On External  Diseconomies,"
Economica, XXXI (November, 1964), pp. 345-362.
^ D a v i s  and Whinston, op. c i t . ,  p. 256.
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problem through th e  market p lace .  The a r t i c l e ,  authored by Stan is law  
W e l l i s z ,23 acquiesced to  the  argument t h a t  a government-determined 
s o lu t io n  would be d i f f i c u l t  to  d e v i s e ,  but  demonstrated t h a t  even in 
Davis and Whinston 's  case  o f  nonseparable  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  such a s o lu ­
t i o n  was p o s s ib le  and t h a t  a good s o lu t io n  involved no more in h e ren t  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  than could be expected in  a market-determined s o lu t io n .
In f a c t ,  Well isz  contended t h a t  the  " . . .  co n d i t io n s  under which the  
modern-old (market) s o lu t io n  i s  v a l id  leads  to  th e  conclus ion  t h a t  f a r  
from being a u n ive rsa l  panacea,  the  p r iv a t e  bargain  s o lu t io n  to  e x t e r ­
nal diseconomies a p p l i e s  only to  excep t ional  c a s e s ."29 Since the  b a r ­
ga in ing  s o lu t io n  i s  l im i t e d  in  a p p l i c a t io n ,  i t  i s  necessary  to  under­
s tand  t h a t  " . . .  whether  we l i k e  i t  o f  n o t ,  we must t r y  to  des ign a 
workable Pigovian system o f  taxes  o r  s u b s i d i e s ,  o r  we must l i v e  with 
the  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  in our  non-optimum w o r ld ." 30
Continuing in t h i s  v e in ,  James Buchanan3! has suggested a taxonomy 
f o r  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  which systematized  the  co n d i t io n s  under which volun­
t a r y  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and government p a r t i c i p a t i o n  could be expected to  
move the  econon\y toward an e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e so u rces .  In 
Buchanan's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme, the  one apparen t  c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  
was the  number o f  e x t e r n a l i t y - a f f e c t e d  i n d iv id u a l s .  The a n a ly s i s
^ W e l l i s z ,  op. c i t . , p. 354.
29Ib id .
30 I b i d . , p. 361.
3!james M. Buchanan, "The I n s tu t io n a l  S t ru c tu r e  o f  E x t e r n a l i t y , "  
Publ ic  Choice, XIV (Spr ing ,  1973), pp. 69-82.
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concluded t h a t  r e g a rd l e s s  o f  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p rope r ty  r i g h t s  be­
tween producers and r e c i p i e n t s  o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  i f  a la rg e  number o f  
i n d iv id u a l s  a re  b e n e f i t e d  (v ic t im ized )  by the  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  the  f r e e  
r i d e r  problem w il l  work to  p reven t  resources  from being e f f i c i e n t l y  
a l l o c a t e d  through p r i v a t e  ba rga in ing .  In t h i s  c a s e ,  an "agent" could 
n e g o t i a t e  s e t t l e m e n ts  which would be binding on a l l  consumers and e f ­
f i c i e n c y  would be ob ta ined .  In t h i s  p ro cess ,  Buchanan concluded t h a t  
th e  agen t  could be not  be assumed to  be a n eu t ra l  o r  im p ar t ia l  p a r t i c i ­
pan t .  Rather ,  th e  agent  was viewed as an advocate f o r  th e  consumer 
and, in  th e  barga in ing  process,  could n e g o t i a t e  f o r  more o r  l e s s
e x t e r n a l i t i e s . 32
Fiscal  Federal ism
The major issues associated with f is c a l  federalism are discussed 
in companion a r t ic le s  appearing in a conference report o f  the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.33 The f i r s t  a r t ic le ,  prepared by Charles 
Tiebout,34 developed a model for a fed era liS tic  structure based on
32pewight Lee has provided a d i scu s s io n  which demonstrated t h a t  i f  
exc lus ion  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  d i s c r im in a to ry  p r i c in g  can r e s u l t  in consump­
t i o n  e f f i c i e n c y  fo r  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  See, Dewight R. Lee, "Discr imina­
t i o n  and E f f ic ien cy  in  the  P r ic in g  o f  Public  Goods," The Journal o f  
Law and Economics, XX (October,  1977), pp. 403-420.
33National Bureau o f  Economic Research, Publ ic  Finances:  Needs, 
Sources,  and U t i l i z a t i o n  (P r in c e to n ,  New Je rs e y :  Pr ince ton  Univer-
s i t y  P re s s ,  1961).
34charles Tiebout, "An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentraliza­
tion ,"  Public  Finances: Needs, Sources, and Uti l iz a t io n  (Princeton
U nitersity  Press, l $ 6 l ) ,  pp. 7^-96.
33
economic e f f i c i e n c y  in the  product ion  o f  pu b l ic  goods. Of c h i e f  con­
cern to  Tiebout  were t h r e e  nonmutually ex c lu s iv e  problems a s so c ia t e d  
with pub l ic  goods. These included b e n e f i t s  accru ing  eq u a l ly  to  a l l  
i n d iv id u a l s  w i th in  a r e g io n ,  such as those  provided by n a t iona l  de­
f en se ;  b e n e f i t s  which diminish  with in c rea se s  in d i s t a n c e  from the  
source o f  p roduc t ion ,  such as the  b e n e f i t s  o f  f i r e  p r o t e c t io n ;  and 
r e c ip ro ca l  and n o n- rec ip roca l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  such as mosquito sp ray ­
ing by one community which may o r  may not a l so  be provided by a 
neighboring community. Addressing the  f i r s t  two problems t o g e th e r ,  
Tiebout  concluded t h a t  the  most e f f i c i e n t  ( l e a s t  average c o s t )  s i z e  
o f  popu la t ion  f o r  the  p ro v is io n s  o f  pub l ic  goods w i l l  not be uniform 
s in ce  a l l  pu b l ic  goods do not genera te  the  same p a t t e r n  o f  b e n e f i t s  
over  given popula t ion  ranges .  As a r e s u l t ,  i t  w i l l  be necessary  to  
have several  l a y e r s  o f  government,  with fu n c t io n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
ass igned  to  each in accordance with the  c o s t  co n d i t io n s  a s so c ia t e d  
with the  pu b l ic  goods to  be supp l ied .  Hence, a fed e ra l i sm  would be 
an a p p ro p r ia t e  governmental form to  provide an e f f i c i e n t  s o lu t io n  to 
the  f i r s t  two problems. In a l i k e  manner, a f e d e r a l i S t i c  s t r u c t u r e  
could a l so  be r e l i e d  upon to  provide an e f f i c i e n t  s o lu t i o n  to  the  ex­
t e r n a l i t y  problem. When one lower leve l  o f  government genera ted  uncom­
pensated f o r  s p i l l o u t s  to  an o th e r ,  Tiebouts  contended t h a t  "one o f  the  
major fu n c t io n s  o f  a h ig h e r  leve l  o f  government,  under f i s c a l  f e d e r a l ­
ism, i s  to  a r b i t r a t e  such s p i l l o v e r s . 35 By so do ing ,  pub l ic  goods pro-
35I b i d . , p. 95.
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duct ion  would be c a r r i e d  to  the  p o in t  where the  summed marginal bene­
f i t s  equaled marginal c o s t .
In a d d i t io n  to  prov id ing  s o lu t io n s  to  th e  supply s id e  o f  th e  p ro­
blems a s s o c i a t e d  with pub l ic  goods, a f e d e ra l i s m  was a l so  advocated on 
the  b a s is  o f  i t s  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t s  on demand-re la ted  problems. Given 
th e  h e te ro g e n e i ty  o f  a t t i t u d e s  and t a s t e s  in  a s o c i e t y ,  i t  would be im­
p o s s ib le  t o  design a unique mix of  p u b l ic  goods which would provide  as 
much t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  as  th e  summed b e n e f i t s  from var ious  combinations  
o f  pu b l ic  goods which have been t a i l o r e d  to  the  d e s i r e s  o f  homogeneous 
groups o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  In a f e d e ra l i s m ,  an o rder ing  o f  loca l  govern­
ments could be arranged to  provide a wide v a r i e t y  o f  p u b l ic  good o f ­
f e r i n g s . ^ 6 Consumer-taxpayers could than choose th e  loca l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
which b e s t  s a t i s f i e d  t h e i r  p re fe rence  f o r  pub l ic  goods .3?
The second a r t i c l e ,  w r i t t e n  by Richard Musgrave, was:
. . . concerned with q u i t e  a d i f f e r e n t  approach, where 
th e  r o l e  o f  the  c e n t r a l  f i s c  i s  not  l im i te d  to  cons id ­
e r a t i o n  o f  e f f i c i e n c y ,  but s e t  by the  very o b je c t iv e s  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  f ed e ra l i sm .  When independent  s t a t e s  j o i n  
in a f e d e r a t i o n ,  they may do so t o  develop a common
36For a more exhaus t ive  d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  p o i n t ,  see :  Charles
T iebou t ,  "A Pure Theory o f  Local E xpend i tu res ,"  Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
Economy, LXIV (October,  1956), pp. 416-424.
37Fur the r  t h e o r e t i c a l  and emperical a n a ly s i s  o f  T ie b o u t ' s  work 
which confirm h i s  conc lus ions  inc lude :  Donald K. R ic h te r ,  "Exis tance
and Computation o f  a Tiebout General Equi1ibriurn," Econometrica , XLVI 
( J u ly ,  1978), pp. 779-805; Myrna Wooders, " E q u i l i b r i a ,  th e  Core, and 
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l  S t ru c tu r e s  in Economies with  a Local Public  Good," 
Journal  o f  Economic Theory, XVIII (August,  1978), pp. 328-348; and 
Richard J .  Cebula, 11 An Empirical Note on the  T iebout-Tul lock  Hypo­
t h e s i s , "  Q uar te r ly  Journal  o f  Economics, XLII (November, 1978), 
pp. 705-711.
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fo re ig n  de fen se ,  o r  e s t a b l i s h  a customs union,  o r  
they may wish to  pursue c e r t a i n  o b j e c t iv e s  which 
r e q u i re  c e n t r a l  government i n t e r f e r e n c e  in the  
f inances  o f  th e  member s t a t e .  8
Keying h i s  comments t o  th e  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  c e n t r a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in the  
f in a n c i a l  m a t te rs  o f  subord ina te  governments,  Musgrave i d e n t i f i e d  two 
reasons f o r  such i n t e r f e r e n c e .  The f i r s t  was to  br ing  about e q u a l i z a ­
t i o n  among subord ina te  u n i t s  o f  government and,  the  second was to  i n ­
duce the  subord ina te  u n i t s  t o  i n c r ea se  t h e i r  l e v e l s  o f  s e rv ic e .
In th e  p lans  which were p resen ted  f o r  accomplishing th e se  purposes ,  
i t  was demonstrated t h a t  c e n t r a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e  would have both p o s i t i v e  
and neg a t iv e  i n f lu e n c e s .  Take, f o r  example, Musgrave's case  o f  e q u a l ­
iz in g  ac tua l  per  c a p i t a  d o l l a r  o u t la y s  on s t a t e  s e rv ic e s  in a l l  s t a t e s .  
To implement t h i s  o b j e c t i v e ,  the  c e n t r a l  government would have to  c a l ­
c u l a t e  th e  average o u t l a y  f o r  a l l  s t a t e s .  Those s t a t e s  with  ta x  y i e l d s  
g r e a t e r  than  the  n a t io n a l  average would be assessed  an amount equal to  
t h e i r  su rp lu s  and th e  money would be given to  s t a t e s  with  t ax  revenues 
l e s s  than th e  n a t io n a l  average.  The d i s i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  the  p lan ,  
however, a r e  obvious . S t a t e s  would be hard -p ressed  to  i n c r ea se  t h e i r  
l e v e l s  o f  t a x a t io n  knowing t h a t  a p a r t  o f  any in c rea se  would be l o s t  
through e i t h e r  a r educ t ion  in  t h e i r  subsidy o r  an i n c re a se  in  t h e i r  
assessment.  T he re fo re ,  i n s t e a d  o f  in c re a s in g  tax  e f f o r t s ,  s t a t e s  would 
a t tem pt  to  s h i f t  t h e i r  tax  burdens by reducing taxes  and r ec e iv in g  l a r ­
ge r  s u b s id ie s  from the  n a t iona l  government. Since a l l  e q u a l i z a t i o n  and
^ R i c h a r d  Musgrave, "Approaches to  A F isca l  Theory o f  P o l i t i c a l  
Federa l ism ,"  Publ ic  Finance:  Needs, Sources,  and U t i l i z a t i o n  (P r in c e ­
to n ,  New Je rsey !  Pr ince ton  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1961), p. 97.
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minimum s e rv ice  level  p lans  b e n e f i t  some j u r i s d i c t i o n s  while  imposing 
c o s t s  on o t h e r s ,  a Pare to  improvement could not  r e s u l t  from ce n t r a l  
i n t e r f e r e n c e .  For t h i s  r eason ,  the  f i n a l  choice  in  a l l  such plans 
would depend on the dual co n s id e ra t io n s  o f  " p o l i t i c a l  philosophy as 
well as economics.
To surranarize, Tiebout and Musgrave demonstrated t h a t  the  major 
i s su es  a s so c ia te d  with f i s c a l  f ed e ra l i sm  a re  both economic and p o l i t i ­
cal in n a tu re .  G enera l ly ,  th e se  i s su e s  seem to  f a l l  i n to  th e  fo l low ­
ing c a t e g o r i e s :  (1) economies and diseconomies o f  s c a l e ;  (2) s p i 11-
ou ts  o f  a r ec ip ro ca l  and nonrec iproca l  n a tu r e ;  (3) e q u a l i z a t i o n ;  and
(4) minimum s e rv ic e  l e v e l s  f o r  subna t iona l  u n i t s  o f  government.  Fur­
t h e r  developments i n v e s t i g a t i n g  s p e c i f i c  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f  th ese  gen­
e ra l  i s su e s  led  q u i t e  n a t u r a l l y  i n to  an a n a ly s i s  o f  the  economic im­
p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a fede ra l  governmental s t r u c t u r e .  In a d i scu ss io n  which 
a t tempted to  e s t a b l i s h  c r i t e r i a  f o r  the  d iv i s io n  o f  fu n c t io n a l  respon­
s i b i l i t i e s  among governmental u n i t s ,  Mancur Alson, J r .  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i ­
f i e d  the  degree to  which t h i s  s u b je c t  had been neg lec ted  when he wrote:
Though economic theo ry  provides  a good b a s is  f o r  
dec i s io n s  about which func t ions  ought to  be performed 
through f r e e  markets and which by c o l l e c t i v e  or  govern­
mental a c t i o n ,  i t  does not  t e l l  us what type o f  govern­
ment or  i n s t i t u t i o n  should perform those  a c t i v i t i e s  
t h a t  r eq u i re  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t io n .  I t  does no t  t e l l  us 
whether a func t ion  should be performed by a l o c a l ,  
s t a t e ,  o r  c e n t r a l  government, by an ad hoc a u t h o r i t y
39Ib id ., p. 113.
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or organization, by an international organization 
or by some other type o f  i n s t i t u t i o n .^
Attempting to  f i l l  th is  void, Olson based his analysis on the 
achievement o f "fiscal equivalence" or "a match between those who re­
ceive the benefits o f a c o l le c t iv e  good and those who pay for i t . "41 
In more familiar terminology the analysis was sim ilar to that of  
Tiebout42 in that i t  was concerned with the establishment o f Pareto 
optimality in the provision o f  public goods when various types of  
ex tern a lit ie s  e x is t .  The major conclusion o f  the work was that:
. . . both th e  " c e n t r a l i z in g "  and " d e c e n t r a l i z in g "  
id e a lo g ie s  a r e  wrong o r  a t  any event  e n t a i l  i n e f ­
f i c i e n c y .  Only i f  t h e r e  a r e  severa l  l e v e l s  o f  
government and a la rg e  number o f  governments can 
immense d i s p a r i t i e s  between th e  boundaries  o f  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s  an d . th e  boundaries  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
goods be avoided. 3
Beyond t h i s  general  co nc lus ion ,  Olson did no t  a t tem pt  to  i d e n t i f y  the
®Mancur Olson, J r . ,  "The P r in c i p l e  o f  'F i s c a l  Equ iva lence ' :  The
Divis ion  o f  R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  Among D i f f e r e n t  Levels o f  Government,"
The American Economic Review, LIX (May, 1969), p. 479-487.
41I b i d . , p. 483.
42Tiebout,  "Economic Theory of  F isca l  D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , "  op. c i t . , 
pp. 79-96.
4% ls o n ,  op. c i t . , p. 483.
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pu b l ic  goods which should be provided by each leve l  o f  government nor 
did he i n v e s t i g a t e  th e  reasons f o r  th e  e x i s t i n g  p a t t e r n  o f  fu nc t iona l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . ^
Approaching the  s u b je c t  o f  governmental form on a more a b s t r a c t  
l e v e l ,  Manfred Newman ques t ioned  whether an idea l  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  fo r
A C
a p o l i t i c a l  system. 3 S t a r t i n g  with  the  acceptance from economic 
theory  t h a t  p e r f e c t  competi t ion  would permit  the  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  a 
Pare to  optimum and t h a t  a pure democracy i s  the  p o l i t i c a l  eq u iv a len t  
to  p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n , ^  Newman developed a s t rong  argument advocat­
ing f ed e ra l i sm  as the  idea l  form o f  government.  His approach was to 
subdiv ide  pu b l ic  goods in to  two c a t e g o r i e s :  in d iv id u a l  goods and
m er i t  goods . ^  Ind iv idua l  goods a r e  those  which a re  produced in con-
^ S e lm a  J .  Mushkin and Robert F. Adams have provided an empirica l  
a n a ly s i s  o f  changes in func t iona l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  among governmental 
u n i t s  and reasons f o r  t h e se  changes in "Emerging Pat terms o f  F ed e ra l ­
ism," National Tax J o u r n a l , XIX (September, 1966), pp. 225-247. Also, 
Rex Honey and James Strathman have demonstrated t h a t ,  f o r  e f f i c i e n c y ,  
small j u r i s d i c t i o n s  have an advantage in d i s t r i b u t i n g  var ious  goods, 
but l a r g e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  have an advantage in  producing complementary 
goods. See: Rex Honey and James Strathman,  " J u r i s d i c t i o n a l  Conse­
quences o f  Optimizinq Publ ic  Goods," The Annals of  Reqional Science,  
XII ( J u ly ,  1978), pp. 32-40.
45Manfred Newman, "On the  Economic Theory o f  Federa l ism ,"  The 
German Economic Review, X (March, 1972), pp. 1-13.
^ F o r  an a n a ly s i s  o f  the  analogy between p e r f e c t  compet i t ion  and 
pure democracy, see :  B. S. Frey,  "Models o f  P e r f e c t  Competition and
Pure Democracy," Kyklos, XXIII (Fourth  Q u ar te r ,  1970), pp. 736-754.
4?Newman uses th e  term "meri t  good' '  in  a d i f f e r e n t  sense than i t s  
g e n e r a l ly  accepted usage;  namely, a good which provides  so c ia l  as well 
as p r iv a t e  b e n e f i t s .
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formity  with ind iv idua l  p re fe ren ces  whereas m er i t  goods a r e  produced in 
conformity with the  p re fe ren ces  o f  the  r u l i n g  group. For a soc ia l  good 
to  be c l a s s i f i e d  as i n d i v i d u a l ,  i t  i s  necessary  t h a t  i t  be approved by 
the  e l e c t o r a t e  unanimously, but a m e r i t  good only needs to  be approved 
by a m a jo r i ty .
In t h i s  framework, a Pare to  improvement in the  p rov is ion  o f  pub l ic  
goods could be achieved through a system o f  governmental u n i t s  which 
would permit  popu la t ion  groupings  s u f f i c i e n t l y  homogeneous to  t ransform  
m e r i t  goods i n to  in d iv id u a l  goods. Thus, goods with wide spread bene­
f i t s  and appea l ,  such as  an o r d e r ly  system o f  adm in is te r ing  j u s t i c e ,  
would be provided by th e  c e n t r a l  government. Then as b e n e f i t s  and ap­
peal of  p u b l ic  goods d im in ished ,  lower l e v e l s  o f  government with 
sm al le r  popu la t ions  would be e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  t h e i r  p ro v is io n .  In t h i s  
way, unanimity in the  p ro v is io n  o f  a l l  pub l ic  goods would e x i s t  and a 
Pareto  optimum p o s i t i o n  would r e s u l t . 48
Considering the  lack  of  homogeneity among the  popula t ion  in  a 
country  such as the  United S t a t e s ,  i t  appears  t h a t  s a t i s f y i n g  Newman's 
co n d i t io n s  f o r  an optimum federa l  governmental s t r u c t u r e  would r eq u i re  
m u l t ip le  l e v e l s  o f  government with numerous u n i t s  comprising each l e v e l .  
Under these  c i rcum stances ,  i t  would follow t h a t  the  r e l a t i v e  magnitude 
o f  economic a c t i v i t y  undertaken a t  the  na t io n a l  leve l  would be subs tan-
48A fed e ra l i sm  thus  formed, however, would not  provide a s o lu t io n  
to  a l l  o f  th e  problems surrounding pub l ic  goods. For example, the  ex­
t e r n a l i t y  and s c a l a r  economies problems, t o  mention only two, would 
s t i l l  remain to  cause i n e f f i c i e n c i e s .
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t i a l l y  l e s s  than t h a t  o f  lower l e v e l s  o f  government,  o th e r  th ings  
being equal .  F u r th e r ,  i t  appears  t h a t  over  a per iod  o f  t im e ,  i n ­
c reases  in  demand f o r  products  provided by lower l e v e l s  o f  government 
would be g r e a t e r  than f o r  those  provided by th e  n a t iona l  government. 
Thus, th e  growth r a t e  o f  th e  former should exceed t h a t  o f  th e  l a t t e r .  
This s u p p o s i t io n ,  however, has not been s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by the  United 
S t a t e s '  exper ience .  On the  c o n t r a ry ,  the  r a t e  o f  growth among gov­
ernmental u n i t s  has been more dramatic  a t  t h e  na t io n a l  leve l  than a t  
the  s t a t e  o r  loca l  l e v e l s .
The tendency f o r  economic func t ions  undertaken a t  the  c en t r a l  
leve l  t o  grow a t  a more rap id  r a t e  than those  a t  the  s t a t e - l o c a l  
leve l  has been th e  s u b je c t  o f  numerous s tu d i e s .  An e a r l y  t h e o r e ­
t i c a l  s tudy  by Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman49 demonstrated t h a t  
in c re a se s  in governmental a c t i v i t y  occur  in  response to  so c ia l  c r i s e s  
such as depress ions  o r  wars.  During the  per iod  o f  remedial a c t i o n ,  
the  e l e c t o r a t e  becomes accustomed to  the  h igher  leve l  of  a c t i v i t y ,  
so t h a t  a f t e r  the  problem has been solved  th e r e  i s  not  widespread 
demand f o r  th e  government t o  reduce i t s  r o l e .  The " c r i s e s "  expendi­
t u r e s  w i l l  then flow i n t o  o th e r  domestic so c ia l  o r  economic programs. 
As a f i n a l  s t e p ,  the  complexity and ex tens ive ness  o f  problems in a 
growing economy w i l l  n e c e s s i t a t e  remedial a c t i o n  a t  h igher  and h igher  
h i e r a r c h i a l  l e v e l s  o f  government; hence,  the  g r e a t e r  w i l l  be the  
growth r a t e  a t  the  h igher  l e v e l s .
49Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth o f  Public  Expendi­
t u r e  in The United Kingdom, (P r in c e to n ,  New Je rs e y :  Pr ince ton  Univer­
s i t y  P re s s ,  1961).
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Studies  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the  t re nd  toward c e n t r a l i z a ­
t i o n  in the  United S t a t e s  have i d e n t i f i e d  many c o n t r ib u t in g  f a c t o r s . 5^ 
Chief  among th ese  a r e  th e  g r e a t e r  f i s c a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  the  c e n t r a l  
government, the  a b i l i t y  o f  the  c e n t r a l  government t o  i n t e r n a l i z e  
e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  with expend i tu res  and taxes^ and the  a b i l i t y  
o f  the  c e n t r a l  government to  eq u a l iz e  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  wealth among 
lower l e v e l s  o f  government. Also, in a d i f f e r e n t  v e in ,  Kenneth V. 
Green5* in t roduced  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i v i t i e s  causing 
s t a t e  and loca l  governments to  a b d ic a te  to  th e  na t io n a l  government 
some o f  th e  fu n c t io n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  which they could perform more 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  Basing h is  p r e s e n ta t i o n  on th e  " i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n f r a ­
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a f e d e ra l i s m ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i t s  i n t e r s t a t e  income d i s t r i ­
but ion and i t s  ta x  i n s t i t u t i o n s . G r e e n  submitted two reasons f o r  
the  t r a n s f e r  o f  f in a n c in g  p a r t i c u l a r  goods to  th e  c e n t r a l  l e v e l .  The 
f i r s t  would be when a m a jo r i ty  exper iences  lower t a x - p r i c e s  per  u n i t  
o f  s e rv i c e  a t  the  c e n t r a l  l e v e l .  The second would be when a m a jo r i ty  
t h a t  i s  paying above average fede ra l  t a x e s ,  but  i s  u n s a t i s f i e d  with 
the  leve l  o f  s t a t e  p ro v is io n  o f  a good, forms a m a jo r i ty  c o a l i t i o n
50For a t re a tm e n t  o f  th ese  f a c t o r s  s e e ,  Bernard P. Heber, Modern 
Publ ic  Finance (4th e d . ;  Homewood, I l l i n o i s :  Richard E. I rwin,  I n c . ,
1979), Chapter 17; James A. Maxwell, Financing S t a t e  and Local Govern­
ments , (Washington, D. C.:  The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1965); and
George F. Break, Intergovernmental F isca l  R e la t ions  in the  United 
S t a t e s , (Washington, dT C . : The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1967')"
5 1 Kenneth V. Green, "Some I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Cons idera t ions  in Fed­
e r a l - S t a t e  F isca l  R e la t i o n s , "  Publ ic  Choice, IV ( F a l l ,  1970), pp. 1-18.
52I b i d . ,  p. 3.
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with a m inor i ty  t h a t  i s  paying below average fede ra l  t a x - p r i c e s  in o rder  
to  in c rease  th e  supply o f  the  good.
Grants-In-Aid
One o f  the  most importan t  means o f  ach iev ing  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  has 
been through the  use o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d .  These g r a n t s ,  by t h e i r  very 
n a tu r e ,  have a f f e c t e d  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  resources  in  the  country ,  and 
as a r e s u l t ,  have been th e  s u b je c t  o f  in t e n se  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  Among 
e a r l y  works dea l ing  with t h i s  problem was James M. Bushanan's "Fed­
e ra l i sm  and F isca l  E q u i ty . " 53 The t h r u s t  o f  the  paper was t h a t  in  a 
f ed e ra l i sm  such as  the  United S t a t e s ,  with resources  being unequal ly  
d i s t r i b u t e d  among ind iv idua l  s t a t e s ,  equals  in d i f f e r e n t  geographical 
a reas  would be t r e a t e d  unequal ly  by the  f ed e ra l  f i s c a l  system. To 
achieve an equal t re a tm e n t  o f  eq u a l s ,  Buchanan championed a system 
o f  i n t e r s t a t e  t r a n s f e r s  between r ic h  and poor s t a t e s  through the  devise  
o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d . 54 In h is  argument,  Buchanan noted t h a t  in response 
to  pure ly  economic f o r c e s ,  re sou rces  would tend to  flow from low mar­
g ina l  product  reg ions  with accompanying low compensation to  high mar­
g ina l  product  a rea s  where compensation was g r e a t e r .  This movement 
would cont inue  u n t i l  the  marginal p r o d u c t iv i t y  f o r  l i k e  resources  would
James M. Buchanan, "Federal ism and F isca l  Equ i ty ,"  The American 
Economic Review, XL (September, 1950), pp. 583-599.
For an analogous argument which advocates  a t r a n s f e r  to  urban 
a r e a s ,  see ,  Kenneth A. Gibson, "A Case f o r  Equity in  Federal-Local  
Re la t ions  in Urban Po l icy  Developments," The Annals o f  th e  American 
Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  and Social  S c ience , CDXCIII (September, 1978), 
pp. 135-146.
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everywhere be equal .  In t ro d u c t io n  o f  a f ede ra l  " f i s c "  i n to  t h i s  purely
economic environment would have unequal impact on d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of  the
country  and would cause a movement away from th e  market determined a l l o ­
ca t io n  of  re so u rc e s .  As exp la ined  by Buchanan:
I f  s t a t e s  a re  no t  i d e n t i c a l  in f i s c a l  c a p a c i ty ,
th e  people in th e  low c ap a c i ty  (low income) s t a t e s
must be su b jec te d  to  g r e a t e r  f i s c a l  p re ssu re  
(h ighe r  t a x a t io n  and /or  lower value  of  pub l ic  
s e r v i c e s )  than people in high c a p a c i ty  s t a t e s .
I f  "equals"  a re  thus  pressed  more in  one area  
than  in  an o th e r ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be provided an i n ­
c e n t iv e  f o r  m igra t ion  o f  both human and non­
human resources  i n to  th e  a re a s  o f  l e a s t  f i s c a l
p r e s s u r e s . 55
To remove t h i s  f i s c a l  p r e s s u re  and r e tu rn  to  an a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r ­
ces based on marginal p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  the  a r t i c l e  recommended " i n t e r a r e a  
f i s c a l  t r a n s f e r s "  o r  g r a n t s - i n - a i d . 56
Although no t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  responding to  Buchanan, A. D, S co t t  r e ­
j e c t e d  the  premise t h a t  g ran t s  produce a p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  on resource  
a l l o c a t i o n .  He argued t h a t  a t r a n s f e r  o f  am e n t i t i e s  to  resource-poor  
a reas :
. . . may be u n d e s i r ab le  in th e  long run f o r  the  
fo llowing  reason:  the  maximum income f o r  the
whole coun t ry ,  and so the  h ig h es t  average p e r ­
sonal income, a re  to  be achieved only  by maxi-
55I b i d . , p. 589.
^ T h e  i s su e  of i n t e r a r e a  t r a n s f e r s  between s p e c i f i c  reg ions  in 
the  United S t a t e s  has been addressed in  the  fo l low ing :  Ann R. 
Markwsen and J e r r y  F as t ru p ,  "The Regional War f o r  Federal Aid,"
The Public  I n t e r e s t , LI I I  ( F a l l ,  1978),  pp. 87-99; and Niles  
Hansen, "Does th e  South Have a Stake in  Northern Pover ty?" ,
Southern Economic J o u r n a l , XL (A p r i l ,  1979),  pp. 1220-1224.
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mizing n a t iona l  product ion .  T h is ,  in t u r n ,  can 
be achieved only when resources  and labo r  a re  
combined in such a way t h a t  the  marginal p ro­
duct  o f  s i m i l a r  u n i t s  o f  l a b o r  i s  the  same in 
a l l  p l a c e s . 57
To the  e x te n t  t h a t  g r a n t s  r e s t r i c t  the  movement o f  resources  through 
subsidy-caused p r i c e  d i s t o r t i o n s ,  the  level  o f  na t iona l  ou tpu t  and i n ­
come would f a i l  to  reach t h e i r  f u l l  p o t e n t i a l .
In an acknowledged response to  S c o t t ' s  a r t i c l e ,  Buchanan^® ex­
panded and r e f in e d  h is  e a r l i e r  a n a ly s i s  which was not intended to  be 
a d e f i n i t i v e  s ta tem ent  on g r a n t s ,  but only an element in the  broader  
a n a ly s i s  o f  f i s c a l  e q u i ty .  In e s sence ,  Buchanan's r ep ly  was concerned 
with d i s t i n g u i s h in g  between a c o l l e c t i v e  and a s p e c i f i c  g r a n t .  Refer­
r in g  to  1950 d a t a ,  Buchanan d iscovered  t h a t  approximate ly  90 percen t  
o f  a l l  g r a n t  funds were a l l o c a t e d  to  the  four  a rea s  o f  highways, edu­
c a t i o n ,  so c ia l  s e rv i c e s  and unemployment compensation o r  r e l i e f .  He 
undertook a d e t a i l e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  each of  th e se  a reas  to  determine 
how g ran ts  a f f e c t e d  resource  a l l o c a t i o n .  B r i e f l y ,  the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
concluded t h a t  a id  to  highways was not  l i k e l y  to  evoke much e f f e c t  on 
the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  human r e so u rc e s ,  but would enhance the  a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  c a p i t a l  r e so u rce s .  The p o s i t i v e  impact on c a p i t a l  was thought  to 
occur  because a more homogeneous n a t iona l  road t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system 
would al low p l a n t  l o c a t io n  d e c i s io n s  to  be based on economic c r i t e r i a
57A. D. S c o t t ,  "A Note on Grants in Federal C oun t r ie s , "  
Economica, XVIII (November, 1950), p. 416^-422.
^ Ja m e s  M. Buchanan, "Federal Grants and Resource A l lo c a t io n , "  
Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LX (June ,  1952), pp. 208-217.
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r a t h e r  than road q u a l i t y  d i f f e r e n c e s  in var ious  p a r t s  o f  th e  country .  
In th e  a rea  o f  ed u c a t io n ,  suppor t ive  g ra n ts  were considered  to  have 
a p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  on both lab o r  and c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n .  To the  ex­
t e n t  t h a t  educat ion  l e v e l s  in poorer  reg ions  o f  the  country  were 
r a i s e d ,  workers would be more knowledgable about  a v a i l a b l e  opportun­
i t i e s  and would be more wi l l i n g  to  migra te  t o  take  advantage o f  them. 
Also, to  the  e x t e n t  t h a t  a r e g i o n ' s  lab o r  fo rce  becomes b e t t e r  edu­
c a t e d ,  th e re  would be an in c r ea se  in the  p o t e n t i a l  r e tu rn  f o r  owners 
o f  c a p i t a l ;  hence, a m igra t ion  o f  c a p i t a l  i n t o  the  poor a rea  would 
occur.  For so c ia l  s e r v i c e s ,  Buchanan acknowledged S c o t t ' s  con ten t ion  
to  be more a p p l i c a b l e ,  but  not  without  some r e s e r v a t i o n .  To the  ex­
t e n t  t h a t  so c ia l  s e rv i c e s  a re  in the  form o f  h ea l th  f a c i l i t i e s ,  the  
r e s u l t s  would be s i m i l a r  to  the  e f f e c t  o f  g r a n ts  f o r  educa t ion .  I f ,  
however, s o c ia l  s e rv ic e s  were made a v a i l a b l e  to  p a r t i a l l y  p roduc t ive  
workers o r  f a m i l i e s  o f  p a r t i a l l y  p roduc t ive  workers ,  th e r e  would be 
a nega t ive  e f f e c t  on resou rce  a l l o c a t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  g ran ts  which sub­
s i d i z e  th e  unemployed would be r e s o u r c e - d i s t o r t i n g  and S c o t t ' s  a rgu ­
ment would be v in d ic a te d .  On ba lance ,  Buchanan noted:
Equaliz ing  t r a n s f e r s  c a r r i e d  ou t  by the  
c e n t r a l  government des igned to  r e l i e v e  the  
f i s c a l  p l i g h t  o f  the  low-income s t a t e s ,  
whether  in th e  form o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  tax  
r a t e s  o r  in t h a t  o f  e q u a l iz in g  g r a n t s ,  can­
no t  be r e j e c t e d  f o r  e f f i c i e n c y  reasons .
I t  has been shown t h a t  th e  a l l o c a t i v e  
e f f e c t s  vary from in s tan ce  to  i n s t a n c e ,  
a l lowing no u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  con­
c lu s io n s  to  be drawn. In s p e c i f i c  cases  
resource  e f f e c t s  should perhaps be taken 
in to  account ,  but  p r im a r i ly  the  t r a n s f e r
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p o l i cy  should be based on a l t e r n a t i v e  o b j e c t iv e s :  
e q u i t y ,  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  and the  p re se rv a t io n  
o f  minimum s tanda rds  o f  the  pub l ic  s e r v i c e s . 59
As a f i n a l  f a c t o r  in the  resource  a l l o c a t i o n  co n t ro v e rsy ,  i t  i s  
necessary  to  co n s id e r  the  e f f e c t s  o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  on o p t im a l i ty .  In 
a s tudy based on u t i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  A lbe r t  Breton®0 d i s t in g u i s h e d  be­
tween e x t e r n a l i t i e s  r e s u l t i n g  from p e r f e c t  and im perfec t  u t i l i t y  map^ 
p ings .  By h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  a p e r f e c t  mapping e x i s t s  when ". . . a l l  
the  o b j e c t iv e  b e n e f i t s  o f  loca l  goods a re  exhausted w i th in  the  bound­
a r i e s  o f  the  lo ca l  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  . . When such a case  e x i s t s  and 
the  n o n -p r iv a te  good i s  paid  f o r  with b e n e f i t  taxes  r a t h e r  than gen­
e r a l  t a x e s ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  to  a t t a i n  a Pare to  optimum a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
re so u rc e s .  But Breton con t inues :
. . . i f  we a r e  p resen ted  with an economical ly  
optimum c o n s t i t u t i o n  and a p e r f e c t  s ig n a l in g  
system f o r  the  p r ic e s  o f  p r iv a t e  goods, the  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  re sou rces  wi l l  not  be Pareto 
optimal i f  n o n -p r iv a te  goods a re  paid f o r  by 
n o n -b e n e f i t  t a x e s ,  such as a p ro p o r t io n a l  i n ­
come tax  . . . .  One way o f  c o r r e c t in g  such 
a s i t u t a t i o n  i s  through a system o f  n eu t ra l  
taxes  c o l l e c t e d  from those  in d iv id u a l s  whose 
r a t e s  a re  sm a l le r  than the  marginal u t i l i t y  
der ived  from n o n -p r iv a te  goods and p a id ,  in 
the  form o f  n eu t ra l  g r an ts  o r  s u b s i d i e s ,  to  
those  i n d iv id u a l s  f o r  whom tax  r a t e s  a r e  l a r ­
ge r  than  the  marginal s a t i s f a c t i o n  from non­
p r i v a t e  goods.
59I b i d . , p. 217.
®°Albert Breton,  "A Theory o f  Government G ran ts , "  The Canadian 
Journal  o f  Economics and P o l i t i c a l  S c ience , XXXI (May, 1965), pp. 175-187.
61I b i d . , p.  180.
62I b i d . ,  p. 181.
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Thus, when goods a re  supp l ied  with in tragovernmental  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and 
a re  f inanced  with general  t a x e s ,  Pare to  o p t im a l i ty  may be reached 
through a system o f  uncondi t iona l  g r a n t s .
I f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an imperfec t  mapping so t h a t  " . . .  the  b e n e f i t s  
o f  n o n -p r iv a te  goods s p i l l  over  the  f r o n t i e r s  o f  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  buy­
ing the  good,"63 a d i f f e r e n t  remedial p r e s c r i p t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  fo r .
In t h i s  c a se ,  s p i l l - o v e r s  mean t h a t ,  in ad d i t io n  
to  the  amount o f  a given good bought by a lower 
leve l  o f  government,  a h igher  leve l  o f  government 
w i l l  have to  i n c r ea se  t h a t  amount by a given quan­
t i t y  so t h a t  an optimal o v e r - a l l  quantum o f  resources  
i s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h a t  good. . . . one o f  the  b es t  
methods a v a i l a b l e  to  the  h igher  leve l  o f  government 
to  in c re a se  th e  amount spen t  on a given n o n -p r iv a te  
good i s  the  co n d i t io n a l  g ran t .
With th e  im perfec t  mapping, the  requirement f o r  cond i t iona l  g ran ts  
i s  comple tely  independent o f  the  tax  system used to  pay f o r  the  good.
On the  o t h e r  hand, the  tax  system does p lay  an important r o le  in d e t e r ­
mining th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  t o t a l  g ra n t  program. I f  taxes  a re  o f  the  
b e n e f i t  ty p e ,  then only  c o n d i t iona l  g ran t s  a re  needed. But i f  a gen­
e ra l  ta x  i s  used to  f in a n ce  the  good, " . . .  uncondi t iona l  g r a n t s —in 
a d d i t io n  to  the  co n d i t io n a l  ones—w il l  be requ i red  to  e q u a l iz e  the  mar­
g inal  u t i l i t i e s  o f  goods and the  tax  r a t e  in the  budgets o f  a l l  c u s t -
H 65omers.
63Ib id .
64I b i d . ,  p. 183. 
65I b i d . ,  pp. 183-184.
In an a r t i c l e  concerned with g ra n t  e f f i c i e n c y ,  L e s te r  T h u r o w ^  
presen ted  an a n a ly s i s  which complemented the  po l icy  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  
Breton. S t r e s s in g  th e  importance o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  and achieveing  g o a l s ,  
Thurow mainta ined t h a t  th e  th r e e  in h e re n t  goals  in  a system o f  g r a n t s -  
i n - a id  a re  to  maximize the  r e tu rn  o f  a given amount o f  resources  which 
have been in v e s te d ,  to  reach th e  h ig h es t  p o s s ib le  in d i f f e r e n c e  curve 
wi th a given level  o f  r e so u rc e s ,  and to  r e d i s t r i b u t e  income. To ob­
t a i n  th ese  g o a l s ,  a combination o f  c o n d i t iona l  g r a n t s ,  uncondi t ional  
g ran ts  and co n d i t iona l  taxes  would be r e q u i r e d —no one tool  could 
accomplish the  t a sk  a lone .  I f ,  however, the  goal o f  g ran ts  i s  to  en­
courage a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o j e c t  a t  the  lowest  c o s t ,  a co n d i t io n a l  g ran t  
should be u se d .6^
A graphic  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  cond i t iona l  
and uncondi t ional  g r a n t s  i s  p resen ted  in Figure  1. The f ig u r e  u t i ­
l i s e s  a l i n e a r  budget c o n s t r a i n t ,  AB, f o r  a community in  which two 
goods, X and Y, a r e  being produced. With the  v e r t i c a l  ax is  measuring 
q u a n t i t i e s  o f  Y and the  ho r izon ta l  ax is  measuring q u a n t i t i e s  of  X, 
eq u i l ib r iu m  w il l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  Xj, Yj, the  po in t  o f  tangency be­
tween i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I and the  budget c o n s t r a i n t .  Considering 
f i r s t  the  e f f e c t  o f  a co n d i t io n a l  g r a n t ,  assume t h a t  i t  i s  d es i r ed  
to  in c re a se  the  consumption o f  good Y and t h a t  a subsidy  equal to  a
^ L e s t e r  c. Thurow, "The Theory o f  G ran ts - In -A id ,"  National Tax 
J o u r n a l . XIX (December, 1966), pp. 373-377.
67This cons lus ion  depends on the  na tu re  o f  a community's u t i l i t y  
fu n c t io n .  See, f o r  example, Samuel Nitzan ,  "Revenue Sharing in Multi - 
person Publ ic  Choice Models," Q uar te r ly  Journal o f  Economics, XCI 
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given percentage o f  the  community's spending on Y i s  provided f o r  t h i s  
purpose. Because X i s  not s u b s id ize d ,  the  maximum q u a n t i ty  t h a t  the  
community can ob ta in  remains f ixed  a t  the  h o r iz on ta l  i n t e r c e p t  o f  the 
budget l i n e  AB. Increases  in the  purchase o f  Y, however, w i l l  inc rease  
the  income subsidy to  th e  community by a co n s ta n t  percentage o f  spend­
ing on Y, and the  budget l i n e  w i l l  r o t a t e  through B to  i n t e r c e p t  the  
v e r t i c a l  ax is  above A. The degree o f  r o t a t i o n  w i l l  depend on the  p e r ­
centage subsidy.  I f  t h e  subsidy i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  s h i f t  the  budget 
c o n s t r a i n t  t o  CB, the  community w il l  be ab le  to  move a h igher  level  o f  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  on i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I I .  The new equ i l ib r iu m  consumption 
o f  X and Y w i l l  be X2 , Y2 , and the  subsidy w i l l  equal to  YgYg.
To c o n t r a s t  the  budgetary adjustment  a s so c ia t e d  with cond i t iona l  
g r a n t s ,  assume t h a t  a g ra n t  equal to  YqY2 i s  provided without  any 
s t r i n g s  o r  c o n d i t io n s .  In t h i s  c a se ,  the  community could use the  
e n t i r e  g ra n t  to  purchase e i t h e r  X o r  Y. Since the  r e l a t i v e  p r ic e s  
o f  the  two goods have no t  changed, the  budget c o n s t r a i n t s  s h i f t s  to 
DE, p a r a l l e l  to  AB. With DE c u t t i n g  through i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I I ,
X2 , Y2 does not provide the  maximum amount o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  to  the  
community. By moving down DE to  i t s  p o in t  o f  tangency with i n d i f f e r ­
ence curve I I I ,  s a t i s f a c t i o n  would be inc reased .
Comparing eq u i l ib r iu m  a t t a i n e d  under co n d i t io n a l  and uncondi t ional  
g r a n t s ,  two important  f a c t o r s  a re  observed.  F i r s t ,  g ran t s  given uncon­
d i t i o n a l l y  w i l l  r e s u l t  in a g r e a t e r  leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  to  the  r e c i ­
p i e n t  than the  same d o l l a r  amount given c o n d i t i o n a l ly .  Second, a given 
in c rease  in consumption o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  good can be achieved a t  a 
sm a l le r  c o s t  with a co n d i t io n a l  g ran t  than with an uncondi t ional  one.
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Theore t ica l  conc lus ions  such as  th e se  have been complemented with 
empirica l  s tu d i e s  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the  s t im u la t io n  —s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t s  
o f  g r a n t s .  Gramlich and G a l p e r ^  found the  fo l lowing tendenc ies  a s ­
s o c ia te d  with d i f f e r e n t  types  o f  g r a n t s :  (1) lump sum t r a n s f e r s  c r e a t e
more o f  a ta x  reduc t ion  and l e s s  o f  an expend i tu re  i n c re a se  per  d o l l a r  
o f  g ran t  than open ended o r  f ix ed  sum matching g r a n t s ;  (2) open ended 
matching g ran ts  s t im u la t e  spending almost  d o l l a r  f o r  d o l l a r  with the 
amount o f  the  g r a n t ;  and (3) c a t e g o r i c a l  f ixed  sum g ra n ts  have an im­
pac t  somewhere between lump sum t r a n s f e r s  and open ended matching 
g r a n t s ,  but  when maintenance o f  e f f o r t  i s  r e q u i r e d ,  the  s t im u la t iv e  
e f f e c t  i s  as g r e a t  as  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e d  with th e  open ended g r a n t . ^
In a r e g r e s s i o n - c o r r e l a t i o n  a n a ly s i s  by Sacks and H a r r i s , ^  co­
e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  var ious  s t a t e - l o c a l  expend i tu re  c a t e g o r i e s  were c a l c u ­
l a t e d .  The s tudy used the  th re e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v a r i a b l e s  o f  per  c a p i t a  
income, popula t ion  d e n s i t y ,  and pe rcen t  u rb an iz a t io n  in th e  r eg re s s io n  
equat ion .  Federal a id  was then included as an a d d i t io n a l  independent 
v a r i a b l e  and r e s u l t e d  in  a s i z a b l e  i n c r e a se  in t h e  exp la ined  v a r i a t i o n
^Edward M. Gramlich and Harvey Gal per  , " S ta te  and Local Fiscal  
Behavior and Federal Grant P o l icy ,"  Brookings Papers on Economic 
A c t i v i t y , ed. Arthur  M. Okun and George L. Perry  (Washington, D. C.:
The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1973), pp. 15-58.
69Martin F e l d s t e i n ' s  r e c e n t  a n a ly s i s  o f  a ided  local  educa t iona l  
expend i tu res  found t h a t  an "add-on" g r a n t ,  which i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  
maintenance o f  e f f o r t ,  s t im u la ted  community educat ional  e f f o r t s .
See: Martin F e l d s t e i n ,  "The E f fe c t s  of  a D i f f e r e n t i a l  Add-on Grant:
T i t l e  I and Local Education Spending," The Journal  o f  Human Resources, 
XIII ( F a l l ,  1978), pp. 443-458.
^Seymour Sacks and Robert H a r r i s ,  "The Determinants o f  S t a t e  and 
Local Government Expenditures  and Intergovernmental  Flows o f  Funds," 
National Tax J o u r n a l , XVII (March, 1974), pp. 75-85.
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f o r  t o t a l  d i r e c t  general e x p e n d i tu re s ,  highways, and e s p e c i a l l y  pub l ic  
w e l fa re .  For spending on loca l  s choo ls ,  hea l th  s e r v i c e s ,  and " o th e r , "  
the  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  f ed e ra l  a id  did not a p p rec iab le  a f f e c t  expla ined 
v a r i a t i o n s . ?*
Other w r i t e r s  such as Jack Osman,73 Thomas O 'Brien?3 and Edward 
Renshaw7^ followed a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  approach to  c o n s t r u c t in g  r e ­
g re ss ion  equat ions  by in c lud ing  not  only d i r e c t  a id  to  a s p e c i f i c  
func t ion  as an independent  v a r i a b l e ,  but  a id  to  o th e r  func t ions  as 
w e l l .  In t h i s  way, the  a n a ly s i s  could i d e n t i f y  not  only  s t im u la t iv e  
e f f e c t s ,  but  a l s o  d i s t r o t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  fede ra l  a id .  Typical o f  the 
conclus ions  reached in  th ese  s tu d i e s  was the  fo l lowing  by Osman:
One im portan t  im p l ica t io n  o f  our  a n a ly s i s  i s  
t h a t  the  f e d e ra l  government i s  ab le  to  i n c re a se  
expend i tu res  on a given func t ion  in  e i t h e r  o f  two 
ways. D irec t  a id  to  a fu n c t io n  w i l l ,  in g e n e ra l ,  
in c rea se  expend i tu res  fo r  t h a t  func t ion  and w i l l ,  
our  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e ,  s t im u la t e  expend i tu res  on
71A r e c en t  s tudy by Edward Gramlich has demonstrated t h a t  federa l  
a id  to  s t a t e  and loca l  governments has been used p r im a r i ly  to  in c rease  
budget su rp luses  r a t h e r  than to  expand s e r v i c e s .  See, Edward M, 
Gramlich, "S ta te  and Local Budgets th e  Day A f te r  I t  Rained: Why Is 
the  Surplus so High? ,11 Brookings Papers on Economic A c t iv i ty  
(Washington, D. C.:  The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1978), pp. 191-214.
19 Jack W. Osman, "The Dual Impact o f  Federal Aid on S ta t e  and Lo­
cal  Government E xpend i tu res ,"  National Tax J o u rn a l ,  XVII (December, 
1966), pp. 363-373.
73Thomas O 'Brien ,  "Grants- In-Aid:  Some F ur the r  Answers," National
Tax J o u r n a l , XXIV (March, 1971), pp. 65-78.
?^Edward Renshaw, "A Note on the  Expenditure  E f f e c t  o f  S ta t e  Aid 
t o  Educat ion,"  Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LXVIII (A p r i l ,  1960), 
pp. 170-174.
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t h a t  fu n c t io n .  Second, expend i tu res  on some 
fu n c t io n s  w i l l  i n c r ea se  through f ed e ra l  a id  to  
o th e r  f u n c t i o n s . 75
F i n a l l y ,  Glenn W. F i sh e r75 among o t h e r s 77 ques t ioned the  r e s u l t s
o f  r e g re s s io n  s tu d i e s  which assumed fed e ra l  a id  to  be an independent ,
c a u sa t iv e  v a r i a b l e .  The p o in t  was made t h a t  because o f  the  matching
p rov is ion  in most g r a n t s ,  the  amount o f  money spen t  by s t a t e  and local
governments on a ided  fu n c t io n s  would p a r t i a l l y  determine the  amount of
a id  rece ived .  In F i s h e r ' s  words:
The na tu re  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by assuming a f e d e ra l  a id  program which provides  
d o l l a r  f o r  d o l l a r  matching with no l i m i t  and no 
c e i l i n g .  In such a c a se ,  th e  amount o f  fede ra l  
a id  would always be 50 pe rcen t  o f  the  s t a t e  expen­
d i t u r e  and the  c o r r e l a t i o n  would be p e r f e c t  ( 1 .0 ) .
In t h i s  case  i t  would be u n r e a l i s t i c  to  assume 
t h a t  the  amount o f  f ed e ra l  a id  i s  independent  of  
the  amount o f  expend i tu re  o r  t h a t  f ed e ra l  a id  _R 
e x p la in s  the  i n t e r s t a t e  v a r i a t i o n s  in e x p e n d i t u r e .70
With f ed e ra l  a id  being dependent on s t a t e  and loca l  government spend­
ing ,  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  computed under th e  assumption o f  indepen­
dence must o v e r s t a t e  the  q u a n t i t i v e  impact o f  f ed e ra l  a id .  Yet,
750sman, op. c i t . , p. 371.
75Glenn W. F i s h e r ,  " I n t e r s t a t e  V ar ia t ion  in  S t a t e  and Local Gov­
ernment Expenditu re ,"  Nat ional  Tax J o u rn a l ,  XVII (March, 1964), pp. 57- 
74.
77See, f o r  example, Thomas F. Pogue and L. G. Sgontz* "The E f fec t  
o f  Gran ts- In-Aid  on S ta te -Loca l  Spending," National Tax J o u r n a l , XXI 
(June,  1968), pp. 190-199 and Wallace E. Oats ,  "The Dual Impact o f  
Federal Aid on S ta t e  and Local Governmental Expenditures :  A Comment," 
National Tax J o u r n a l , XXI (June ,  1968), pp. 120-123.
^Fisher, op. c i t . , p. 72.
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d e s p i t e  the  problems a s s o c i a t e d  with  ob ta in in g  an exac t  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the  impact o f  g r a n t s  on r e c i p i e n t  governments,  t h e r e  can be no doubt 
t h a t  some response i s  p r e s e n t .  As i d e n t i f i e d  i s  a s tudy by H. M.
Hardy,79 with the  d i v e r s i t y  t h a t  e x i s t s  among loca l  governmental u n i t s ,  
i t  i s  not reasonable  to  expect  each to  r e a c t  to  g ran ts  in  the  same way, 
but  some re a c t io n  i s  c l e a r l y  in d i c a t e d .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  D. A. L. A u l t ^  
has repo r ted  a p o s i t i v e  impact on loca l  fu nc t iona l  ex p e n d i tu re s ,  with 
th e  s i z e  o f  the  i n c re a se  depending on the  na tu re  o f  the func t ion  i t ­
s e l f .  Responses to  c a p i t a l  expansion g r a n t s ,  f o r  example, were high,  
while  responses  to  w e l fa re  g ran ts  were low.
Referenced a r t i c l e s  in the  foregoing  paragraphs d e a l t  with empir­
ic a l  s tu d i e s  o f  co n d i t io n a l  g ran t s  only.®* The narrow focus was d i c ­
79h. M. Hardy, "Budget Responses o f  Indiv idual  Governmental Units  
to  Federal G ran ts ,"  Pub l ic  Finance Q u a r t e r ly , IV ( A p r i l ,  1976),  
pp. 173-186.
A. L. A u l t ,  "P rov inc ia l  Grants and Local Government Expendi­
t u r e s , "  Public  Finance Q u a r t e r ly , IV ( J u ly ,  1976), pp. 295-306.
8 1 l n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  bu t  not  unexpectedly ,  major a d d i t io n s  to  the  body 
o f  g ra n t  l i t e r a t u r e  have occured dur ing  per iods  o f  increased  funding by 
the  fede ra l  government. As a r e s u l t  o f  domestic p r i o r i t i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d
in P re s id en t  Kennedy's "New F ro n t i e r "  and P re s id e n t  Johnson 's  "Great 
S o c ie ty ,"  f o r  example, g r a n t s - i n - a i d  p r o l i f e r a t e d  from 160 a u th o r iz a ­
t i o n s  in 1962 to  379 a t  the  end o f  1966. Correspondingly,  funding grew 
from $7.6 b i l l i o n  to  $12.7 b i l l i o n .  St imulated by the  g r e a t l y  expanded 
emphasis on g r a n t s ,  academic in q u i ry  in the  a rea  became more in ten se  
and reached a peak, in terms o f  p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  in the  yea rs  1968 and 
1969. A combination o f  a reduced sense o f  urgency following the  con­
c e n t r a t e d  b u r s t  o f  a c t i v i t y  and Viet Nam and i n f l a t i o n  s h i f t i n g  f i s c a l  
emphasis away from g ran ts  c o n t r ib u te d  to  an abatement in the  number of  
new c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  g r a n t  l i t e r a t u r e .  Then, in 1972, i n t e r e s t  in the  
s tudy o f  g ran t s  was rek in d le d  with the  passage o f  revenue shar ing  and 
a body o f  l i t e r a t u r e  ana lyz ing  th e  "new" type o f  g ran t  began to  be 
developed.
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t a t e d  by the  f a c t  t h a t  p r i o r  to  1972, co n d i t io n a l  g r a n ts  were the  only 
type au th o r ized  by Congress. With th e  passage o f  the  S t a t e  and Local 
F isca l  A ss is tance  Act o f  1972, however, the  p a t t e r n  o f  i s su in g  only 
c o n d i t iona l  g ran t s  was broken, and Congress provided a v i r t u a l l y  un­
c o n d i t io n a l  g r a n t  to  S t a t e  and loca l  governments which i s  popu lar ly  
known as revenue sha r ing .  The f i r s t  formal o u t l i n e s  o f  revenue s h a r ­
ing were p resen ted  by Walter  H e l le r82 and Joseph Pechman.83 Both 
w r i t e r s  advocated a plan  which would earmark a given percentage of  
fede ra l  t a x  c o l l e c t i o n s  to  be d i s t r i b u t e d  among s t a t e  and local  gov­
ernments in accordance with p o p u la t io n ,  weighted by tax  e f f o r t  and 
per  c a p i t a  income. As f i n a l l y  adopted by Congress,  revenue shar ing  
g e n e ra l ly  followed concepts  con ta ined  in  H e l l e r ' s  and Peckman's p ro­
p o s a l s . 84
One o f  the  e a r l i e s t  and most comprehensive a n a l y t i c a l  works on 
revenue sha r ing  was pub l ished  by the  Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n  under the
83Walter W. H e l l e r ,  New Dimensions o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy (Cambridge, 
Mass.:  Harvard U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1966).
83Joseph A. Pechman, "Financing S t a t e  and Local Government," Pro­
ceedings  o f  a Symposium on Federal Taxation (New York: The
American Bankers A sso c ia t io n ,  1965).
QA
OHFor a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  revenue sh a r in g ,  see  Chapter IV. Also, 
two works prov id ing  information  about the  immediate s t im u l i  f o r  pas­
sage o f  the  S t a t e  and Local F isca l  A ss is tance  Act o f  1972 as well  as 
d e t a i l s  o f  the  Act I t s e l f  a re :  William W il iner  and John P. Nichols ,  
Revenue Sharing (Washington. D. C.:  Pro Plan In te rn a t io n a l  L td . ,  1973)
and Otto G. S t o l z ,  Revenue Shar ing:  Legal and Pol icy  Analyses (New
York: Praeger  P u b l i s h e r s ,  1974).
t i t l e ,  Monitoring Revenue Shar ing .**5 The book addressed i t s e l f  to  the  
a n a ly s i s  o f  t h r e e  a sp ec t s  o f  revenue sh a r in g —d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s ,  
f i s c a l  e f f e c t s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s .  With the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  funds 
determined by formula,  i t  was found t h a t  m etro!op i tan  a reas  rece ived  
the  g r e a t e s t  amount o f  shared  funds ,  per  c a p i t a .  I f ,  however, revenue 
shar ing  was viewed as  a percentage  o f  non-school ta x  revenues ,  sp a rce ly  
populated  areas  rece ived  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm en t .  Also, a comparison of  
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  funds between r i c h  and poor s t a t e s  revea led  t h a t  on 
a per  c a p i t a  b a s i s ,  low income s t a t e s  were awarded a l a r g e r  amount o f  
funds than high income s t a t e s .  The f i s c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  revenue shar ing  
in d ic a te d  a cau t ious  a t t i t u d e  on the  p a r t  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  govern­
ments.  Only a very small amount o f  revenue shar ing  was used to  expand 
so c ia l  programs which c a l l e d  f o r  con t inu ing  f in a n c i a l  committments.
The two primary uses were f o r  tax  r e l i e f  and c a p i t a l  expansion. F i ­
n a l l y ,  in the  a rea  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s ,  revenue shar ing  was found to  
have inc reased  c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  governmental budgetary p ro ­
cess .  This r e s u l t  was e f f e c t e d  through the  requirement t h a t  the  use 
o f  revenue shar ing  funds had to  be publ ished  in loca l  newspapers of  
general c i r c u l a t i o n .  In many l o c a l i t i e s ,  pub l ic  o f f i c i a l s ,  recogn i ­
z ing t h a t  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  funds would r ece iv e  wide spread  p u b l i c i t y ,  
a c t i v e l y  s o l i c i t e d  c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in choosing how revenue s h a r ­
ing monies were to  be used.
85Richard P. Nathan, Allen D. Manual, and Susanna E. Ca lk ins ,  
Monitoring Revenue Shar ing  (Washington, D. C.:  The Brookings I n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  1975).
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Focusing on th e  use to  which revenue shar ing  funds were a l l o c a t e d ,  
Caperto and Cole88 found t h a t  in 1976, about s e v e n ty - th re e  pe rcen t  o f  
revenue sha r ing  d o l l a r s  were devoted to  law, f i r e ,  environment,  s t r e e t ,  
and r e c r e a t i o n  fu n c t io n s .  Of th e se  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  law and f i r e  p ro­
t e c t i o n  dominated in th e  use o f  f u n d s .87 i t  was a l s o  determined t h a t  
the  use o f  funds v a r ied  more by reg ion  than  by s i z e  o f  r e c i p i e n t  govern­
ment. Of some s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  the  study r epor ted  the  fo l lowing impact on 
the  f i s c a l  a f f a i r s  o f  r e c i p i e n t  governments : (1) f i v e  pe rcen t  used the
funds to  reduce t a x e s ,  (2) fo r ty - se v e n  pe rcen t  used th e  funds to  prevent  
an in c re a se  in  t a x e s ,  (3) t h i r t y - o n e  pe rcen t  used the  funds to  reduce 
the  amount o f  a ta x  in c r e a s e  and (4) seventeen p e rcen t  r epo r ted  t h a t  
revenue sh a r in g  had no impact on loca l  ta x  l e v i e s .
Other s tu d i e s  o f  revenue shar ing  have g e n e r a l ly  been concerned with 
the  t h r e e  a re a s  s ta k e d -o u t  in Monitoring Revenue S h a r in g . In those  
d ea l in g  with formula a n a l y s i s ,  the  o b j e c t iv e  has been to  sugges t  changes 
so t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  g o a l s ,  i .  e . ,  e q u a l i z a t i o n ,  e q u i ty ,  ta x  e f f o r t  and
88David A. Caperto and Richard L. Cole, "General Revenue Sharing: 
I t ' s  impact on American C i t i e s , "  Governmental Finance,  VI (November, 
1977), pp. 24-33.
87While recogniz ing  th e se  general  t en d e n c ie s ,  Paul T e r r i l l  con­
ducted a s tudy  o f  the  uses to  which seven communities in  Washington 
Oregon, and C a l i f o r n i a  pu t  revenue shar ing  funds. S t a t i n g  t h a t  the  
r e s u l t s  were a ty p ic a l  and t h a t  th e  communities were chosen f o r  study 
because o f  t h e i r  innova t ive  use o f  revenue sha r ing  funds ,  T e r r i l l  
demonstrated t h a t  revenue shar ing  does have the  p o t e n t i a l  o f  encour­
aging innova t ive  programs a t  th e  loca l  leve l  in so c ia l  w e l fa re .
See: Paul T e r r i l l ,  The Social  Impact o f  Revenue Shar ing (New York:
Praeger  P u b l i s h e r s ,  1976).
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n o n d i s to r t i o n ,  would be e a s i e r  t o  a c h i e v e . 88 Work done by a re sea rch
team headed by Barry Jesmer provides  a good i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the  d i r e c -
89t i o n  o f  formula s tu d i e s .  Most n o ta b ly ,  the  s tudy concluded t h a t :
(1) The r eq u i red  o n e - t h i r d / t w o - th i r d s  s p l i t  o f  money to  s t a t e / l o c a l  
governments was u n f a i r  and u n r e a l i s t i c  because i t  d id  no t  take  i n to  
c o n s id e ra t io n  in d iv id u a l  v a r i a t i o n s  in  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  s t a t e  and 
loca l  governments; (2) Def ining revenue e f f o r t  in terms o f  tax  c o l l e c ­
t i o n s  encouraged the  use o f  taxes  a t  the  expense o f  nontax sources  of  
revenue;  (3) L im i ta t ions  on th e  maximum and minimum per  c a p i t a  e n t i t l e ­
ments were q u es t ioned ,  and i t  was recommended t h a t  th e  upper l i m i t  o f  
45 pe rce n t  should be r e t a i n e d  to  avoid excess ive  a l l o c a t i o n s ,  but t h a t  
the  lower l i m i t  o f  20 p e rc e n t  should be removed; and (4) I n t r a s t a t e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  funds should be changed to  permit  a "need" element .
In the  second major a rea  o f  revenue sha r ing  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  f i s c a l  
e f f o r t s ,  the  tendency has been to  take  use r e p o r t s  which r e c i p i e n t  gov­
ernments have submit ted  to  th e  O f f ice  o f  Revenue Sharing and from th ese
88See, f o r  example, Gerald E. Auten, "The D i s t r i b u t io n  o f  Revenue-
Sharing Funds and Local Publ ic  Expenditure  Needs," Publ ic  Finance Quar­
t e r l y , I I  ( Ju ly ,  1974), pp. 352-375; Barry Jesmer e t .  a ) . ,  "General
Revenue Sharing: Designing a Formula Which Does Not Discourage or
D i s t o r t  Local V a r ia t io n s  in Financing and D e l ive r ing  S e rv ic e s , "  General
Revenue Sharing Research U t i l i z a t i o n  P r o j e c t , Vol. I (Washington, D. C.:
National Science Foundation, 1975), pp. 13-28; and Stephen M. Bar rs ,
" E qua l iza t ion  and Equi ty  in  Revenue Sharing:  An Analysis  o f  A l te rn a ­
t i v e  I n t e r s t a t e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  Formulas," I b i d . , pp. 55-74.
89Barry Jesmer, et. a ! . , loc. c i t .
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determine the  fu n c t io n s  t h a t  a re  being supported by shared fu n d s .99 
Breaking with t h i s  approach,  the  I n s t i t u t e  o f  Public  Po l icy  S tudies  
a t  the  U n iv e rs i ty  o f  Michigan developed a f i s c a l  impact model fo r  
revenue s h a r i n g . ^  The model employed expend i tu re  d a t a ,  by fu n c t io n ,  
f o r  per iods  o f  17 to  23 y ea rs  in f i v e  s e l e c t e d  c i t i e s .  Based on h i s ­
t o r i c a l  d a ta ,  p r o je c t io n s  f o r  spending in fu n c t io n a l  c a te g o r i e s  were 
made under the  assumption t h a t  no revenue shar ing  funds were a v a i l ­
a b le .  These p r o je c t io n s  were then compared with th e  ac tua l  expendi­
t u r e  o f  funds in each ca tegory  when loca l  revenues had been supple^ 
mented by revenue sh a r in g .  The f i s c a l  impact o f  revenue shar ing  was 
found to  vary accord ing  to  the  f i s c a l  h e a l th  o f  th e  c i t y  t e s t e d .  In 
c i t i e s  with a high t a x  e f f o r t ,  revenue shar ing  was found to  d i s p la c e  
loca l  t a x e s .  In c i t i e s  with o p e ra t in g  d e f i c i t s  and l i t t l e  op p o r tu n i ty  
to  i n c re a se  revenues ,  revenue shar ing  was used to  reduce the  d e f i c i t s .  
F i n a l l y ,  in  c i t i e s  with  a co n se rv a t iv e  f i s c a l  ph i losophy , - revenue  
shar ing  was used to  r e p l e n i s h  c a p i t a l  and improve s o c ia l  s e rv i c e s .
From th e se  f in d in g s ,  t h e  s tudy gives  a c l e a r  warning a g a in s t  accep t ing  
da ta  r epo r ted  to  the  O f f ice  o f  Revenue Sharing a t  t h e i r  face  va lue .
In a d d i t io n  to  th e  economic-based ana lyses  o f  revenue sh a r in g ,  
s tu d i e s  have a l so  been concerned with p o l i t i c a l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s .  One
99See, f o r  example, James D. Foust and Morton J .  Marcus, "Revenue 
Shar ing—A Program in the  National I n t e r e s t ? . "  M iss i s s ip p i  Val ley J o u r ­
nal o f  Business and Economics, XIX (Spr ing ,  1974), pp. 30-39 and 
Richard R. Nathan, "The Uses o f  Shared Revenue," The Journal  o f  Finance, 
XXX (May, 1975), pp. 557-565.
^Thomas J u s t e r ,  "A Survey o f  the  Impact o f  General Revenue Shar­
i f * "  General Revenue Sharing Research U t i l i z a t i o n  P r o j e c t ,  Vol. 2 
(Washington, D. C.:  The National Science Foundat ion,  1975), pp. 23-33.
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a r t i c l e ,  which cons idered  the  e f f e c t  o f  p rec lud ing  a l l  but  general  pur­
pose loca l  governments from rece iv in g  revenue shar ing  funds,  concluded 
t h a t  "general revenue shar ing  has o f te n  worked a t  c ross -purposes  with 
reg ional  planning programs and review p ro ce sse s ,  as well  as with the  
o rg an iz a t io n s  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  t h e i r  c o n d u c t . "92 Rather  than being a 
c r i t i c i s m  o f  an unexpected s i  d e - e f f e c t  o f  revenue sh a r in g ,  t h i s  f in d in g  
was a t r i b u t e  to  the  success fu l  accomplishment o f :
. . . the  major purposes o f  the  S t a t e  and Local F iscal  
A ss is tance  Act {which) were to  provide f in a n c i a l  r e l i e f ,  
r e s t o r e  in tergovernmental  f i s c a l  ba lance ,  and d e c e n t r a l ­
i ze  d ec is ion  making . . . {and n o t )  . . .  to  enhance the  
op e ra t io n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  loca l  u n i t s ,  o r  to  support  r e ­
gional  p lanning and c o o r d i n a t io n .93
Thus, t h e r e  i s  a b ias  in revenue sha r ing  a g a in s t  intergovernmental co­
o p e ra t io n .  I f  reg ional  coopera t ion  i s  to  be encouraged,  f u tu r e  revenue 
sha r ing  laws should c o r r e c t  t h a t  b ia s .
In ano ther  approach to  the  p o l i c i c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  revenue sh a r in g ,  
Deil S. W r ig h t ' s94 a n a ly s i s  led  to  th e  conclus ion  t h a t  revenue s h a r ­
i n g ' s  b ia s  a g a in s t  sp ec ia l  purpose governments would r e s u l t  in fewer 
o f  th e se  o rg an iz a t io n s  in the  f u t u r e . 9^ At the  same t ime,  however, 
the  20 pe rcen t  minimum per  c a p i t a  e n t i t l e m e n t  to  a l l  general  purpose
92Carl W. S tenberg ,  "Revenue Sharing and Governmental Reform,"
The Annals o f  the  American Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  and Social S c ien ce , 
CDXIX (May, 1975), p. 50-62. —
93Ib id .
94Deil S. Wright,  "Revenue Sharing and S t ru c tu r a l  Features  of  
American Federal ism,"  The Annals o f  the  American Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  
and Social Sc ience , CDXIX (May, 1975), pp. 100-113.
9^0nly general  purpose governments a re  e l i g i b l e  f o r  revenue s h a r ­
ing funds.
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governments would s u s t a i n  the  l i f e  o f  some o rg an iz a t io n s  beyond the  
per iod when they  would n a t u r a l l y  ex p i re .  Also, Wright envis ioned a 
change in fu n c t io n a l  emphasis o f  s t a t e  governments through a " sec u la r  
s h i f t  o f  s t a t e  government from a c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  to  a s e r v i c e - i n t e n ­
s iv e  component o f  the  f e d e ra l  s y s t e m . " ^
To conclude the  review o f  revenue shar ing  l i t e r a t u r e ,  two a d d i ­
t io n a l  works must be mentioned. The f i r s t  i s  The Economic and P o l i ­
t i c a l  Impact o f  General Revenue Shar ing . 9? This work was funded 
through a Nat ional  Science Foundat ion/Research Applied to  National 
Needs g ran t  f o r  the  purpose o f  . . a id  {ing} p o l ic y  makers in 
t h e i r  e v e lu a t io n  o f  t h e  General Revenue Sharing Program."98 Based 
on da ta  ob ta ined  from a survey o f  s t a t e ,  county,  and c i t y  r e c i p i e n t s  
o f  revenue sha r ing  funds ,  the  s tudy provided a comprehensive r e p o r t  on 
the  economic and p o l i t i c a l  impact o f  revenue shar ing .  The second work 
i s  Revenue Sharing:  The Second Round99 which i s  the  f i r s t  o f  two p la n ­
ned Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n  seque ls  t o  Monitoring Revenue Shar ing . The 
Second Round looks a t  the  f i s c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  revenue shar ing  with empha­
s i s  on c e n t r a l  c i t i e s  and i n v e s t i g a t e s  p o l i t i c a l  fo rces  which d i r e c t e d  
the  use o f  revenue sha r ing  funds.
b r i g h t ,  op. c i t . , p. 119.
9^F. Thomas J u s t e r  ( e d . ) ,  The Economic and P o l i t i c a l  Impact o f  
General Revenue Shar ing (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Social
Research, 1977).
98I b i d . , p. i i i .
R i c h a r d  P. Nathan and Charles  F. Adams, J r . ,  Revenue S har ing ;
The Second Round (Washington, D. C.:  The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1977).
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Optimum Provis ion  o f  Local Publ ic  Goods
The f in a l  i s s u e  to  be included in the  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  con troversy  
i s  th e  problem o f  o p t im a l i ty  in the  p rov is ion  o f  loca l  pu b l ic  goods. 
The widely accepted p o s i t i o n  adheres  to  the  Sameulsonian1^  conclusion 
t h a t  an u n d e ra l lo ca t io n  o f  resources  would occur because summed mar­
g inal b e n e f i t s  o f  a l o c a l l y  provided pub l ic  good would exceed marginal 
c o s t .  Charles  T i e b o u t , ^ *  while agree ing  with these  r e s u l t s  in the 
case  o f  a n a t i o n a l l y  provided pub l ic  good, argues t h a t ,  given c e r t a i n  
assumptions ( p e r f e c t  m o b i l i ty  being most im p o r tan t ) ,  u n d e ra l lo ca t io n  
w i l l  no t  r e s u l t  in  the  case o f  l o c a l l y  provided pub l ic  goods. Tiebout  
be l i ev e s  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  a r e  a s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  communities with i n ­
d iv idual  governments,  a consumer w i l l  choose to  l i v e  in the  community 
t h a t  b e s t  s a t i s f i e s  h i s  p re fe ren ce  p a t t e r n  f o r  pub l ic  goods. In t h i s  
way, th e  ind iv idua l  w i l l  reveal  h i s  t r u e  p re fe rence  and an optimum 
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  resources  w i l l  r e s u l t . ^ 2
Alan Williams has provided an i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n t r a s t  to  the  con­
sensus  p o s i t i o n ;  namely, t h a t  w i thou t  remedial a c t io n  an underprovi­
s ion  o f  l o c a l l y  provided pub l ic  goods would occur.  In the  thought-  
provoking a r t i c l e ,  "The Optimal Prov is ion  o f  Public  Goods in a System
lOOpaul A. Samuel son, "Diagrarranatic Exposi t ion o f  a Theory o f
Public  Expenditure ,"  Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , LXIV
(November, 1955), pp. 350-356.
101Tiebout ,  op. c i t . , pp. 416-442.
^ T i e b o u t  recognizes  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  t h a t  accrue
w ith in  the  loca l  coiranunity, but  over looks th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r ­
community economies o r  s p i l l o v e r s .
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o f  Local Government,"103 w i l l i a m 's  geometric  a n a ly s i s  concluded t h a t  
i t  i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  the  t o t a l  product ion  o f  a pu b l ic  good to  exceed the  
optimum amount. At th e  same t im e ,  however, he admonished, " I t  i s  not 
implied ,  o f  cou rse ,  t h a t  t h i s  outcome w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  be t r u e  in a l l  
c a s e s ,  but  only t h a t  i t  i s  a p e r f e c t l y  p o s s ib le  r e s u l t  which does not 
r e q u i r e  any obviously  unreasonable  assumptions to  be made."104
The a n a ly s i s  t h a t  leads  Williams to  h is  conclusion can be demon­
s t r a t e d  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  Figure 2. Assume t h a t  th e re  a re  two commun­
i t i e s  I and I I  with i d e n t i c a l  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  cu rv es ,  AA'. With each 
community rece iv in g  c o m p e n s a t i o n ^  f o r  the  s p i l l  ou ts  o f  i t s  pub l ic  
good which b e n e f i t s  th e  o th e r  community, th e  rea l  income curve SA' 
shows consumption p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  each community.
The l i n e s  through a^ and b^ and through a^ and b^ r e p re s e n t  con- 
sum pt ion- reac t ion  curves  f o r  I and I I ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These consumption- 
r e a c t io n  curves a re  th e  locus o f  eq u i l ib r iu m  combinations o f  pu b l ic  and 
p r i v a t e  goods consumption by each community f o r  var ious  l e v e l s  o f  pub l ic  
good product ion  by th e  o th e r  community. In e q u i l ib r iu m ,  I produces a t
^^ A la n  Williams,  "The Optimal P rovis ion  o f  Public  Goods in a 
System o f  Local Government," Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LXXIV 
(February,  1966), pp. 18-33.
104I b i d . , p. 31.
^ C r u c i a l  to  Wil liams' agrument a r e  h is  assumptions concerning 
the  na tu re  o f  th e se  compensations.  The assumptions a re  t h a t  each com­
munity (1) rece iv e s  e x p l i c i t  compensation f o r  i t s  s p i l l o u t ,  (2) pays a 
compensation f o r  each s p i l l  in  r e c e iv e d ,  and (3) t r e a t s  compensation 
r e c e i p t s  as spendable in  p r i n c i p l e  upon e i t h e r  pu b l ic  o r  p r i v a t e  goods. 
Assumption (3) a l lows Williams to  t r e a t  th e  r ea l  income curve ,  SA' as 




Alan Will iams' Demonstration o f  the  P o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  an Over-Supply o f  Publ ic  Goods
Source: Alan Wil liams,  "The Optimal Prov is ion  o f  Publ ic  Goods in a 
System o f  Local Government," Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, 
LXXIV (February ,  1966), p. 30.
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q j  and II  a t  q2 jwith  s p i l l o u t s  o f  q ^ a n d  ^ ^ r e s p e c t i v e l y .  That t h i s  
i s  " expec ta t iona l  equ i l ib r ium "  may be demonstrated by observing the  
exac t  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between I and I I  which e x i s t  a t  these  p o in t s .
By producing a t  th e  p o in t  c^ ,  I i s  g e n e ra t in g  s p i l l o u t s  o f  q^r^ = b ^ .  
I I ' s  consumpt ion-reac t ion  curve d i c t a t e s  t h a t  f o r  the  leve l  o f  s p i n ­
outs  genera ted  by I ,  I I  should produce a t  q2* Performing in  t h i s  way, 
I I ' s  s p i l l o u t s  equal q2r 2 = b jT j .  Since each community i s ,  in  f a c t ,  
o p e ra t in g  as the  o th e r  expects  i t  t o  a c t ,  e q u i l ib r iu m  must e x i s t .
I t  must be r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  th e  above e q u i l ib r iu m  i s  only "expec­
t a t i o n a l  e q u i l i b r i u m " - - i t  i d e n t i f i e s  a s i t u a t i o n  in  which each commun­
i t y  i s  a c t in g  e x a c t ly  as  the  o th e r  expected i t  to  a c t .  Suppose t h a t  
with given t a s t e s ,  income e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  and t ra n s fo rm a t io n  cu rves ,  the  
p r e f e r r e d  p o s i t i o n  f o r  I i s  and f o r  I I ,  z%. The ques t ion  must be 
asked whether  i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  f o r  (q^ + q2 ) to  be g r e a t e r  than (z^ + z2 ).  
I f  t h i s  co nd i t ion  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  th e  r e a c t i o n  model may lead  to  too much 
o f  the  pub l ic  good be ing provided in aggrega te .  From Figure  I I ,  i t  can 
be seen t h a t  Aj > so t h a t ,  in t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  Will iams'  r e a c t io n  
model demonstrates  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  t o t a l  product ion  o f  a 
pub l ic  good to  exceed th e  optimum amount.
The conc lus ions  o f  Will iams' a n a ly s i s  have been c r i t i c i z e d  in two 
major a r e a s :  (1) the  con ten t ion  t h a t  an aggrega te  oversupply o f  l o ­
c a l l y  provided pu b l ic  goods i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with  Pare to  o p t im a l i ty  and
(2) t h a t  only r a r e l y  w i l l  th e  necessa ry  combinations  o f  p r ic e  and i n ­
come e l a s t i c i t i e s  e x i s t  t o  permit  an aggrega te  oversupply o f  l o c a l l y  
provided pu b l ic  goods. The i n i t i a l  c r i t i c i s m ,  by William C Brainard
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and Trenery Dolbear ,  Jr. ,*®® ques t ioned  th e  leg i t im acy  o f  W il l iam 's  
requirement t h a t  s o c ia l  optima be def ined  wi th in  th e  con tex t  o f  an
agreement to  a l im i te d  pooling o f  autonomy by the  communities.  The
reason f o r  t h i s  o b je c t io n  was t h a t  one community would be made worse 
o f f  by agree ing  to  pool autonomy and would, t h e r e f o r e ,  not be l i k e l y  
to  do so v o l u n t a r i l y .  But i f  pooling were done under compulsion, the  
r e s u l t i n g  movement t o  a p o s i t i o n  o f  aggrega te  oversupply  o f  a l o c a l l y  
provided pub l ic  good would v i o l a t e  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  Pare to  improvement.
Continuing with t h i s  theme, Mark A. Pauly contend t h a t  Will iams' 
conclus ions  were reached because o f  a f a i l u r e  " to  sp e c i fy  c l e a r l y  in 
what way the  ' l o c a l  p u b l ic  good' being d iscussed  possesses  elements o f  
' p u b l i c n e s s ' . Pauly p resen ted  fo u r  examples o f  how d i f f e r e n t  
s p i l l  out  assumptions  would a f f e c t  the  a t t a in m en t  o f  o p t im a l i ty .  In 
the  case  o f  a good with no i n t e r i o r  intracommunity s p i l l o u t s ,  the  
e q u i l ib r iu m  p rov is ion  o f  a pub l ic  good would be a t  an optimum l e v e l .
In the  o th e r  th re e  c a s e s ,  however, when s p i l l o u t s  o f  one type o r  an­
o th e r  e x i s t e d ,  e q u i l ib r iu m  f a i l e d  to  meet the  Samuel son co n d i t io n s  f o r  
o p t i m a l i t y ,  i .  e . , t h a t  summed marginal b e n e f i t s  equal marginal c o s t .
An a n a ly s i s  o f  what would be r equ i red  to  achieve o p t i m a l i ty  led  t o  the
conclus ion  t h a t  in some cases  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  an optimum p o s i t io n  
to  e x i s t  a t  a leve l  o f  ou tp u t  l e s s  than eq u i l ib r iu m .  But i f  t h i s
*®®William C. Brainard  and F. Trenery Dolbear ,  J r . ,  "The P o s s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  Oversupply o f  Local 'P u b l i c '  Goods: A C r i t i c a l  Note,"
Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LXXV (February,  1967), pp. 86-90.
*°^Mark V. Pauly, "O p t im a l i ty ,  'P u b l i c '  Goods, and Local Gov­
ernments: A General T h eore t ica l  A n a ly s is , "  Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
Economy. LXXVII (May, 1970), p. 572-585.
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were t r u e ,  a t ta inm en t  o f  o p t im a l i ty  would n e c e s s i t a t e  a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  income and would* t h e r e f o r e ,  not  be a Pareto  improvement. I t  i s  
only when o p t im a l i ty  i s  achieved a t  h igher  l e v e l s  o f  pub l ic  good p ro­
v is io n  t h a t  a Pare to  improvement i s  p o s s ib le .  Thus, Pauly v in d ica ted  
both p o s i t io n s  on th e  ques t ion  o f  whether  too much o r  too small an 
amount o f  l o c a l l y  provided p u b l ic  goods would be produced in indepen­
dent e q u i l ib r iu m ,  but  demonstrated t h a t  a Pare to  improvement could be 
made only through an expansion in the  supply o f  th e  pub l ic  good.
The f i n a l  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the  con troversy  was provided by Herber t
Mohring and Allan Maslove.^®® The purpose o f  t h e i r  work was to :
. . . address  th e  q u e s t io n ,  How d i s p a r a t e  must com­
munit ies  be in t h e i r  p r i c e  and income e l a s t i c i t i e s  
o f  demand f o r  th e  "Williams E ffec t"  to  be observed?
That i s ,  under what c ircumstances  would uncompen­
sa te d  s p i l l o v e r s  o f  the  type o f  pu b l ic  good Williams 
cons idered  r e s u l t  in  g r e a t e r  ou tpu t  than would even­
t u a t e  i f  compensation were p a i d . *09
Mohring and Maslove's a n a ly s i s  involved an a lg e b r a i c  model which 
t r e a t e d  a community's s p i l l o u t s  as " id e n t i c a l  with a simple exc ise  
ta x  problem." The procedure c o n s is ted  o f  imposing an ex c i s e  tax  
equal to  a percentage o f  pub l ic  good ou tpu t  by a community ( th u s ,  
the  ex c i s e  ta x  opera ted  s i m i l a r l y  t o  a lo s s  o f  s p i l l o u t s  by the 
community) and t r a n s f e r r i n g  the  in -k ind  r e c e i p t s  to  ano the r  commun­
i t y .  In t h i s  model,  a subsequent  e l im in a t io n  o f  th e  tax  t r a n s f e r  
would s a t i s fy  W il l iam 's  assumed pooling o f  autonomy to  provide f o r
^ H e r b e r t  Mohring and Allan Maslove, "The Optimal P rovis ion  o f  
Public  Goods: Yet Another Comment," Journal  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Econoiny, 
LXXXI (May/June, 1973), pp. 778-785.
109Ib id . , p. 778.
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r equ i red  payments f o r  s p i l l o u t s .  A f te r  d e r iv in g  a lg e b ra ic  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ips  from demand and supply fu n c t io n s  f o r  the  v a r i a b l e s  to  be t e s t e d ,  
var ious  r a t e s  o f  t a x e s ,  p r i c e  and income e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  and shares  o f  
income spent  on the  pu b l ic  good were s u b s t i t u t e d  to  determine under 
what c o n d i t io n s  an oversupply  o f  pub l ic  goods would occur .  I t  was 
found t h a t  when th e  p u b l ic  good " . . .  accounts  f o r  a modest share  
o f  t o t a l  e x p e n d i tu re s ,  th e  Williams e f f e c t  would be observed only i f  
t r u l y  s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  in t a s t e s  e x i s t .  "HO Also,  when th e  r a t e  
o f  t a x a t io n  in c re a se d ,  r e q u i re d  e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  an oversupply o f  
p u b l ic  goods would in c re a se  as w e l l .  These r e s u l t s  led  to  the  con­
c lu s io n  t h a t :  " . . .  a l though the  W il l iam 's  e f f e c t  involves  no v io ­
l a t i o n s  o f  rece ived  d o c t r in e  concerning consumer behav io r ,  the  odds 
a g a i n s t  i t s  occurence a re  high a t  l e a s t  in th e  co n tex t  o f  th e  model 
he p resen ted .  " H I
Summary
This c h ap te r  has been devoted to  a p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  a broad-based 
body o f  l i t e r a t u r e  d ea l in g  with resource  a l l o c a t i o n  by u n i t s  o f  loca l  
government. The d i sc u s s io n  began with an a n a ly s i s  o f  a primary impe­
diment to  e f f i c i e n t  re so u rce  a l l o c a t i o n ;  namely, e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  The 
e x t e r n a l i t y  problem was t r e a t e d  f i r s t  from th e  vantage p o in t  o f  t r a c in g  
the  ev lov ing ,  in c r e a s in g ly  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  term. Sub­
sequent  to  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  d e f i n i t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  e x t e r n a l -
110I b i d . , p. 783. 
U l I b i d . , pp. 784-785.
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i t i e s , arguments were p resen ted  r e l a t i v e  to  the  method o f  remedying 
th e  mi s a l l o c a t i o n  o f  re sou rces  caused by the  e x i s t a n c e  o f  e x t e r n a l ­
i t i e s .  Two d i f f e r i n g  opin ions  were p re se n te d ,  one advocated f r e e  
barga in ing  between the  r e c i p i e n t  and th e  producer  o f  th e  e x t e r n a l i t y  
and the  o th e r  mainta ined t h a t  an o u t s id e  f o r c e —the  government— 
should e n t e r  and a r b i t r a t e  a s o lu t i o n .  In the  con tex t  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  
th e  arguments can be extended to  two loca l  governmental u n i t s  which 
a r e  a f f e c t e d  by e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  The e x t e r n a l i t i e s  h inder  e f f i c i e n t  
r esource  a l l o c a t i o n .  To so lve  th e  problem, the  communities could 
n e g o t i a t e  between themselves  o r  could tu rn  t o  an o u t s id e  f o r c e —the 
n a t iona l  government—f o r  a s o lu t io n .
The next s ec t io n  o f  t h e  c h a p te r  then addressed the  s u b je c t  of  
intergovernmental  fu n c t io n s  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in a f e d e r a l i s t i c  gov­
ernmental s t r u c t u r e .  The b e n e f i t s  o f  a fed e ra l i sm  v i s - a - v i s  a u n i t a ry  
form o f  government were cons idered  and an ex ten s iv e  t re a tm en t  o f  g r a n t s -  
i n - a i d  as a tool  f o r  intergovernmental  coopera t ion  (inducement) was 
p resen ted .  Counter arguments were developed dea l ing  with the  e f f e c ­
t iv e n e s s  o f  g ran ts  in improving resource  a l l o c a t i o n ,  and the  ques t ion  
o f  whether o r  not  g r a n t s  f o s t e r e d  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o r  s t im u la t io n  e f f e c t s  
on loca l  government ex p en d i tu re s .  As a f i n a l  c o n s id e ra t i o n ,  th e  d i f ­
f e r e n t  e f f e c t s  o f  co n d i t io n a l  and uncondi t ional  g ran ts  on loca l  gov­
ernmental behavior  were i n v e s t ig a t e d .  The purpose o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  was 
to  provide background in form at ion  which w i l l  be heav i ly  drawn upon in 
l a t e r  p a r t s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  when ana lyz ing  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  
on coopera t ion  among u n i t s  o f  loca l  government.
Concluding the  ch a p te r  was an argument by Alan Wil liams,  and r e ­
sponses t o  th e  argument,  which ques t ioned  th e  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  l o c a l l y  
provided pub l ic  goods would be suppl ied  in l e s s  than  optimum q u a n t i t i e s .  
The c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  W il l iam 's  argument to  th e  development o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  
was not  so much concerned with th e  conc lus ions  reached^as  with the  me­
thod used to  ob ta in  th e  conc lus ions .  His geometric  r e a c t io n  model pro­
vided the  s t imulus  f o r  developing the  r e a c t io n -c o o p e ra t io n  model which 
i s  p resen ted  in  Chapter  I I I .  That model,  by demonstra t ing more d i r e c t l y  
the  n a tu re  o f  th e  r e a c t io n s  ad jus tm en t ,  concurs  with  Bra inard ,  Dolbear ,  
and Pauly t h a t  an oversupply  o f  p u b l ic  goods would imply a non-Pare to 
change because o f  a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income.
CHAPTER I I I
JOINT PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 
IN AN INTERACTION MODEL
This ch ap te r  begins  the  development o f  an a n a ly s i s  which w i l l  
cu lminate in a d e t a i l e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  f ed e ra l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  to  
lower l e v e l s  of  government in  the  United S t a t e s .  The purpose o f  t h i s  
ch ap te r  i s  to  analyze  th e  concept o f  optimum supply o f  p u b l ic  goods 
as  i t  a p p l i e s  to  loca l  governments.  The primary d i f f i c u l t y  encount­
ered in t h i s  a rea  i s  th e  ex i s t e n c e  o f  in tergovernmental  s p i l l o u t s  of  
pub l ic  goods produced by an in d iv id u a l  loca l  government .* When such 
s p i l l o u t s  a re  g en e ra te d ,  i t  i s  necessa ry  t h a t  they  be recognized  and 
included in both th e  r e c i p i e n t  and supplying governments'  resource  
a l l o c a t i n g  c a l c u lu s .  By a c t in g  in i s o l a t i o n  and f a i l i n g  to  cons ide r  
the  s p i l l  o u t s / s p i l l  in s  o f  pub l ic  goods to / f ro m  o th e r  governments,  a 
community w i l l  not  a l l o c a t e  re sou rces  in  a manner c o n s i s t e n t  with 
co n d i t io n s  necessary  t o  achieve maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n .
*For purposes o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n ,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  loca l  gov­
ernments e x i s t  which s a t i s f y  optimum s i z e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  both production 
and d ec is ion  making c o s t s .  For a d i s c u s s io n  o f  the  former,  see  Le if  
Johansen, Public  Economics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. ,  1968). A
good t re a tm e n t  o f  the  l a t t e r  type o f  c o s t  i s  con ta ined  in Gordon 
Tul lock ,  Toward a Mathematics of  P o l i t i c s  (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The 
U n ive rs i ty  o f  Michigan P ress ,  1969) and James M. Buchanan and Gordon 
Tul lock ,  The Calculus o f  Consent (Ann Arbor,  Michigan: The U n ivers i ty  
o f  Michigan P re s s ,  1965).
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A Local Government Interdependency Model
The p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  t h i s  a n a ly s i s  inc lude  two loca l  governmental 
u n i t s  ( c i t i e s )  lo ca ted  oppos i te  each o th e r  on the  banks o f  a r i v e r .
The c i t i e s ,  f o r  convenience c a l l e d  Westbank and Eastbank, a re  assumed 
to  be i d e n t i c a l .  Both have id e n t i c a l  resource  endowments, production 
f u n c t io n s ,  and u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n s  which provide convex in d i f f e r e n c e  
curves to  the  o r ig i n .  I t  i s  f u r t h e r  assumed t h a t  the  c i t i e s  produce 
two goods, food and r i v e r  deepening,  and t h a t  the  income e l a s t i c i t i e s  
f o r  both goods a r e  g r e a t e r  than zero .  The good, food, p re se n t s  no 
spec ia l  problems f o r  th e  a n a ly s i s  because i t  i s  a pure ly  p r iv a t e  good 
consumed e n t i r e l y  w i th in  the  producing c i t y  with no s p i l l o u t s  o r  s p i 11- 
in s .  River deepening,  on the  o th e r  hand, i s  a pure ly  pub l ic  good whose 
b e n e f i t s  a r e  not con ta ined  w i th in  the  c i t y  supplying i t ,  but r a t h e r  
s p i 11 ou t  in equal q u a n t i t i e s  to  the  o th e r  c i t y .  For example, i f  the 
r i v e r  i s  dredged one f o o t  deeper ,  both c i t i e s  b e n e f i t  eq u a l ly  no mat­
t e r  who was re sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  dredging.  Other assumptions made to  
s im p l i fy  the  e x p o s i t io n  inc lude:  (1) no s t r a t e g i c  barga in ing  by the
communities,  (2) equal sh a r in g  o f  the  co s ts  of  pub l ic  good production 
when coopera t ion  between the  two communities e x i s t s ,  (3) barga in ing  
c o s t s  a re  ze ro ,  and (4) p o l i t i c a l  consequences do not  e n t e r  i n to  the 
c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  economic problems.
In t h i s  h igh ly  s im p l i f i e d  economy, each community would a t tempt  
to  maximize s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  i t s  c i t i z e n s  by producing the  combination 
o f  food and dredging f o r  which i t s  product ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s  curve i s  
tangen t  to  a so c ia l  w e l fa re  curve.  In so doing,  an e q u a l i t y  between
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the marginal r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  and marginal r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
f o r  both communities would be achieved and a Pareto  optimum a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  resources  would r e s u l t .
Such an e q u i l ib r iu m  i s  d isp layed  in Figure 3 which c o n s i s t s  of  
two par ts*  P a r t  A r e p re s e n t s  the  a t ta inm en t  of  eq u i l ib r iu m  f o r  West- 
bank and Par t  B provides  ’he same information  f o r  Eastbank. Produc­
t i o n  poss ib i" ! i tes  curves  f o r  the  two c i t i e s  have been drawn l i n e a r l y  
to  i n d i c a t e  a co n s ta n t  marginal r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  ( c o n s tan t  mar­
ginal  c o s t )  between the  pub l ic  good and the  p r iv a t e  good. A dd i t ion ­
a l l y ,  the  two p a r t s  have been co n s t ru c ted  so t h a t  the  l i n e  segments 
between the o r ig in  and v e r t i c a l  i n t e r c e p t  and the o r ig i n  and h o r i ­
zonta l  i n t e r c e p t  a re  equa l .  This convention f u r t h e r  emphasizes the  
theme o f  e q u a l i t y  as s t i p u l a t e d  above. In t h i s  model o f  independent  
ad jus tm ent ,  Westbank w i l l  produce Dw u n i t s  o f  dredging and Fw u n i t s  
of  food, and Eastbank w i l l  produce De u n i t s  o f  dredging and Fe u n i t s  
of food to  maximize s a t i s f a c t i o n .  Because o f  the  e q u a l i t y  assumption,
Dw = De = Fw = Fe-
Given th e  pub l ic  good, D, and the  p r iv a t e  good, F, the  f a m i la r
marginal cond i t ions  a s so c ia te d  with the  eq u i l ib r iu m  desc r ibed  above
may be obta ined  from th e  fo l lowing product ion  and u t i l i t y  func t ions
f o r  the  two c i t i e s :
(1A) Tw = T„ (Dw, F„) (IB) Te = Te (De , Fe )
(2A) U -  U,, (D , F ) (2B) U = U m ,  F J' w w w w  e e e e
where: Tw = product ion  fu nc t ion  f o r  Westbank
Te = product ion  fu nc t ion  f o r  Eastbank
£ * * r 6 A *//f$
0«£D6M>6-
u Jc stq am kS
l>/z£b(b/Aiiy
P a r t  A
co
Figure 3 
I s o l a t e d  Equi l ibr ium
-C*
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Uw = u t i l i t y  func t ion  f o r  Westbank 
Ug = u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n  f o r  Eastbank 
Dw = Westbank's product ion and consumption o f  D
Fw = Westbank's pr^d 'ic t ion and consumption o f  F
De = Eastbank 's  product ion and consumption of  D
Fg = Eastbank 's  i. educt ion and consumption o f  F
In i s o l a t e d  e q u i l ib r iu m ,  each c i t y  w i l l  a l l o c a t e  resources  in such a 
manner as to  equate  the  marginal r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  o f  th e  two 
goods with t h e i r  marginal r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n .  Thus,
f o r  Westbank and
f o r  Eastbank.
Since each c i t y  views D and F as pure p r iv a t e  goods, n e i t h e r  w i l l  have 
reason to  change t h e i r  product ion mix from the  composit ion i d e n t i f i e d  
by th e se  marginal c o n d i t io n s .
The foregoing  h igh ly  s im p l i f i e d  a n a ly s i s  may now be expanded and 
made more i n t e r e s t i n g  by re la x in g  the  model 's  o r ig in a l  assumptions.
The f i r s t  assumption to  be modified i s  the  improbable s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  
the  two loca l  governments were unable to  recognize  o r  b e n e f i t  from 
intergovernmental  s p i l l o u t s  o f  the  pub l ic  good, dredging.  In a more
(3A ) dT^ dUw
d°w = J 5 L  
f w  f w
dFw dFw
(3B) dT dU e __e




p r a c t i c a l  s e t t i n g ,  once a c i t y  dredged a r i v e r  to  new d ep th s ,  the 
deeper  r i v e r  would be e a s i l y  i n d e n t i f i a b l e  and e q u a l ly  a v a i l a b l e  to  
both communities.  Under th e se  c o n d i t i o n s ,  the  eq u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t io n s  
o f  Figure 3 r e p re s e n t  d i s e q u i l ib r iu m  combinat ions o f  dredging and food. 
Each c i t y  would f in d  i t s e l  consuming twice the  leve l  o f  dredging t h a t  
i t  expected and with the  ' ^ome e l a s t i c i t y  o f  food g r e a t e r  than ze ro ,  
th e r e  would be a r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  resources  in favo r  o f  food product ion .  
This r e a l l o c a t i o n  process  and the  r e s u l t i n g  eq u i l ib r iu m  may be demon­
s t r a t e d  by r e f e r r i n g  to  the  e f f e c t s  o f  Westbank's s p i l l o u t s  on East-
O
bank 's  product ion in Figure 4.
Figure 4 i s  c o n s t ru c te d  so t h a t  the  o r ig in  o f  the  diagram f o r  
Westbank co inc ides  with the  o rd in a te  i n t e r c e p t  of  Eastbank 's  produc­
t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  curve.  The v e r t i c a l  a ttachment o f  the  two diagrams 
makes i s  p o s s ib le  to  d i r e c t l y  measure the  e f f e c t  o f  Westbank's s p i 11- 
ou ts  to  Eastbank. For example, i f  product ion i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  i s o ­
l a t e d  eq u i l ib r iu m  l e v e l s  f o r  both communities,  Eastbank would be on
2
w elfa re  curve I producing and consuming OD u n i t s  o f  dredging and 1 e e
0Fg u n i t s  o f  food and Westbank would be on w e l fa re  curve Iw producing
1 1 and consuming OD* u n i t s  o f  dredging and 0Fw u n i t s  o f  food. Now, be­
cause dredging i s  a pure pub l ic  good; the  product ion  o f  OD̂  u n i t s  by 
Westbank e f f e c t s  an i n c r e a se  in the  o r d in a te  i n t e r c e p t  o f  Eastbank 's  
e f f e c t i v e  product ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s  curve from 0Te to  OD* and inc reases
^In the  d i scu s s io n  o f  Figure 4 ,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  n e i t h e r  c i t y  
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the  amount o f  pub l ic  good a v a i l a b l e  to  the  l a t t e r  c i t y  a t  every p o s s i ­
b le  leve l  o f  p r i v a t e  good product ion  by OD* u n i t s .  Hence, Eastbank 
exper iences  an i n c r ea se  in i t s  a t t a i n a b l e  combinations o f  pub l ic  and
p r iv a t e  goods and w i l l  be aM e to  reach  w e l fa re  curve I I e . In equ i-
3 ?l ib r iu m ,  Eastbank would c< isume 0De u n i t s  o f  dredging and 0F |  u n i t s
o f  food. To reach these  ^nsum pt ion  l e v e l s ,  Eastbank would produce
OF*: u n i t s  l '  food and OD̂  u n i t s  of  dredging.  I t  would then r e l y  on 
0 0
1 3Westbank to  supply th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in dredging between 0De and 0De .
This p o s i t i o n ,  however, does not  r e p re s e n t  f u l l  e q u i l i b r i u m , f o r  West­
bank would be making concur ren t  ad justments  in i t s  product ion  to  take  
advantage o f  s p i 1 Tins from Eastbank. Hence, t h e r e  w i l l  be a continuous 
ad jus tm en t - read jus tm en t  process  u n t i l  Westbank i s  producing th e  exact  
amount o f  pub l ic  good t h a t  Eastbank expects  i t  to  produce and v ice  
versa  f o r  Westbank’s ex p ec ta t io n  o f  Eastbank 's  pub l ic  good product ion .  
The process  can be exp la ined  by r e f e r r i n g  to  Figure 5 in which r e a c t io n  
curves  f o r  the  two c i t i e s  a re  der ived .  To focus primary a t t e n t i o n  on 
the  r e a c t io n  curves  themselves ,  the  s im p les t  p o s s ib le  assumptions were 
made concerning th e  p roduct ion  and u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n s  from which the 
r e a c t io n s  curves were der ived .  In a d d i t io n  to  the  assumed e q u a l i t y  
between the  two c i t i e s  p o s tu la t e d  a t  the  o u t s e t  of  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  which 
r e s u l t s  in P a r ts  I and V o f  the  f i g u r e  being i d e n t i c a l ,  o th e r  assump­
t io n s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  inc lude :
(1) The c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  l i n e a r  product ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s  curves 
f o r  th e  two c i t i e s  demonstrates  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a co n s ta n t  marginal 
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the  equal d i s t a n c e  between the  o r ig i n  and the  h o r izo n ta l  i n t e r c e p t s  of  
the  curves  in d i c a t e s  t h a t  both goods can be produced with equal e f f i ­
c iency by the  c i t i e s .
(2) The i n d i f f e r e n c e  maps f o r  the two c i t i e s  a re  symmetrical to
a ray drawn a t  a 45 degree angle  on th e  axes o f  the  lower p o r t io n s  of
P a r ts  I and V. This c o n ' ' a u c t i o n  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  c i t i e s  value pub­
l i c  and p r iv a t e  goods e q u a l ly  and t h a t  the  income e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  
equal throughout  the  income range.
Figure 5 c o n s i s t  o f  f i v e  p a r t s .  P a r ts  I and V show equ i l ib r iu m  
p o s i t io n s  f o r  Westbank and Eastbank, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a f t e r  p rov is ions  
have been made f o r  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  genera ted  by the  pu b l ic  good. P a r ts  
I I  and IV a re  simply he lp ing  diagrams which al low coord ina tes  f o r  
Westbank1s and Eastbank1s r e a c t io n  curves  to  be loca ted  in P ar t  I I I .
To begin the  a n a l y s i s ,  assume i n i t i a l l y  t h a t  Westbank produces 
none o f  the  pub l ic  good and i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  loca ted  a t  p o in t  H in P a r t  I . 
This p o in t  may now be t r a c e d  to  P a r t  IV, where i t  meets the  he lp ing  l i n e  
( a t  the  o r i g i n ) ,  then  through P a r t  I I I  to  P a r t  II  where i t  meets the  
help ing  l i n e  (again a t  the  o r i g i n ) ,  and f i n a l l y  to  P a r t  B where i t
meets the  v e r t i c a l  ax i s  a t  p o in t  D. The r e s u l t  i s  as expected;  s ince
Westbank produces no pu b l ic  goods, Eastbank rece iv es  no s p i l l  i n s ,  and, 
th u s ,  exper iences  no change in i t s  product ion  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Under
these  c o n d i t io n s ,  Eastbank i s  co n s t r a in ed  by the  t rans fo rm at ion  curve
T 1DF and in e q u i l ib r iu m  w i l l  produce Dg u n i t s  of  dredging and F* u n i t s
o f  food. The f i n a l  th in g  t h a t  remains to  be done in  t h i s  s tep  i s  to
lo c a t e  Eastbank1s r e a c t io n  to  the  leve l  o f  Westbank's product ion  o f  the
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3
publ ic  good in P a r t  I I I .  This i s  done by t r a c i n g  D u n i t s  o f  the  pub-
e
l i e  good product ion by Westbank. Since the  l a t t e r  amount i s  z e ro ,  the
coord ina te  i s  lo ca ted  on the  o r d in a te  of  P a r t  I I I  a t  p o in t  E. To iden-
3
t i f y  ano ther  p o in t ,  assume ■'n P a r t  I t h a t  Westbank i s  producing D
w
u n i t s  o f  dredging.  Tracing t h i s  q u a n t i t y  through Par ts  IV, I I I ,  II,
and f i n a l l y  i n to  V, th e  b u d jp t  c o n s t r a i n t  BC i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  East-
3 5
bank. In e q u i l ib r iu m ,  Eastbank w i l l  consume Fg u n i t s  o f  food and Dg
u n i t s  o f  dredging.  Of the  t o t a l  amount o f  dredging consumed, Eastbank
1 5 1 3
produced only  D0 u n i t s  and rece ived  the  remainder ,  (Dg - D0 ) = Dw, as
s p i l l  ins  from Westbank. By t r a c i n g  Eastbank 's  product ion  o f  dredging,
1 3D„ u n i t s ,  i n to  P a r t  I I I  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  a coo rd ina te  with D. u n i t s  ofe 3 w
dredging by Westbank, a second p o in t  on Eas tbank 's  r e a c t io n  curve i s  
lo c a te d .  At the  r i s k  o f  redundancy, but  to  f i rm ly  i d e n t i f y  the  con­
s t r u c t i o n  techn ique ,  one f in a l  co o rd in a te  w i l l  be developed f o r  E a s t ­
bank ' s  r e a c t io n  curve.  Suppose t h a t  Westbank produces G u n i t s  of 
d redging,  i .  e . , uses a l l  o f  i t s  r esources  f o r  dredging and none f o r  
food. Tracing t h i s  amount to  th e  he lp ing  l i n e  in Par t  IV r e s u l t s  in 
the  e s tab l i sh m en t  o f  p o in t  Ej.  Going through P a r t  I I I  to  the  help ing  
l i n e  in P a r t  II  and then  over to  P a r t  V permits  the  lo c a t io n  o f  budget 
c o n s t r a i n t  LM f o r  Eastbank. Subjec t  to  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t ,  Eastbank w il l  
consume D u n i t s  o f  dredging and F u n i t s  of  food. The c i t y  w i l l  pro­
duce a l l  o f  i t s  own food and r e l y  on Westbank to  supply a l l  o f  the  
dredging.  Tracing zero  u n i t s  of  dredging from P a r t  V i n t o  P a r t  I I I  
to  e s t a b l i s h  a c o o rd in a te  with Westbank's d redging ,  the  p o in t  Ej i s  
obta ined  f o r  Eas tbank 's  r e a c t io n  curve.  By con t inu ing  t h i s  process
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f o r  o th e r  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  the  pub l ic  good which may be produced by West­
bank, a f u l l y  def ined  r e a c t io n  curve f o r  Eastbank w i l l  be ob ta ined .
To de termine Westbank's r e a c t io n  cu rve ,  P a r ts  V, I I I ,  I ,  and IV 
may be used in a manner analogous to  the  way Par ts  I ,  IV, I I I ,  I I ,
and V were used to  d e r iv e  Eastbank 's  curve.  For exapmle, i f  Eastbank 
3
i s  producing D0 u n i t s  o f  d red g in g ,  an in c rease  in Westhank's budget
c o n s t r a i n t  from GH to  JK w i l l  be e f f e c t e d .  In eq u i l ib r iu m ,  Westbank
3 5
w i l l  consume F u n i t s  o f  food and D u n i t s  o f  dredging.  I t  w i l l ,  
w w
however, produce only Dw u n i t s  o f  the  l a t t e r  good f o r  i t s e l f  and r e l y
5 1 3  1
on Eastbank to  supply (D -  D )  = Do u n i t s .  Tracing D through P a r t
W W 6  W
3
IV in to  P a r t  I I I  where i t  i n t e r s e c t s  with D , a coo rd ina te  f o r  West-e
bank 's  r e a c t io n  curve i s  e s t a b l i s h e d
For a more complete understanding o f  the  r e a c t io n  cu rves ,  a t t e n ­
t io n  i s  d i r e c t e d  to  Figure  6 which i s  a r eproduc t ion  on a l a r g e r  s c a le  
o f  the  r e a c t io n  curves  der ived  in Figure 5. The curves EEj and WŴ 
a r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  th e  r e a c t io n  curves  f o r  Eastbank and Westbank. Be­
cause o f  the  i d e n t i t y  assumptions d iscussed  above, OE = OW and OE  ̂ = 
OWj. Equi l ibr ium in t h i s  diagram i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  p o in t  T, th e  i n t e r ­
se c t io n  between the  two re a c t io n  cu rves ,  f o r  i t  i s  only a t  t h i s  p o in t  
t h a t  Westbank i s  doing e x a c t ly  what Eastbank expected i t  to  do when 
f i n a l i z i n g  i t s  p roduct ion  p la n s ,  and Eastbank i s  doing e x a c t ly  what 
Westbank expected i t  t o  do when f i n a l i z i n g  i t s  production p lan s .
The r e a c t i o n  process  which produces e q u i l ib r iu m  may be demon­
s t r a t e d  by co n s id e r in g  the  leve l  o f  publ ic  goods produced by each 
c i t y  under t o t a l l y  independent  behav io r ,  as rep re sen ted  by p o in t  P
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and, hence, w i l l  respond to  the  unexpected level  o f  s p i 11 ins  which 
the  o th e r  i s  producing.  The second product ion adjustment  taken by 
the  c i t i e s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in Eastbank producing Eg u n i t s  o f  the  publ ic  
good and Westbank producing W3 u n i t s .  Again, however, t h i s  combin­
a t io n  o f  the  p u b l ic  good does  not  r e p re s e n t  e q u i l ib r iu m  and f o r  the 
same reason t h a t  combination E2 , W2 d id  no t .  Each c i t y ,  then ,  w il l  
con t inue  tc r e a c t  to  th e  o t h e r ' s  product ion  of  the  pub l ic  good and 
th e re  w i l l  be a s teady  convergence to  e q u i l ib r iu m  a t  T.
Although the  preceding  a n a ly s i s  was conducted under the  assump­
t io n  o f  simultaneous ad jus tm en t ,  t h i s  was not  a necessary  cond i t ion  
f o r  the  a t ta inm en t  o f  eq u i l ib r ium .  The movement toward equ i l ib r ium  
could have been demonstrated e qua l ly  as well by assuming t h a t  one 
o f  the  c i t i e s  ( e i t h e r  one) recognized and reac ted  to  the  q u a n t i ty  o f  
pub l ic  goods being produced by the  o th e r  a t  P and i n i t i a t e d  the  ad­
ju s tm en t .  The model would have then moved to  e q u i l ib r iu m  not through 
simultaneous ad jus tm en ts ,  but through a l e a d - 1ag process  with each 
c i t y  changing i t s  p o s i t i o n  from l e a d e r  to  fo l low er  to  l e a d e r  a t  each 
s te p .  While the  movement to  e q u i l ib r iu m  would have been d i f f e r e n t ,  
the  ac tua l  p o s i t i o n  would have been the same. In g e n e r a l ,  Table V 
in d i c a t e s  how pub l ic  good product ion  w i l l  change f o r  each c i t y  i f  i t  
i s  loca ted  in  any o f  th e  fou r  a reas  bounded by the  r e a c t io n  curves.
The d i scu ss io n  o f  r e a c t io n  curve e q u i l ib r iu m  to  t h i s  p o in t  has 
been conducted under the  co nd i t ion  t h a t  i n t e r s e c t i o n  between the 
curves w i l l  occur in th e  f i r s t  quadrant .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  however, 
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in  o th e r  quadran ts  o f  a graph. Consider,  f o r  example, the  r e s u l t s  of
assuming t h a t  the  re sou rce  base o f  Eastbank g r e a t l y  exceeds t h a t  of 
Westbank. Under t h i s  assumption,  Westbank1s product ion  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
curve in P a r t  I o f  Figure 7 l i e s  r e l a t i v e l y  c lo se  to  the  o r i g i n ,  while 
th e  p roduct ion  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  curve f o r  Eastbank l i e s  r e l a t i v e l y  f a r  
away from the  o r ig i n  in P ar t  V o f  the  f ig u r e .
For convenience in  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  assume t h a t  Eastbank i s  in i n i t i a l
e q u i l ib r iu m  on w e l fa re  func t ion  Ip in P ar t  V, producing and consuming D*
1 e 
u n i t s  of  dredging and Fe u n i t s  o f  food. Tracing Eastbank 's  spi 11 out  o f
dredging through P a r t  I I I  and in to  P a r t  I ,  i t  i s  found t h a t  the  amount
o f  s p i l l  ins  which Westbank r ece iv es  i s  g r e a t e r  than the  community's
c a p a c i ty  to  produce dredging f o r  i t s e l f .  Reacting to  th e  s p i l l i n g ,
1 1
Westbank would l i k e  to  move to  a p o s i t i o n  such as D , F on welfa re
w w
fu n c t io n ,  I,,. To reach  t h a t  p o s i t i o n ,  however, Westbank would have w
to  be ab le  to  produce F* u n i t s  o f  food. Lacking t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y ,  West-
w
bank w i l l  only be ab le  to  o b ta in  a leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  equal to  II ,
2
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u n i t s  o f  food. Eastbank, r ece iv in g  no s p i 11 i n s ,  w i l l  remain a t  the  
eq u i l ib r ium  p o s i t io n  assumed a t  the  beginning o f  the a n a ly s i s .
P a r t  I I I  of  Figure  7 provides  a d d i t io n a l  i n s i g h t  in to  the  na ture  
o f  the  r e a c t io n  p re s su re s  c r  the  two communities.  The r e a c t io n  curves 
were co n s t ru c ted  in the  same way as the  r e a c t io n  curves in Figure 5.
The obvious d i f f e r e n c e  between Figures 5 and 7 i s  the  lo c a t io n  of  the  
p o in t  o f  i n t e r s e c t i o n  between the  two re a c t io n  curves .  In the  p re sen t  
ca se ,  i n t e r s e c t i o n  occurs  in the  second quadrant  r a t h e r  than the  f i r s t  
quadrant  o f  P ar t  I I I .  Eastbank, which i s  r ece iv ing  no s p i 11 ins  from 
Westbank, i s  o p e ra t in g  on i t s  r e a c t io n  curve a t  p o in t  A. Westbank 
would l i k e  to  respond to  the  leve l  o f  s p i 11 ins  t h a t  i t  i s  rece iv in g  
by producing a t  p o in t  B on i t s  r e a c t io n  curve.  Such a p o s i t io n  is  
not p o s s ib l e ,  however, because i t  involves  a nega t ive  level  o f  publ ic  
good product ion and a leve l  of  p r iv a t e  good production which exceeds 
Westbank's c a p a b i l i t i e s  to  produce. Under th ese  c i rcum stances ,  West­
bank w i l l  have a con t inu ing  p o s i t i v e  r e a c t io n  fo rce  which i t  i s  power­
l e s s  to  e l im in a te  because o f  i t s  r e l a t i v e  poverty.
An ad d i t io n a l  f a c t o r  which could cause an i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  r e a c t io n  
curves  in the  second quadrant  i s  the income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  Westbank f o r  
the  pub l ic  good. I f  Westbank's income e l a s t i c i t y  i s  sm al l ,  s p i 11 ins  
o f  dredging w i l l  cause a s u b s t a n t i a l  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  loca l  resources  
in favo r  of  food product ion .  I t  i s  conceivable  t h a t  i f  Westbank r e ­
ceived la rg e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  s p i 11i n s , a p o in t  could be reached,  as in 
the  previous  c a se ,  such t h a t  the  community has a v a i l a b l e  more than 
enough dredging r e l a t i v e  to  food. Suppose, f o r  example, t h a t  Westbank
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has rece ived  a s u f f i c i e n t  q u a n t i t y  o f  s p i l l  ins  from Eastbank so t h a t  
i s  has a l ready  devoted a l l  o f  i t s  resources  to  th e  product ion  o f  food. 
Addit ional s p i 11 ins  o f  dredging would r e s u l t  in Westbank's d e s i r e  to  
cont inue  to  r e a l l o c a t e  local  r esources  toward food product ion .  But 
because a l l  o f  i t s  r esources  a re  a l r e a d y  being used to  produce food, 
a f u r t h e r  r e a l l o c a t i o n  of resources  would r e q u i r e  t h a t  Westbank pro­
duce a nega t ive  amount o f  d redging;  hence, the  r e a c t io n  curve i n t e r ­
s e c t io n  in the  second quadrant .
Of the  remaining two q u ad ra n ts ,  t h r e e  and f o u r ,  quadrant  four  
p re sen t s  no sp ec ia l  problems. The same circumstances  t h a t  e x i s t e d  
f o r  Westbank to  c r e a t e  an i n t e r s e c t i o n  in the  second quadrant  would 
have to  be p re sen t  f o r  Eastbank. That i s ,  f o r  an i n t e r s e c t i o n  of  
r e a c t io n  curves to  occur in the  fo u r th  quadran t ,  Eastbank would have 
to  be poor r e l a t i v e  to  Westbank and /o r  Eastbank1s income e l a s t i c i t y  
f o r  dredging would have to  be small .
An i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  r e a c t io n  curves in the  t h i r d  quadrant  i s  more 
unique and r e q u i r e s  an a d d i t io n a l  ex p lana t ion .  F i r s t ,  in  o rde r  fo r  
an i n t e r s e c t i o n  to  occur in the  t h i r d  quad ran t ,  the  r e a c t io n  curves  o f  
both Eastbank and Westbank must be p o s i t i v e l y  s loped.  With the  r e a c ­
t ion curves having a p o s i t i v e  s lo p e ,  i t  must be t ru e  t h a t  s p i l l i n s  which 
one loca l  government r e c e iv e s  from th e  o th e r  w i l l  cause the  r e c i p i e n t  
government to  expend more o f  i t s  r esources  on the  publ ic  good. The 
s p i l l  in in c rease  in rea l  income o f  each community r e s u l t s  in each p ro ­
ducing more pub l ic  goods and l e s s  p r iv a te  goods. But f o r  t h i s  to  hap­
pen, the  p r iv a te  good must be i n f e r i o r  in both cotTmunities.
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Before concluding the  a n a ly s i s  o f  eq u i l ib r iu m ,  i t  i s  necessary  to 
ev a lu a te  the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  r e a c t io n  model in terms o f  Pareto  e f f i ­
c iency.  To conduct th e  e v a lu a t io n ,  a r e tu rn  w i l l  be made to  th e  o r i ­
g inal assumptions a s so c ia te d  with Figure 5. For the  p re sen t  purposes ,  
the  e q u i l ib r iu m  o f  Figure  5 has been d u p l ica ted  in Figure 8 . In the  
l a t t e r  f i g u r e ,  th e  productfon and consumption combinations o f  p r iv a te  
and publ ic  goods f o r  each o f  the  c i t i e s  may be t r a c e d  from the  i n t e r ­
s e c t io n  o f  the  two re a c t io n  curves in P a r t  I I I  to  P a r t s  I and V. For
1
example, with  Eastbank producing Dg u n i t s  of  th e  pub l ic  good, Westbank
w i l l  be loca ted  on r ea l  income curve D*K and w i l l  reach equ i l ib r iu m  a t
the  p o in t  o f  tangency between t h i s  curve and i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve Iw.
The e q u i l ib r iu m  mix o f  publ ic  and p r iv a t e  goods in consumption w il l
o
e q u a l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  Dw and Fw u n i t s  with Westbank producing Fw u n i t s
1
o f  the  p r iv a t e  good and D u n i t s  o f  the  pub l ic  good. The d i f f e r e n c e
1 W
between D* and D°,De u n i t s ,  w i l l  be the  r e s u l t  o f  s p i l l i n s  from E a s t ­
bank. In a s im i l a r  manner, the  equ i l ib r iu m  consumption mix o f  the  two
o
goods f o r  Eastbank i s  found to  be De u n i t s  o f  the  pub l ic  good and F0 
u n i t s  o f  the  p r iv a t e  good. Eastbank w il l  produce Fg u n i t s  o f  the  p r i -
i
va te  good and D0 u n i t s  o f  the pub l ic  good i t s e l f  and r e ly  on s p i l l i n s
o 1
from Westbank to  provide the  d i f f e r e n c e  between D0 and D0 .
As demonstrated in  the  f i g u r e ,  e q u i l ib r iu m  f o r  each c i t y  c o n s i s t s  
o f  the  p o in t  o f  tangency between i t s  rea l income curve and an i n d i f f e r ­
ence curve.  Because the  rea l  income curve i s  p a r a l l e l  to  the  i s o l a t e d  
income o r  product ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s  curve ,  each c i t y  i s  o pe ra t ing  a t  the 
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r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  i s  equal to  i t s  marginal r a t e  of  s u b s t i t u t i o n .
In an a l l - p r i v a t e  good world ,  t h i s  e q u a l i t y  would r e s u l t  in  the  maxi­
mum leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  being r e a l i z e d  by both communities.  Since 
one o f  the  goods i s  p u b l i c ,  however, e f f i c i e n c y  r e q u i re s  t h a t  each c i t y  
a d j u s t  product ion  u n t i l  i t s  marginal r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  o f  dredging 
i n to  food i s  equal to  t h e  combined marginal r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  
dredging fo r  food f o r  both communities.^ Symbolical ly ,  MRTe = MRSe +
MRSW f o r  Eastbank and MRT = MRS, + MRS f o r  Westbank i f  re sou rces  a re  w w w e
to  be a l l o c a t e d  op t im a l ly .  Under th e se  c o n d i t i o n s ,  th e n ,  i t  appears 
t h a t  the  model s u f f e r s  from an in t e rn a l  c o n f l i c t ,  i . e . ,  i t  provides 
p r iv a t e  good o p t i m a l i ty  with  the  ex i s t e n c e  of  a p u b l ic  good.
A r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  model 's  geometry, however, w i l l  permit  
a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  apparen t  in co n s i s ten cy .  Refer r ing  to  E as t ­
bank' s e q u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t i o n ,  the  community i t  en joying  a leve l  o f  s a t ­
i s f a c t i o n  as i d e n t i f i e d  by soc ia l  w e l fa re  curve I I e , consuming D° u n i t s
o f  dredging and F0 u n i t s  o f  food. Of the  D° u n i t s  o f  dredging consumed,
1
Eastbank produces only o n e - h a l f ,  o r  De u n i t s  i t s e l f ,  along with the  f u l l
F u n i t s  o f  food. Based on t h i s  combination o f  the  two p roduc ts ,  D* e e
and Fe , Eastbank would only be ab le  to  achieve a leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
as shown by the  w e l fa re  curve I e . Obviously,  with w e l fa re  curve f [ [G 
c u t t i n g  budget c o n s t r a i n t  DF, Eastbank 's  ac tua l  marginal r a t e  o f  t r a n s -
^The well-known co n d i t io n  f o r  optimal re sou rce  a l l o c a t i o n  has been 
ques tioned  when more than one pub l ic  good i s  involved and a d i s t o r t i o n -  
a ry  tax  i s  used to  f inance  the  goods. See, Lawrence J .  Law, Eytan 
S h i sk in s k i ,  and Joseph E. S t i g l i t z ,  "E f f ic ie n cy  in the  Optimum Supply 
o f  Public  Goods," Econometrica , XLVI (March, 1978), pp. 269-284.
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formation (MRT) i s  g r e a t e r  than i t s  marginal r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  fo r  
i t s  own p roduc t ion .  Furthermore,  i t  can be demonstrated t h a t  the  same 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t s  between Westbank's a c tu a l  marginal r a t e  o f  t r a n s ­
formation and i t s  marginal r ^ t e  of  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  i t s  own product ion .  
These r e s u l t s  a re  e x a c t ly  what i s  expected f o r  co n s is ten cy  with the 
requirements  f o r  Pare to  o p t i m l i t y ;  namely, t h a t  the  summed marginal 
r a t e s  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  a pub l ic  good be equal to  the  producing
e n t i t y ' s  marginal r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n .  I t  only remains to  take  the
f in a l  s tep  and demonstrate  t h a t  MRT.. = MRS., + MRSQ and MRTrt = MRS„ +r w w e e e
MRSW.
Refer r ing  once again to  Eastbank 's  equ i l ib r iu m  p o s i t i o n ,  the 
s h i f t e d  budget c o n s t r a i n t  which r e s u l t e d  from s p i l l  ins  can be viewed 
as a s u r ro g a te  f o r  Westbank's budget c o n s t r a i n t .  With j u s t  Westbank's 
own consumption o f  the  publ ic  good, e q u i l ib r iu m  did not  e x i s t .  Now, 
with Eastbank 's  consumption added, eq u i l ib r ium  has been e s ta b l i s h e d  
and, hence, Westbank's marginal r a t e  o f  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  equals  the 
summation o f  the  marginal r a t e s  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  Westbank and E a s t ­
bank. Through an analogous argument f o r  Eastbank, the  ex i s t e n c e  o f  
Pare to  o p t im a l i ty  can be demonstrated so t h a t  w e l fa re  i s  maximized f o r  
both c i t i e s .
The foregoing r e a c t io n  model which was co n s t r a in ed  by independent 
a c t io n  on the  p a r t  o f  Westbank and Eastbank r e s u l t e d  in an e f f i c i e n t  
eq u i l ib r iu m  w ith in  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t .  I f  the  independent  a c t io n  r e q u i r e ­
ment were re lax ed ,  however, and coopera t ion  in the  p rov is ion  o f  the  
pub l ic  good were p e rm i t ted ,  both c i t i e s  would be ab le  to  move to  a
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s u p e r io r  ( g r e a t e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n )  p o s i t i o n .  They would d iscove r  t h a t  
th e  " r e a l "  income c o n s t r a i n t  in the  previous  d i sc u s s io n  was only an 
i l l u s i o n  r e s u l t i n g  from the  independent  a c t io n  requirement.
For example, both c i t i e s  now agree to  coopera te  f u l l y  in pub l ic  
good production by sha r ing  s q u a l ly  the  co s ts  o f  p roduc t ion .  In the 
independent s e t t i n g ,  each c i t y ' s  choice  between pu b l ic  and p r iv a te  
goods was made under th e  e x p l i c i t  knowledge o f  the  com pe t i t ive  na tu re  
o f  the  goods. That i s ,  under the  knowledge t h a t  more of  one type o f  
good could be produced only a t  the  expense o f  the  o th e r  good. When 
the  model was opened to  permit  s p i l l  ins  w ithout  the  r e c i p i e n t  community 
r e a l i z i n g  t h e i r  sou rce ,  suddenly b e n e f i t s  were made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  which 
no o p p or tun i ty  c o s t  had been incu r red .  The s p i l l i n s  to  th e  r e c i p i e n t  
community f o r  which no s a c r i f i c e  had been made, th en ,  were consumption . 
e x t e r n a l i t i e s  which were cons idered  g i f t s  o f  n a tu re .  Now, with the  
model extended to  permit  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  the  source o f  the  s p i l l i n s ,  
each community becomes aware of  the  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  involved in the 
production and consumption o f  the  pub l ic  good, and each recognizes  t h a t  
coopera t ion  in p roduct ion  could e f f e c t i v e l y  decrease  the  o p p or tun i ty  
c o s t s  in terms o f  the  p r i v a t e  good by o n e -h a l f .  Thus, through cooper­
a t i o n ,  each u n i t  o f  mutual ly  agreed upon reduc t ion  in the  product ion 
o f  the p r iv a t e  good would make a v a i l a b l e  two u n i t s  o f  the  pu b l ic  good.
In terms o f  the  geometry o f  Figure 9 ,  the  rea l  income curves would 
s h i f t  to  D0J f o r  Westbank and DWF f o r  Eastbank. These new rea l  income 
curves  i n t e r s e c t  the  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves  o f  equ i l ib r iu m  in the  r e a c t io n  
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E f fec t  o f  Cooperation KO4*
adjustments  have been accomplished,  Westbank w i l l  consume Dw u n i t s  o f
1 2the  pub l ic  good and Fw u n i t s  o f  the  p r i v a t e  good. I t  w i l l  supply Dw
u n i t s  o f  the  pub l ic  good i t s e l f  and r e l y  on s p i l l i n s  from Eastbank to
3
supply the  d i f f e r e n c e .  Likewise, Eastbank w i l l  consume De u n i t s  of
1 2
the  pu b l ic  good and F u n i t s  o f  the  p r i v a t e  good. I t  w i l l  supply DQC 0
u n i t s  o f  the  pub l ic  good Qfld r e l y  on s p i l l i n s  from Westbank f o r  the  
d i f f e r e n c e .
The c r i t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h i s  a n a ly s i s  and th e  preceding 
one i s  th e  way t h a t  th e  r e a l  income curve s h i f t s  in response t o  cooper­
a t i v e  and non-coopera t ive  pub l ic  good p roduc t ion .  In the  former ca se ,  
n e i t h e r  c i t y  could see  th e  e n t i r e  range o f  p o t e n t i a l  s p i l l i n s ,  but 
only one p o in t  w i th in  t h a t  range ,  i .  e . ,  the  q u a n t i t y  which a t  any 
time was being produced. Because the  c i t i e s  were excluded from s p i l l i n  
in fo rm at ion ,  they were s u rp r i s e d  by an excess o f  pub l ic  goods over  the  
q u a n t i t y  t h a t  they themselves had produced. Each c i t y  was misled  in to  
b e l ie v in g  t h a t  the  e x i s t i n g  level  o f  s p i l l i n s  was the  only q u a n t i t y  
a v a i l a b l e  to  i t  and t h a t  the  s p i l l i n s  would e x i s t  r e g a rd le s s  o f  i t s  
product ion  d e c i s io n s .  As a r e s u l t ,  each c i t y  p a s s iv e ly  consumed the  
amount o f  pub l ic  good made a v a i l a b l e  by the  o t h e r ,  and each reached an 
eq u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t i o n  with a sm a l le r  amount o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  than was 
p o s s ib le  with coopera t ion .  By p e rm i t t in g  coopera t ion  to  take  p la c e ,  
the  v e i l  obscurr ing  th e  t r u e  o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t  o f  p u b l ic  goods was r e ­
moved and the  f u l l  range o f  w e l fa re  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  was revea led .  Under 
th e se  new c o n d i t i o n s ,  s p i l l i n s  ceased to  be p a s s iv e ly  consumed. Both 
c i t i e s  recognized t h e i r  mutual dependence and the  p o t e n t i a l  gains
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which were a v a i l a b l e  through b a rg a in in g .^  With a l a r g e r  p o t e n t i a l  
q u a n t i t y  o f  pub l ic  goods included in the  d ec is ion  making c a lcu lu s  o f  
the  c i t i e s ,  a h igher  lev e l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  was achieved.  In t h i s  new 
p re fe r r e d  p o s i t i o n ,  th e  reduced o p p or tun i ty  c o s t  o f  dredging r e s u l t s  
in each c i t y  producing a sm a l le r  q u a n t i ty  o f  food and a l a r g e r  q u a n t i t y  
o f  dredging than under pure r e a c t io n .  Thus, the  pub l ic  s e c t o r  wil l  
p lay  a l a r g e r  r o l e  in the  economy under coopera t ion  than i t  would under 
pure r e a c t io n .
Im por tan t ly ,  the  conclus ion  t h a t  coopera t ion  in the  i d e n t i t y  model 
r e s u l t s  in an expansion o f  w e l fa re  does not  depend on the  assumption of  
symmetry o f  w e l fa re  curves  on a ray o f  45 degrees from the  o r ig i n .  To 
demonstrate  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  s ta tem en t ,  assume the  e x i s tan c e  of  wel­
f a r e  curves  symmetrical on r e s p e c t iv e  rays o f  22.5 and 67.5 degrees  from 
the  o r ig i n .  With the  excep t ion  o f  th e se  changes and the  r e s u l t i n g  e f ­
f e c t s  on r e a c t io n  curves  in P a r t  I I I ,  Figures 10 and 11 have been con­
s t r u c t e d  s i m i l a r l y  to  Figure  9. In Figure 10, r e a c t io n  e q u i l ib r iu m  i s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  D^, Fw f o r  Westbank and Dg, Fe f o r  Eastbank. Because of  
the  g r e a t e r  p re fe ren ce  f o r  p r i v a t e  goods, only small amounts o f  pub l ic  
goods a re  d e s i r ed  and produced, so the  r e a c t io n s  curves in P a r t  I I I  l i e  
r e l a t i v e l y  c lo se  to  the  o r ig i n  throughout  t h e i r  e n t i r e  range. Now a l ­
lowing coopera t ion  to  take  p lace  s h i f t s  the  r e s p e c t iv e  budget con­
s t r a i n t s  o f  Westbank and Eastbank from DgG and D*H to  DeJ and DWF.
^For a d i f f e r e n t  geometr ica l  approach to  gains  through b a rg a in ­
ing ,  see:  James M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply o f  Public  Goods 
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E f fec t  o f  P reference  fo r  P r iv a te  Good being G rea te r  than t h a t  f o r  Publ ic  Good
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Figure 11
E f fe c t  o f  Pre fe rence  f o r  Public  Good being G rea te r  than t h a t  f o r  P r iv a t e  Good
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Each o f  the  new budget c o n s t r a i n t s  i n t e r s e c t  the  r e a c t io n  eq u i l ib r iu m  
in d i f f e r e n c e  curves  f o r  the  communities and thereby  reveal  the  e x i s t ­
ence o f  g r e a t e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  l e v e l s  under coopera t ion  than under pure 
r e a c t io n .
This r e s u l t  i s  brought ou t  more c l e a r l y  in Figure 12 which i s  an
enlargement  o f  P a r t  I in Ffgu^e 10. With the  budget c o n s t r a i n t  D*
re p re se n t in g  Westbank's r e a l  income curve in r e a c t io n  eq u i l ib r iu m ,
t h a t  c i t y  w i l l  be ob ta in in g  a leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  equal to  ITW ( the
1w elfa re  curve tangen t  to  the  budget c o n s t r a i n t  DeG). With f u l l  cooper­
a t i o n  and equal sh a r in g  o f  the  c o s t s  o f  pu b l ic  good p roduc t ion ,  the 
budget c o n s t r a i n t s  s h i f t s  to  which passes  through ITW. Equil ib r ium 
now e x i s t s  on w e l fa re  curve I I I w* Because t h i s  curves l i e s  f u r t h e r  from 
the  o r ig in  than  I 1̂ ,  i t  must r e p re s e n t  a g r e a t e r  leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .
Following an analogous l i n e  o f  reasoning in Figure  10, except  t h a t  
a s t rong  p re fe ren ce  f o r  pub l ic  goods r e s u l t s  in the  e s tab l i sh m en t  of
r e a c t io n  curves  ly ing  f u r t h e r  from the  o r ig in  than they did in t h a t
o
f i g u r e ,  r e a c t io n  eq u i l ib r iu m  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  D , F f o r  Westbank and
w w
D°, Fg f o r  Eastbank in Figure 11. Opening the  model to  coopera t ion  r e -
1 1 
s u i t s  in budget l i n e  s h i f t s  o f  DgF to  DgJ f o r  Westbank and DwH to  DJ4
f o r  Eastbank. As in th e  two previous  c a s e s ,  the  s h i f t e d  budget con­
s t r a i n t s  i n t e r s e c t  r e s p e c t iv e  r e a c t io n  eq u i l ib r iu m  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves 
o f  the  two c i t i e s .  Thus, once aga in ,  h igher  l e v e l s  a re  p o s s ib le  through 
coopera t ion  than through r e a c t io n .
One f in a l  p o in t  t h a t  should be cons idered  i s  e f f i c i e n c y  in the  co­
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Figure  9 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  r e a l  income curve DgJ has twice  the  s lope o f  
6 J .  In co o p e ra t iv e  e q u i l ib r iu m ,  Westbank consumes on in d i f f e r e n c e  
curve I I W, tan g en t  to  DeJ ,  and produces on the  p roduct ion  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
curve G J .  Hence, in the  e q u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t io n ,  the  MRT o f  pub l ic  f o r  
p r iv a t e  goods f o r  Westbank i s  equal to  o n e -h a l f  o f  i t s  MRS. But, r e ­
c a l l i n g  t h a t  Westbank's e q u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t i o n  was a t t a i n e d  under f u l l  
r eco g n i t io n  t h a t  a t  any leve l  o f  p r iv a t e  good product ion  i t s  c o n t r i ­
but ion  to  incrementa l  changes in  the  product ion  o f  th e  p u b l ic  good 
would be equal to  o n e - h a l f  the  r eq u i red  r a t e ,  i t  may be concluded t h a t  
MRTW equals  MRSW f o r  th e  supply o f  pub l ic  goods produced i n t e r n a l l y .
The d i f f e r e n c e  between Westbank's t o t a l  w i l l in g n e s s  to  s u b s t i t u t e  
pub l ic  f o r  p r i v a t e  goods and i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  i n t e r n a l l y  
produced pub l ic  goods f o r  p r i v a t e  goods w i l l  be equal to  the  n e g o t i a t ed  
s p i l l i n s  from Eastbank. Recognizing t h a t  Eastbank i s  f u l l y  aware o f  
the  product ion  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  Westbank and t h a t  dredging i s  a pure 
pub l ic  good, i t  must be t r u e  t h a t  Eastbank has a d ju s ted  i t s  consumption 
mix o f  p u b l ic  and p r i v a t e  goods to  take  maximum advantage o f  th e  s p i 11- 
ins  and t h a t  the  s p i l l i n s  a re  worth the  same to  Eastbank,  i .  e . , a re  
produced a t  the  same c o s t  o f  p r iv a t e  goods o r  MRT, as they a re  to  West­
bank. The re fo re ,  MRTw equals  MRSw f o r  i n t e r n a l l y  produced dredging 
plus  MRSg f o r  dredging s p i l l i n s  from Westbank. By s i m i l a r  reason ing ,
i t  may a l so  be concluded t h a t  MRT equals  MRS. f o r  i n t e r n a l l y  produced
6 6
dredging plus  MRSW f o r  dredging s p i l l i n s  from Eastbank.
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E f fe c t  o f  Unequal Resource Endowment
A f u r t h e r  com plica t ion  i s  added to  the  o r ig i n a l  i d e n t i t y  model
when i t  i s  recognized t h a t  the  communities may not  have equal resource
bases .  In Figure 13, th e  i d e n t i t y  assumption has been re laxed  by a s -
s ig in in g  a re source  base t o  Eastbank equal to  t h r e e - f o u r t h s  o f  t h a t
f o r  Westbank. The major  geom etr ic  changes which r e s u l t  a r e  a one-
fo u r th  reduc t ion  in  th e  h o r iz o n ta l  and v e r t i c a l  i n t e r c e p t s  o f  Eastbank 's
t ra n s fo rm a t io n  curve in the  lower p o r t io n  o f  P a r t  V and a o n e - fou r th
reduc t ion  in the  v e r t i c a l  ax is  o f  P a r t  I I I .  Under th e se  c o n d i t i o n s ,
r e a c t io n  e q u i l ib r iu m  w i l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  with Westbank on rea l  income
curve D*G and i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I and Eastbank on r ea l  income curve 
e w
DWH and i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I I e . In t h e i r  r e s p e c i tv e  e q u i l ib r iu m  p o s i ­
t i o n s ,  Westbank w i l l  produce u n i t s  o f  dredging and F* u n i t s  o f  food 
and Eastbank w i l l  produce Dg u n i t s  o f  dredging and Fe u n i t s  o f  food.
Under p r e se n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  the  t o t a l  pub l ic  s e c t o r  w i l l  be sm al le r  
than in the  o r ig in a l  i d e n t i t y  model. In terms o f  geometry, the  proof  
i f  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  i s  s t r a i g h t  forward. Since Westbank has exper ienced 
no change in i t s  u t i l i t y  func t ion  f o r  p r i v a t e  and p u b l ic  goods o r  in 
i t s  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  cu rv e ,  no change w i l l  occur in i t s  r e a c t io n  curve 
from Figure 9 t o  Figure 13. Because Westbank's income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  
publ ic  goods i s  g r e a t e r  than z e ro ,  the  community's r e a c t io n  curve has 
a s lope  whose a b s o lu te  value i s  g r e a t e r  than one. Any movement along 
the  r e a c t io n  cu rve ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  r e s u l t  in a g r e a t e r  v e r t i c a l  than 
h o r iz o n ta l  change. With Eas tbank 's  re sou rce  base d e c l i n i n g ,  i t s  r e ­
a c t io n  curve a t  a lower v e r t i c a l  p o s i t i o n .  Thus, Westbank's p roduct ion
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o f  pub l ic  goods w i l l  i n c r e a se  from the  o r ig i n a l  i d e n t i t y  model, but 
Eastbank 's  product ion  w i l l  f a l l  by a g r e a t e r  amount, to  reduce the  
t o t a l  s i z e  o f  the  p u b l ic  s e c t o r .  In economic te rms,  Eastbank f inds  
t h a t  i t s  sm a l le r  r esource  base has put  i t  in a p r e f e r r e d  s p i l l  in po­
s i t i o n ,  while  j u s t  the  oppos i te  i s  t r u e  f o r  Westbank. The combination 
o f  a sm a l le r  resource  base- and a g r e a t e r  s p i l l  in l e v e l ,  r e l a t i v e  to 
t h a t  base ,  caused Eastbank to  reduce i t s  product ion  of  pub l ic  goods. 
Westbank, faced with a sm al le r  s p i l l  in of  pub l ic  goods was forced to 
in c rease  i t s  p ro d u c t io n ,  but by a sm al le r  amount than Eastbank 's  de­
c re a se .  I t  should be noted t h a t  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  the  consequences of  
the  model 's  parameters  and should not  be cons idered  an automat ic or  
necessa ry  conc lus ion .  I f  the  income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  e i t h e r ,  o r  both,  
o f  the  two c i t i e s  f o r  t h e  pub l ic  good were pe rm it ted  to  inc rease  su f r  
f i c i e n t l y ,  the  p re sen t  model could r e s u l t  in e q u i l ib r iu m  a t  a g r e a t e r  
leve l  o f  pub l ic  good product ion .  But i f ,  as assumed in Figure 13, 
p re fe rences  o f  the  two c i t i e s  f o r  the  two goods a re  i d e n t i c a l  and the 
income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  dredging and food a re  eq u a l ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be a 
reduc t ion  in the  t o t a l  amount o f  dredging produced.
More s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  th e  e f f e c t  on pub l ic  good product ion in the
re a c t io n  model, though,  a re  the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  co o pera t ive  e f f o r t s  o f
Westbank and Eastbank in th e  product ion o f  dredging.  Such coopera t ion
w i l l  s h i f t  Westbank's r ea l  income curve from D̂ G to  D J and Eastbank 's  
1 e  e
from D H to  D F. As a r e s u l t ,  Westbank w i l l  exper ience an in c rea se  in w w v
O
welfa re  by moving to  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I I w and consuming u n i t s  of  
dredging and Fw u n i t s  o f  food. Eastbank,  on the  o th e r  hand, w i l l  s u f -
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f e r  a lo s s  in s a t i s f a c t i o n  by moving to  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I e and con-
3 1
suming D. u n i t s  o f  dredging and FQ u n i t s  o f  food.6 6
These r e s u l t s  were not  completely unexpected and a re  r e a d i ly  ex­
p la in a b le .  Because Westbank possessed a g r e a t e r  resource  base than 
Eastbank,  the  s p i l l  ou ts  wMch i t  genera ted  were g r e a t e r  than the  s p i l l ­
ins  which i t  r ece ived .  Viewing s p i l l i n s  in a quid pro quo framework, 
Westbank was in a p o s i t i o n  as a n e t  donor o f  s p i l l i n s  and Eastbank a 
n e t  r e c i p i e n t .  As long as the  communities were unaware o f  each o t h e r ,  
ba rga in ing  between the  two to  share  the  c o s t  o f  the  n e t  s p i l l i n s  p ro ­
vided by Westbank could not  be accomplished, and Eastbank could cont inue 
to  r e c e i v e  the  su rp lus  s p i l l i n s  f r e e  of  charge.  Under cond i t ions  of  
equal barga in ing  s k i l l s  and f u l l  coopera t ion  without  s t r a t e g i c  ba rga in ­
ing behavior ,  Eastbank was induced to  product  g r e a t e r  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  the  
pub l ic  good to  "pay" Westbank f o r  the  n e t  s p i l l i n s  which i t  r ece ived .
To do t h i s ,  r esources  were r e a l l o c a t e d  from p r i v a t e  to  pub l ic  good p ro ­
duct ion  with a r e s u l t i n g  lo ss  o f  u t i l i t y  by Eastbank, I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t o  note  t h a t  under equal income e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  food and dredging ,  co­
o pe ra t ion  r e s u l t e d  in an in c rea se  in p r i v a t e  good product ion and de­
c rease  in pub l ic  good product ion  by Westbank. I f  the  income e l a s t i c i t y  
f o r  food had not  been equal to  t h a t  f o r  d redging ,  i t  would have been 
p o s s ib le  f o r  Westbank's product ion  o f  food and /o r  dredging to  in c r e a s e ,  
d e c rease ,  or  remain th e  same.
The conc lus ions  reached above a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  apropos to  c e n t r a l  
c i t y  problems. Considering the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ce n t r a l  c i t i e s  and 
suburbs ,  the  c e n t r a l  c i t y  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been placed in a pos ture  of  
provid ing  an expanding supply o f  pub l ic  goods and i s  g en e ra l ly  cons id -
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ered to  be a ne t  donor o f  s p i l l i n s  to  suburbs.  Under th ese  c o n d i t io n s ,  
i t  i s  important  to  recognize  t h a t  the  s p i l l i n s  provided by the  c e n t r a l  
c i t y  y i e l d  not  only d i r e c t  consumption b e n e f i t s  to  r e c i p i e n t  communit­
i e s ,  but  importan t  i n d i r e c t  consumption b e n e f i t s  as w e l l .  For example, 
to  the  e x t e n t  t h a t  a suburb does not f u l l y  compensate a c e n t r a l  c i t y  
f o r  s p i l l i n s  r e c e iv e d ,  i t  not  only o b ta in s  a f r e e  supply o f  a p a r t i c u ­
l a r  commodity, but i t  i s  a l s o  p laced  a t  a com pet i t ive  advantage in a t ­
t r a c t i n g  in d u s t ry .  The uncompensated s p i l l i n s  permit  the  suburban area  
to  main ta in an a r t i f i c i a l l y  low tax  e f f o r t  f o r  i t s  e x i s t i n g  level  o f  
consumption and in so doing provides  a lo c a t io n  f o r  tax  avoidance by 
in d u s t ry .  But not  only  do uncompensated s p i l l i n g  permit  advantageous 
consumption/tax r a t i o s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  goods, they can a l so  reduce the  
o v e ra l l  leve l  o f  "normal1' suburban governmental spending. In the  case 
o f  low c o s t  housing f o r  the  poor o r  e l d e r l y ,  f o r  example, an excess  o f  
s p i l l i n s ,  i .  e . , c e n t r a l  c i t y  p ro v is io n s  o f  housing u n i t s  which cause 
a migrat ion o f  the  poor and aged to  c e n t r a l  c i t i e s ,  would r e l i e v e  the  
suburbs o f  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  prov id ing  c o l l a t e r a l  s e rv ic e s  to  th ese  
two groups. Given c o n s id e ra t io n  such as t h e s e ,  i t  would appear  t h a t  
suburbs would r e s i s t  e f f o r t s  toward f u l l - s h a r i n g  cooper ta ion  in the  
p rov is ion  o f  goods with  r e c ip ro c a l  s p i l l o u t  e f f e c t s .
Another s p i n - o f f  o f  th e  foregoing  a n a ly s i s  dea ls  with govern­
mental f ragmenta t ion  and sp ec ia l  d i s t r i c t s .  T y p ic a l ly ,  the  spec ia l  
d i s t r i c t  i s  viewed in an unfavorable  l i g h t  because o f  the  d i f f i c u l t y  
in ach iev ing  co o p e ra t io n ,  c o o rd in a t io n ,  and c o n t r o l .  To the  e x te n t  
t h a t  the  spec ia l  d i s t r i c t  corresponds to  the  low resource  community, 
t h e r e  i s  noth ing in th e  previous  a n a ly s i s  t h a t  would m i t ig a t e  those
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c r i t i c i s m s .  But i f  th e  spec ia l  d i s t r i c t  i s  well funded,  i t  i s  conceiv­
a b le  t h a t  th e  re so u rce  base f o r  the  p a r t i c u l a r  purpose f o r  which the 
d i s t r i c t  was formed might be g r e a t e r  than the  e f f e c t i v e  re source  base 
o f  a general purpose government which was a l so  supplying the  good. In 
t h i s  c a se ,  the  sp e c ia l  d i s t r i c t  would be in the  p o s i t i o n  o f  n e t  donor 
and the  f r e e  r i d e r  would 6e  the  general  purpose government.  The break­
down in e f f o r t s  toward coopera t ion  would then come from the  general  gov­
ernment r a t h e r  than th e  sp e c ia l  d i s t r i c t .  One example o f  t h i s  might be 
a wealthy school d i s t r i c t  which provided q u a l i t y  r e c r e a t io n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  
f o r  i t s  p a t ro n s .  I f  the  general  government does not a l l o c a t e  s u f f i c i e n t  
funds to  r e c r e a t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  r e s i d e n t s  l i v i n g  o u t s id e  o f  the  spe­
c i a l  d i s t r i c t  may cause an overcrowding o f  the  school f a c i l i t i e s .  In 
t h i s  c a s e ,  i t  would be to  the  advantage o f  the  spec ia l  d i s t r i c t  to  e n t e r  
i n t o  c o n t r a c t s  o f  coopera t ion  with  the  general  purpose government and to  
the  advantage o f  th e  general government to  r e s i s t  such co o p e ra t io n .
E f f e c t  o f  Unequal P re fe rences  f o r  the  Public  Good
A second i n t e r e s t i n g  v a r i a t i o n  o f  the  o r ig in a l  model i s  ob ta ined  
when the  assumption o f  equal income e l a s t i c i t i e s  between pu b l ic  and 
p r i v a t e  goods f o r  both communities i s  re laxed .  In terms o f  Figure  14, 
the  geometric  e f f e c t  o f  r e l a x in g  t h i s  assumption i s  shown as a change 
in th e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  pay c o n f ig u ra t io n  o f  Eastbank. Rather  than  con­
s i s t i n g  o f  symmetrical i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves cen te red  on a ray eminating 
from the  o r ig i n  a t  a 45° an g le ,  th e  map now inc ludes  symmetrical i n d i f ­
fe ren ce  curves  c e n te r e d  on a ray drawn from the  o r ig i n  with a f l a t t e r ,  
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Unequal Pre fe rences  f o r  P r iv a t e  and Public  Goods o
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Eastbank now has a s t r o n g e r  p re fe rence  f o r  the  p r iv a t e  good than the
pub l ic  good a t  g r e a t e r  l e v e l s  o f  income, i .  e . , the  income e l a s t i c i t y
fo r  food i s  g r e a t e r  than  the  income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  dredging.  Under
th ese  c i rcum stances ,  r e a c t io n  e q u i l ib r iu m  i s  e s tb a l i s h e d  on rea l  income
curve D*G and i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I ,  f o r  Westbank and r ea l  income curve e w
DlH and i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I f o r  Eastbank. Because o f  i t s  s t ro n g e r  p re -  
w £
fe rence  f o r  the  pub l ic  good, Westbank produces a l a r g e r  q u a n t i t y  than 
Eastbank, i . e . , D* versus  Dg, and provides  g r e a t e r  s p i l l  o u t s .  Eas t ­
bank, in t u r n ,  r e l i e s  on s p i l l i n s  to  s a t i s f y  most o f  i t s  d e s i r e s  fo r  
the  pub l ic  good and c o n c en t ra te s  i t s  product ion  e f f o r t s  on th e  p r iv a t e  
good. Hence, in t h i s  model as in th e  previous  one,  Westbank i s  a ne t  
donor and Eastbank a n e t  r e c i p i e n t  o f  s p i l l i n s .
Opening the  model to  f u l l  co o p e ra t io n ,  u n in h ib i te d  by s t r a t e g i c  
a c t i v i t i e s  o r  unequal ba rga in ing  a b i l i t i e s ,  causes  the  rea l  income 
curves  o f  Westbank and Eastbank to  s h i f t  to  DgJ and DwF, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
With equal sha r ing  o f  the  c o s t s  o f  p roduc t ion ,  Westbank's eq u i l ib r ium  
w il l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  a level  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  rep re sen ted  by i n d i f f e r ­
ence curve II  . In p ro d u c t io n ,  Westbank's ou tpu t  w i l l  equal F* u n i t s  
w w
2
o f  food and Dw u n i t s  o f  d redging—a r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  re sou rces  in favor
o f  food product ion  as compared to  r e a c t io n  eq u i l ib r iu m .  Eastbank, in
tu r n ,  w i l l  be lo ca ted  on i n d i f f e r e n c e  curve I ^ a n d  w i l l  produce F*
2
u n i t s  o f  food and u n i t s  o f  dredging.  In c o n t r a s t  to  Westbank's 
change in p roduc t ion ,  Eastbank w i l l  have r e a l l o c a t e d  resources  away 
from food and toward dredging.  As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  product ion changes, 
Westbank exper iences  an in c re a se  in s a t i s f a c t i o n  and Eastbank a reduc­
t i o n .
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Conclusions
The foregoing models demonstrated t h a t  only in a world in which 
every th ing  was equal could coopera t ion  between two governmental u n i t s ,  
both producing s p i l l i n s  to  the  o t h e r ,  be expected to  r e s u l t  in a Pare to  
improvement from r e a c t io n  e q u i l ib r iu m .  The reason f o r  t h i s ,  as poin ted  
out in the  models dea l in g  uJrith var ious  types  o f  i n e q u a l i t i e s  between 
the  two governmental u n i t s ,  i s  because o f  the  f r e e  r i d e r  p r in c ip l e  
which a r i s e s  when th e  e q u a l i t y  assumption i s  r e laxed .  When th e r e  was 
an absence o f  p e r f e c t  e q u a l i t y ,  coopera t ion  r e s u l t e d  in an inc rease  in 
w e lfa re  o f  one c i t y  only  a t  the  expense o f  the  o th e r .  In two cases  
which a r e  t y p ic a l  o f  ac tua l  economic c o n d i t i o n s —unequal resources  
bases and unequal p r e f e r e n c e s —i t  was demonstrated t h a t  governments 
with sm a l le r  re sou rces  bases and a g r e a t e r  p re fe rence  f o r  p r iv a t e  goods 
w i l l  be n e t  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  s p i l l i n s  in r e a c t io n  equ i l ib r ium .  Under these  
c i rcum stances ,  t h e r e  w i l l  not be a smooth, automatic  t r a n s i t i o n  from r e ­
a c t io n  eq u i l ib r iu m  to  coopera t ion  equ i l ib r ium .  But because the  w ea l th ­
i e r  community o r  one with a s t r o n g e r  p re fe ren ce  f o r  pu b l ic  goods than 
the  o th e r  recognizes  the  p o t e n t i a l  gains  from t r a d e ,  barga in ing  w il l  
take  p lace .  I f  t h e r e  a re  no p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n  such as j u r i s d i c ­
t i o n a l  j e a l o u s i e s ,  the  barga in ing  process  w i l l  f u l l y  exhaust  a l l  po ten­
t i a l  ga ins .  I f  p o l i t i c a l  j e a l o u s i e s  do e x i s t ,  barga in ing  may not take 
p lace  or may only  be l im i te d  so t h a t  t h e r e  i s  not a f u l l  exhaust ion of  
p o t e n t i a l  ga ins .  As an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  th e  barga in ing  requirement ,  a r ­
guments w i l l  be p resen ted  l a t e r  to  demonstrate t h a t  a h igher  leve l  o f  
government could e n t e r  with  a system o f  g r an ts  to  pay the  donor gover- 
ment f o r  uncompensated s p i l l i n s  and /or  the  r e c i p i e n t  government to
I l l
expand i t s  product ion  o f  s p i l l  ou ts  to  reach  the  maximum leve l  o f  
w e l fa re  which i s  p o s s ib le .
CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL GRANTS-IN-AID 
IN THF UNITED STATES
The purpose o f  the  p r e se n t  c h ap te r  i s  to  provide the  reader  with a 
broad unders tanding  o f  f ed e ra l  g ran ts  in the  United S t a t e s .  To accom­
p l i s h  t h i s  g o a l ,  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be given to  th re e  t o p i c s —philosophy o f  
g r a n t s ,  h i s t o r i c a l  development o f  g r a n t s ,  and major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  
g r a n t s .  P r io r  t o  beginning t h i s  to p ic a l  d i s c u s s io n ,  however, a b r i e f  
comment must be made concerning the  n a t io n a l  government.  Drawing d i ­
r e c t l y  from co n d i t io n s  in  the United S t a t e s ,  the  na t iona l  governing 
body c o n s i s t s  o f  duly e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from d i s t r i c t s  which may 
inc lude  more than one governmental u n i t .  The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a re  e l e c ­
ted  f o r  a s p e c i f i e d  term and must s tand  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  a t  the  end o f  
the  term i f  they wish to  cont inue  in o f f i c e .  The l e g i s l a t i v e  l a t i t u d e  
o f  each r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i s  fo rm al ly  l im i t e d  by a w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
and, w i th in  these  c o n f in e s ,  in fo rm a l ly  by the  w i l l  o f  h is  c o n s t i t u e n t s .
One o f  the  p ro v is io n s  in the  United S t a t e s '  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  t h a t  
congress  has the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  promoting the  general w e l fa re  o f  the  
country .  Because the  country  i s  not  homogeneous in the  geographic d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e so u rc e s ,  degree o f  development,  o r  per  c a p i t a  income, 
th e r e  e x i s t s  a wide range o f  per  c a p i t a  pub l ic  good consumption f o r
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those  pub l ic  goods provided by loca l  governments.  Moreover, some com­
m unit ies  supply  the  goods in q u a n t i t i e s  l e s s  than the  amount deemed to  
be optimal by the  n a t io n a l  government. One way t h a t  the  na t iona l  gov­
ernment can r e so lv e  t h i s  problem and s a t i s f y  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  mandate 
o f  promoting the  general  w l f a r e  i s  by i n s t i t u t i n g  a system o f  g r a n t s -  
i n - a id  to  be made a v a i l a b l e  to  loca l  governments.
Philosophy o f  Grants
B a s i c a l l y ,  th e  United S t a t e s ’ g r a n t s - i n - a i d  program employs two 
approaches t o  i n c r ea se  w e l f a re .*  One approach i s  to  i n c r ea se  a com­
m uni ty 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n  from the  consumption o f  a s p e c i f i c  good and the  
o th e r  i s  to  in c re a se  th e  general u t i l i t y  leve l  o f  the  r e c i p i e n t  govern­
ment. Correspondingly ,  the  former may be sa id  to  r e p re s e n t  s p e c i f i c  
w e l fa re  and the  l a t t e r  general  w e l fa re .  Two important  a spec ts  o f  t h i s  
taxonomy should be noted.  F i r s t ,  th e  s p e c i f i c  and general  w e lfa re  func­
t i o n s  to  be developed in  t h i s  paper  p e r t a i n  to  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  the  
n a t iona l  government r a t h e r  than  to  c i t i z e n s  o f  loca l  governmental u n i t s .  
Considering t h a t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a re  e l e c t e d  f o r  s p e c i f i c  terms and must 
p e r i o d i c a l l y  s tand  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n ,  i t  i s  necessary  f o r  the  incumbents 
t o  d ischa rge  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in a way t h a t  i s  favored by a maj­
o r i t y  o f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  i f  they  wish to  con t inue  in  o f f i c e .  There­
f o r e ,  i f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  through a program o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  can a s ­
s i s t  local  governments in provid ing  l a r g e r  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  pub l ic  goods,
^Terminology in t h i s  s e c t io n  was adopted from: Thomas R. I re land
and David B. Johnson, The Economics o f  Char i ty  (Blacksburg ,  V i rg in ia ;  
Center  f o r  th e  Study o f  Publ ic  Choice, 1970).
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consumption b e n e f i t s  which accrue  to  c i t i z e n s  o f  t h e  a ided governments 
w i l l  i n c r e a se  p o l i t i c a l  support  f o r  incumbents. I t  i s  the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  suppor t  which i s  measured by the  welfa re  fu n c t io n s  
mentioned above.
The second a s p ec t  o f  t h e  taxonomy i s  concerned with e f f i c i e n t  t e c h ­
niques o f  ach iev ing  d e s i r e d  g ca l s .  For example, suppose t h a t  a commun­
i t y  s u f f e r s  from a r e l a t i v e l y  small r e source  base and i s  unable or  un­
w i l l i n g  to  provide a leve l  o f  pub l ic  goods deemed minimal by the  n a t iona l  
government.  The s a t i s f a c t i o n  concept  apropos t o  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  
o f  general  w e l fa re  and the  type o f  g r a n t  which should be used to  achieve 
th e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t  most e f f i c i e n t l y  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from the  type used to  
achieve  a s p e c i f i c  w e l fa re  goal most e f f i c i e n t l y .  As w i l l  be demon­
s t r a t e d  below, the  former w e l fa re  goal should be pursued through an 
uncondi t iona l  g ran t  while  the  l a t t e r  through a co n d i t io n a l  one.
S p ec i f ic  Welfare
The s p e c i f i c  w e l fa re  func t ion  o f  the  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  th e  n a t iona l  
government may form al ly  be p resen ted  as fo l lows:
Us = f (Y ,  Xc )
where: Y i s  a pure p u b l ic  good which i s  n a t io n a l  in c h a r a c t e r ,  e.  g . ,
n a t iona l  defense  and 
Xc i s  the  consumption o f  s p e c i f i c  goods in loca l  communities.
Design o f  g ra n t  program to  su b s id iz e  s p e c i f i c  goods. One e f f e c t  
o f  the  na t io n a l  government 's  s p e c i f i c  w e l fa re  fu nc t ion  i s  th e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  minimum s tanda rds  f o r  th e  q u a n t i t y  o f  pu b l ic  goods supp l ied  by 
loca l  governments.  Since the  problem i s  one o f  in c re a s in g  th e  supply
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o f  p a r t i c u l a r  goods favored by th e  na t io n a l  government,  e f f i c i e n c y  c a l l s  
f o r  a g ra n t  system which w i l l  s u b s id iz e  the  loca l  consumption o f  these  
s p e c i f i c  goods. I f  a id  were given to  loca l  governments on an uncondi­
t io n a l  b a s i s ,  the  n a t io n a l  government would have no assurances  t h a t  the  
money would be used f o r  i t s  intended purpose,  and th e  r e s u l t  would be an 
i n e f f i c i e n t  method o f  goal achievement.  On the  o th e r  hand, i f  a id  were 
given only under the  co n d i t io n  t h a t  i t  be used f o r  a s t a t e d  purpose,  the  
goal o f  a minimum leve l  o f  ou tpu t  could be achieved a t  a cheaper  d o l l a r  
c o s t  than i t  would be with  no co n d i t io n s  a t t a c h e d .  In the  terminology 
o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  then ,  s p e c i f i c  w e l fa re  would seem to  be more e f f i c i e n ­
t l y  implemented through c o n d i t io n a l  r a t h e r  than uncondi t ional  g r a n t s .  
Whether t h i s  i s  a c t u a l l y  the  r e s u l t  w i l l  depend on a number o f  f a c t o r s ,  
the  c h i e f  o f  which a re :  th e  n a tu re  o f  the  imposed c o n d i t i o n s ,  the  de­
gree  o f  f in a n c i a l  suppor t  a v a i l a b l e ,  the  income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  supported 
goods, and the  ac tua l  l ev e l  o f  consumption o f  t h a t  good r e l a t i v e  to  the 
planned amount.
Consider ,  f o r  example, Figure  15 which measures the  q u a n t i t y  o f  
a n a t i o n a l l y  favored s p e c i f i c  good, N, on the  v e r t i c a l  ax is  and the  
q u a n t i t y  o f  a composite good, K, on the  ho r izo n ta l  a x i s .  A local  gov­
ernm ent 's  budget c o n s t r a i n t  i s  shown i n i t i a l l y  as the  l i n e  AB. With 
t h i s  budget c o n s t r a i n t ,  e q u i l ib r iu m  f o r  the  loca l  government i s  e s ­
t a b l i s h e d  a t  N2 u n i t s  o f  the  favored good and Kj o f  th e  composite good. 
I f  the  f ede ra l  government e s t a b l i s h e s  N4 u n i t s  o f  N as the  minimum 
q u a n t i t y  which should be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  the  c i t i z e n s  o f  the  loca l  
government, a g ran t  program des igned to  achieve t h i s  minimum s tandard  




Ki K l  ^3
Figure 15
Comparison o f  Condit ional 
and Unconditional Grants
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the  form of  a subsidy equal to  M. pe rcen t  of  the  c o s t  o f  N. Such an 
o f f e r  would e f f e c t i v e l y  s h i f t  the  loca l  budget c o n s t r a i n t  from AB to  CB 
and would r e s u l t  in an eq u i l ib r iu m  combination o f  N4 u n i t s  o f  N and K2 
u n i t s  o f  K being supp l ied .  With the  d o l l a r  amount o f  a id  being c o n t in ­
gent  on the  leve l  o f  support  by the  loca l  governments,  a g ra n t  such as 
t h i s  i s  c l a s s i f i e d  as c o n d i t i o n a l .
A second p o s s i b i l i t y  would be to  provide the  same amount o f  d o l l a r  
a id  to  the  loca l  government with no s t r i n g s  a t t a c h e d .  In t h i s  c a se ,  
the  budget c o n s t r a i n t  would s h i f t  to  DE and the  local  government would 
supply N3 u n i t s  o f  N, a sm al le r  q u a n t i t y  than the  minimum na t iona l  
s tanda rd .  To encourage the  loca l  government to  provide u n i t s  o f  N 
with such an uncondi t ional  g r a n t ,  the  n a t iona l  government w i l l  be r e ­
qu ired  to  spend more money than was necessary  in the case  o f  a condi­
t io n a l  g r an t .  The lo g ic  of  t h i s  r e s u l t  may be expla ined  through the  
r e l a t i v e  and a b so lu te  e f f e c t s  of  d i f f e r e n t  types  o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  on 
expendi tu re  p a t t e r n s  o f  loca l  governments.  In the  case o f  uncondi t ional  
g r a n t s ,  loca l  governments w i l l  exper ience  an in c re a se  in t h e i r  c ap ac i ty  
to  provide more o f  a l l  goods. Since the  g ran t  has not make one good 
any more or l e s s  d e s i r a b l e  than ano ther  good, the  p re fe rence  p a t t e r n  
o f  communities w i l l  not be d i s t o r t e d  by the  g r a n t .  In the  case o f  the  
co n d i t iona l  g r a n t ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, r e l a t i v e  p r ic e s  between the  sub­
s id iz e d  good and a l l  o t h e r  goods w i l l  change, making the  subs id ized  
good a r e l a t i v e l y  b e t t e r  buy, and p re fe rences  w i l l  be d i s t o r t e d  in i t s  
favor .  Hence, the  g r e a t e r  w i l l  be the  supply of  the  n a t i o n a l l y  favored 
good i f  a id  i s  given c o n d i t i o n a l l y  r a t h e r  than u n c o n d i t io n a l ly .
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Another q u a l i fy in g  f a c t o r  to  the  i n i t i a l  a n a ly s i s  concerns the 
type o f  cond i t ions  a s so c ia te d  with g r a n t s .  I f  the  loca l  government 
which r ece ives  the  g ra n t  i s  requ i red  to  provide the  same amount o f  
i n t e rn a l  support  f o r  th e  good t h a t  e x i s t e d  before  g ran ts  were g iven ,  
a g ra n t  program s u f f i c i e n t  to  in c rease  N from to  u n i t s  would 
r e s u l t  in a budget c o n s t r a i n t  of  HJLB. Such a program would provide 
the  d es i r ed  r e s u l t  a t  the  l e a s t  money c o s t ,  but  a t  the g r e a t e s t  d i s ­
t o r t i o n  o f  the  corranunity's p re fe rence  p a t t e r n .
A f in a l  l im i t i n g  f a c t o r  i s  th e  income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  the  composite 
good. I f ,  w i th in  the  range o f  favored-good and composite-good which i s  
being provided p r i o r  to  the  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  g r a n t s ,  the  income e l a s t i ­
c i t y  f o r  the  composite good i s  z e ro ,  an uncondi t ional  g ran t  producing 
budget l i n e  HJK w il l  have the  same e f f e c t  on the  equ i l ib r iu m  q u a n t i ty  
o f  the  pub l ic  good as the  cond i t iona l  g ran t  o f  the  preceding paragraph. 
The po l icy  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  th e se  l i m i t a t i o n s  with r e sp e c t  to  achieving 
p o l i t i c a l  support  w i l l  be brought out in g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  in a l a t e r  
ch ap te r .
General Welfare
The general w e l fa re  func t ion  o f  the  na t iona l  government may be 
s t i p u l a t e d  as :
Ug = f(Y, Uc )
Where: Y i s  a pure pub l ic  good which i s  n a t iona l  in c h a r a c t e r  and
Uc rep re s e n t s  th e  general  economic co n d i t io n s  of  a local  govern­
ment.
The func t iona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between the  independent and dependent var -
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i a b l e s  a re  analogous to  those  which e x i s t e d  f o r  the  s p e c i f i c  w e lfa re  
fu n c t io n s ;  namely, in c r e a se s  in Y and U w i l l  i n c rease  th e  s a t i s f a c ­
t i o n  o f  the  na t io n a l  government.  As was i n f e r r e d  in the  previous  d i s ­
cussion  o f  s p e c i f i c  w e l fa re ,  the  type o f  g r a n t - i n - a i d  program which 
w i l l  e f f i c a c i o u s l y  implement the  general  w e l fa re  goals  o f  t h e  na t iona l  
government w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  from those  a s so c ia te d  with s p e c i f i c  wel­
f a r e  goals .  Under general w e l fa re  g o a l s ,  an u n r e s t r i c t e d  g ra n t  w il l  
be c a l l e d  f o r  r a t h e r  than  a co n d i t io n a l  one.
H is to r i c a l  Development o f  the Grant Program 
The h i s t o r i c a l  development o f  f ed e ra l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  in  the  United 
S ta t e s  can b e s t  be exp la ined  w i th in  the  co n tex t  o f  an evolv ing  r e l a ­
t i o n s h ip  among governmental p a r tn e r s  in  a fede ra l  system o f  government. 
Although a fed e ra l i sm  t e c h n i c a l l y  " . . .  d iv id es  a u t h o r i t y  between 
s e l f -g o v e rn in g  p a r t s  in  the  c e n t r a l  whole. . , 1,2 co o p e ra t io n ,  as im­
p l i e d  by the  term " p a r tn e r s , "  i s  more a p p ro p r i a t e  to  the  American 
exper ience .  As exp la ined  by Daniel E l a z a r : ^
p
John H. Ferguson, The American System o f  Government, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, I n c . ,  1959),  p. 68.
3
Elazar  has used a marble c a k e - l a y e r  cake analogy to  d i s t i n g u i s h  
between the  workings o f  a f ed e ra l i sm  in p r a c t i c e  and theory .  He con­
tends  t h a t  governmental fu n c t io n s  a re  not  d i s t i n c t l y  separa ted  as a re  
the  d i f f e r e n t  f l a v o r s  in a l a y e r  cake,  but  t h a t  they over lap  and are  
in te r tw in ed  as in  a marble cake. See, f o r  example, Daniel J .  E laza r ,  
"The Shaping o f  Intergovernmental  Re la t ions  in the  Twentieth Century,"
The Annals , CCCLIX (May, 1965), pp. 10-22, and ____________ , American
Federal ism: A View from the  S t a t e s , (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1966), pp. 339. Examples o f  th e  more t r a d i t i o n a l  views o f  
fed e ra l i sm  inc lude  Arthur  N. Holcombe, Our More P e r fe c t  Union, 
(Cambridge, Mass,:  Harvard U n iv e rs i ty  P re ss ,  1950) and Edward S. 
Corwin, The Tw il igh t  o f  the  Supreme C our t , (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
U n iv e rs i ty  P re s s ,  1934).
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The idea o f  th e  f ed e ra l  union as a p a r tn e r s h ip  i s  
a key a sp e c t  o f  f ed e ra l i sm .  This idea o f  p a r t n e r ­
sh ip  has been extended f q r  beyond the  simple sense 
o f  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  f ede ra l  and s t a t e  
governments to  become the  guiding p r i n c i p l e  in 
most o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  t i e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  grouDs, i n t e r e s t s ,  and i n d i v i ­
duals  t o g e th e r  in the American p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r ,  
animating publ ic -p  i v a t e  r e l a t i o n s  as  well  as 
in tergovernmental  ones. The term i t s e l f  has 
come in to  common c>saqe. We a l l  recognize  the 
f requen t  r e f e r e n c e s  made to  the  " p a r tn e r s h ip s "  
between "government and bu s in es s " ;  between 
" labo r  and management"; as well as  to  those  
between governments.
P a r tn e r s h ip  implies  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  
r ea l  power among severa l  c en te r s  which must 
n e g o t i a t e  coope ra t ive  arrangements with one 
ano ther  to  achieve  common goal s . 4
By viewing the  f e d e ra t i o n  as a p a r t n e r s h i p ,  problems which more than 
one leve l  o f  government co n s id e r  as t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  should be 
re so lved  through j o i n t  a c t io n .  In many in s ta n c e s  where problems have 
been considered  to  be under th e  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  sub­
na t io n a l  l e v e l s  o f  government,  the  g ran t  has proven i t s e l f  to  be an 
e f f i c i e n t  and f l e x i b l e  tool  to  promote goal achievement through cooper­
a t i v e  a c t i o n .  The d i sc u s s io n  which fol lows w i l l  t r a c e  the  h i s t o r i c a l  
development o f  g ra n ts  as they  were modified to  meet changing i n t e r ­
governmental problems.
Land Grants :  The Beginning
The genes is  of  America’s system o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  cam be found in 
th e  g r e a t  land g ra n t  programs o f  the  Nineteenth Century which gave 
primary support  to  educat ion  and in t e rn a l  improvements. These e a r l y
^Elazar, American Federalism, op. c i t . , pp. 2-3.
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g ra n ts  e s t a b l i s h e d  the  foundat ion and conta ined  many p recu rso rs  o f  the  
p ro v is io n s  w r i t t e n  i n t o  p re sen t -d ay  g r a n t s .  The formal commitment o f  
the  f ed e ra l  government to  a system o f  g r a n t s  was f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  in 
the  Northwest Ordinances o* T785 and 1787. Terms o f  the  Ordinances 
pledged fede ra l  a id  to  the  s t a t e s  which were to  be carved out  o f  the  
Northwest T e r r i t o r y  f o r  t h e  support  o f  pu b l ic  educat ion.® The f i r s t  
ac tua l  g ran t  under t h i s  a u th o r i z a t io n  was made in 1802 when Ohio was 
admit ted  i n t o  th e  Union as th e  seven teen th  s t a t e .  In the  enabl ing  
l e g i s l a t i o n  g ra n t in g  s ta tehood  to  Ohio, Congress gave each township 
one s e c t io n  o f  land which was to  be sold  f o r  not  l e s s  than $1.25 per  
a c r e .  All revenues ob ta ined  from th e  s a l e  o f  the  land were to  be used 
fo r  pub l ic  education.® In l a t e r  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  in s t e a d  o f  g ra n t in g  one 
sec t io n  o f  land in each township to  the  governing body o f  the  township, 
Congress gave the  land to  the  S t a t e  and allowed i t  t o  choose th e  lo c a ­
t i o n  o f  the  a l l o t e d  land.  In 1816, fou r teen  y e a r s  a f t e r  the  i n i t i a l  
g r a n t s ,  Congress,  a t  the  i n s i s t e n c e  o f  S ta t e s  not  q u a l i fy in g  f o r  g ran ts  
under the  Northwest Ordinances,  expanded educa t iona l  support  to  a l l
5I b i d . , pp. 131-132.
®A1though the  expressed  purpose o f  the  land g ran ts  was to  support  
pub l ic  ed u ca t io n ,  the  s u b s t a n t iv e  purpose was to  provide  an in c e n t iv e  
f o r  rap id  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  the  Northwest.  In o rd e r  to  make t h i s  a rea  a t ­
t r a c t i v e  to  s e t t l e r s ,  the  f ed e ra l  government secured pledges from the  
t e r r i t o r i e s  to  t em p o ra r i ly  exempt pub l ic  lands from ta x a t io n  a f t e r  be­
ing purchased by p r i v a t e  in d iv id u a l s .  To compensate the  t e r r i t o r i e s  
f o r  l o s t  tax  revenues ,  Congress gave them one s e c t io n  o f  land in each 
township. This e a r l y  example o f  in tergovernmental  coopera t ion  c l e a r l y  
r e v e a l s  the  n a t iona l  government 's  a t t i t u d e  toward in tergovernmental  r e ­
l a t i o n s  in f e d e ra l i s m —t h a t  o f  p rov id ing  an in c e n t iv e  f o r  lower l e v e l s  
o f  government to  a c t  in such a way as to  promote the  general  w e l fa re  
o f  the  whole country .
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s t a t e s  with  pu b l ic  land by enac t ing  l e g i s l a t i o n  to  r e tu rn  5 pe rcen t  o f  
the  revenues c o l l e c t e d  from the  s a l e  o f  th e se  lands  to  the  r e sp e c t iv e  
s t a t e s .
Perhaps the  s in g l e  most important  p iece  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  providing 
a id  to  educat ion  was th e  M err i l l  Act o f  1862. The bas ic  form o f  t h i s  
Act was passed by both houses o f  Congress in  1859, but  was the  v ic t im  
o f  a veto by P re s id e n t  Buchanan. With th e  change in  a d m in i s t r a t io n  
r e s u l t i n g  from the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  o f  1860, Senator  M orr i l l  r e ­
in t roduced  h is  b i l l .  Subsequent to  i t s  acceptance by Congress the  
b i l l  was signed in to  law by P re s id en t  Lincoln. The terms o f  the  
M orr i l l  Act provided each s t a t e  with 30,000 ac re s  o f  land f o r  each 
o f  i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and s e n a to r s .  The land was to  be used to  main­
t a i n  c o l le g e s  where a g r i c u l t u r e  and mechanical a r t s  would be t a u g h t . 7 
Those s t a t e s  not  having pub l ic  land rece ived  land s c r i p t  equal to  
t h e i r  d i s t r i b u t i v e  sha re s .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note t h a t  in  a l l  o f  th e  y e a r s  t h a t  have pas­
sed s in ce  the  p ro v is io n s  o f  t h i s  Act were f i r s t  implemented, only  two 
important  p ieces  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  have been passed dea l ing  with land-  
g ra n t  c o l l e g e s .  The f i r s t  o f  th e se  was the  second M orr i l l  Act o f  1890. 
The purpose o f  the  Act was t o  provide more adequate  funding f o r  the  
l a n d -g ra n t  c o l l e g e s  and a t  the  same time provide f o r  more e f f i c i e n t  
management o f  g ran t  funds.  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the  Act ap p ro p r ia ted  the  
proceeds o f  500,000 ac re s  o f  land to  each s t a t e  and t e r r i t o r y ,  up to
7W. Brooke Graves , American Intergovernmental R e l a t i o n s , (New York: 
Charles  S c r ib n e r ' s  Sons, 1964), pp. 492-492.
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a t o t a l  o f  $625,000 pe r  y ea r .  The money i t s e l f ,  however, was not  to  
be given to  the  c o l l e g e s ,  but  was t o  be used to  purchase 5 pe rcen t  
United S t a t e s '  bonds t o  provide  a permanent endowments. Annual i n ­
t e r e s t  earned on th e  endowiv.erts was to  be given to  the  c o l l e g e s .  By 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  permanent endowment, squandering o f  funds was e l im ­
inated .® The second Act,  GanjChead-Jones, was passed in 1935. In ad­
d i t i o n  to  in c re a s in g  annual suppor t  to  l a n d -g ra n t  c o l le g e s  by $960,000 
an n u a l ly ,  th e  Act a l s o  extended suppor t  i n t o  the  a reas  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
r e sea rch  by prov id ing  f o r  the  d issem ina t ion  o f  information  through the  
A g r ic u l tu r a l  Extent ion S e r v i c e . ^
As th e  f ede ra l  program o f  a id  t o  educat ion  was develop ing ,  a p a r ­
a l l e l  program was begun to  promote a more r ap id  r a t e  o f  i n t e r n a l  im­
provements.  D irec ted  p r im a r i l y  to  th e  a rea s  o f  overland road ,  c an a l ,  
and r a i l r o a d  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  which inaugura ted  a system o f  
land g ran ts  to  s t a t e s  t o  promote th ese  i n t e r n a l  improvements was pas­
sed in 1823. Designed to  a id  Ohio in bu i ld in g  a road to  th e  border  
o f  the  Michigan T e r r i t o r y ,  the  1823 Act con ta ined  many f e a tu r e s  com­
monly found in subsequent  i n t e r n a l  improvement g r a n t s .  In a d d i t io n  
to  prov id ing  f o r  a b a s ic  120- f o o t  wide r ig h t -o f -w ay  f o r  the  road i t ­
s e l f ,  Congress a l s o  gave Ohio s t r i p s  o f  land one mile wide on both
®Elazar,  American F edera l ism , op. c i t . , pp. 222-226.
^Graves, op. c i t . , p. 492.
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s id e s  o f  the  r ig h t -o f -w a y  to  be so ld  to  def ray  c o n s t ru c t io n  c o s t s , ^  
Under the  terms o f  the  g r a n t ,  Ohio was r eq u i red  to  s e l l  i t s  land f o r  
not  l e s s  than  $1.25 pe r  ac re  and to  complete the  road w i th in  a fo u r -  
y e a r  pe r iod .  While over land  nrads continued to  be the  c h i e f  t r a n s ­
p o r t a t i o n  concern o f  th e  n a t io n ,  congresss  continued to  provide p r i ­
mary a id  t o  t h i s  func t ion  As i n t e r e s t  turned f i r s t  to  cana ls  and 
l a t e r  to  r a i l r o a d s ,  however,  Congress s h i f t e d  i t s  g ra n t  p r i o r i t i e s  
in to  th e se  a re a s .
I f  P ro fe s so r  W. Brooke Graves view i s  co r rec t* * —t h a t  o th e r  than 
s la v e ry  th e  t h r e e  major problems o f  America in  the  1800's  were d i sp o ­
s i t i o n  o f  the  pub l ic  domain, i n t e r n a l  improvements,  and educa t ion— 
land g ran t s  proved to  be an e f f e c t i v e  tool  in  provid ing  s o lu t io n s  
to  America's  problems. The g r a n t s ,  f o r  example, made i t  p o s s ib le  
f o r  s t a t e s  c r e a te d  ou t  o f  the  Northwest T e r r i t o r y  to  exempt home­
s tead  land from t a x a t io n  and thereby  encouraged rap id  s e t t l e m e n t  of  
the  new s t a t e s .  The g ra n t s  a l s o  provided suppor t  f o r  primary and 
secondary schoo ls ,  and,  through the  M orr i l l  Acts ,  a ided h igher  edu­
c a t io n .  F i n a l l y ,  by s u b s id iz in g  road ,  r i v e r ,  c a n a l ,  and r a i l r o a d  con­
s t r u c t i o n ,  the  g ran ts  inc reased  the  r a t e  o f  i n t e r n a l  improvements and 
made s e t t l e m e n t  o f  the  West a l e s s  arduous t a sk .
***In l a t e r  g r a n t s ,  land along th e  r ig h t -o f -w ay  was given in  a 
checkerboard p a t t e r n  on e i t h e r  s id e  o f  the  r ig h t -o f -w ay  r a t h e r  than 
in  continuous s t r i p s  to  permit  the  f ed e ra l  government t o  r e t a i n  some 
o f  th e  more va luab le  land  a d ja c e n t  t o  the  r ig h t -o f -w ay .
**Graves, op. c i t . , p. 491.
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Money Grants:  Extensions o f  Aided Functions  and C o n t r o l s :
Although land g r a n t s  were the  usual form o f  f ed e ra l  a id  u n t i l  the  
1900' s  a precedent  f o r  monetary a id  can be t r a c e d  back to  the  y e a r  
1790.12 i t  was in t h a t  y e a r  t h a t  the  f ed e ra l  government assumed r e ­
s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  deb ts  incu r red  by th e  s t a t e s  to  f in an ce  the  Revolu­
t i o n a ry  War. This ac t io n  ui&s taken because th e  f e d e ra l  government 
recognized t h a t  i t s  f o re ig n  c r e d i t  s tand ing  was i n e x t r i c a b l y  i n t e r ­
twined with th e  c r e d i t  o f  the  in d iv id u a l  s t a t e s .  I f  any s t a t e  de­
f a u l t e d  on i t s  d eb t ,  a shadow o f  u n c e r t a in ty  would be c a s t  on the 
f in a n c i a l  v i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  e n t i r e  new n a t io n .  To avoid t h i s  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y ,  the  s t a t e s '  deb t  o b l i g a t i o n s  were assumed by th e  f e d e ra l  gov­
ernment.
A second example o f  pre-1900 monetary a id  occurred  in 1803 when 
Ohio was admit ted  i n t o  th e  Union.*3 The a s s i s t a n c e ,  given in  the  form 
o f  shared revenue r a t h e r  than a g r a n t - i n - a i d ,  r e q u i red  th e  f ed e ra l  gov­
ernment to  s e t  a s id e  o n e - te n th  o f  a l l  revenues rece ived  from the  s a l e  
o f  pu b l ic  land w i th in  the  s t a t e  to  be used to  f in a n ce  a road l in k in g  
the  popula ted  East  t o  Ohio and the  M iss is s ip p i  River .
A f in a l  example o f  e a r l y  cash a id  which should be mentioned was 
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a f ed e ra l  budget su rp lus  to  the  s t a t e s  in  1 8 3 7 . ^
12I b i d . , p. 484
13Ib id .
14Deil S. Wright,  Federal Gran ts- In-Aid :  P e rsp ec t iv e s  and A l t e r ­
n a t i v e s , (Washington, D. C . : American E n te rp r i s e  I n s t i t u t e ,  1968), 
p.  25.
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By t h a t  d a t e ,  the  f ed e ra l  government had r e t i r e d  i t s  war deb t  and found 
i t s e l f  with a su rp lus  f o r  the  f i r s t  t ime in  h i s t o r y .  A f te r  cons ide r ing  
severa l  op t ions  f o r  d ispos ing  o f  the  s u rp lu s ,  Congress decided to  d i s ­
t r i b u t e  i t  to  the  s t a t e s .  To avoid p o s s ib l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  
the  funds were given in the form o f  loans  with the  mutual understanding 
t h a t  the  loans  would no t  have to  be repa id .
With th ese  and o th e r  in s ta n c e s  o f  f in a n c i a l  a id  s c a t t e r e d  through­
ou t  th e  per iod  o f  t ime when land g ran ts  were th e  dominant form o f  f e d ­
e r a l  a id  to  s t a t e s ,  any s t a r t i n g  p o in t  which i s  chosen to  begin the 
d i sc u s s io n  o f  money g r a n t  development must be somewhat a r b i t r a r y .  Re­
cogniz ing t h i s  element o f  a r b i t r a r i n e s s ,  th e  M orr i l l  Act o f  1890 has 
been chosen as  the  l e g i s l a t i o n  which e f f e c t e d  a t r a n s i t i o n  from land 
to  money g r a n t s - i n - a i d .  This Act i s  t i e d  in  phi losophy,  purpose,  and 
au th o r  to  one o f  the  most important  p ieces  o f  land g ra n t  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
the  M orr i l l  Act o f  1862. Passed to  provide  more adequate support  than 
th e  land g ra n t  c o l leg e s  were then r e c e iv in g ,  the  second M orr i l l  Act of  
1890 s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  a id  was t o  be given in the  form o f  f in a n c i a l  a s s i s ­
tan ce ;  namely, i n t e r e s t  income from bonds purchased with the  proceeds 
from the  s a l e  o f  ded ica ted  land.  As a co nd i t ion  f o r  rece iv in g  g r a n t s ,  
s t a t e s  were r eq u i red  to  submit an annual r e p o r t  d e t a i l i n g  how t h e i r  
funds were spen t .  I f  t h e  funds were not  spen t  f o r  s p e c i f i e d  f u n c t io n s ,  
Congress a u tho r ized  th e  Treasury  to  withhold g ran t s  from non-complying
s t a t e s .
l^Morton Grodzins,  The American System, (Chicago: Rand McNally 
and Company, 1966), p. 34.
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In looking a t  the  h i s t o r i c a l  development o f  g ran t  c o n t r o l s ,  i t  i s  
important  t o  recognize  t h a t  the  annual r e p o r t  requirement predated  the  
M orr i l l  Act o f  1890. This p rov is ion  was f i r s t  in t roduced  in the  M orr i l l  
Act o f  1862 and cont inued in the  Hatch Act o f  1887. A l t e r n a t iv e ly  known 
as  the  A g r ic u l tu ra l  Experifnental S ta t io n  Act,  th e  Hatch Act provided 
g ra n t s  o f  $15,000 per  y ea r  to  s t a t e s  f o r  the  e s ta b l i sh m en t  and main­
tenance o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  exper imental s t a t i o n s .  Although each s t a t e  was 
r equ i red  by t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  to  submit an annual r e p o r t  on i t s  expendi­
t u r e s ,  no p rov is ion  was made to  v e r i f y  th e  v a l i d i t y  of  s t a t e  r e p o r t s .  
This omission persevered  in a l l  g ran t  l e g i s l a t i o n  f o r  the  next e ig h t  
y e a r s .  F i n a l l y ,  in 1895, an amendment to  the  Hatch Act e s t a b l i s h e d  
the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a f e d e ra l  a u d i t ,  and t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  has been continued 
in succeeding g ra n t  l e g i s l a t i o n .* ®
The f in a l  con tro l  p rov is ions  which a re  included in p r e se n t  g ran ts  
were in t roduced  in the  Weeks Act o f  1911 and the  Smith-Lever Act o f  
1914. The former Act,  in tended as an a id  to  help prevent  f o r e s t  f i r e s ,  
provided funds f o r  the  purchase o f  watershed lands along navigable  
streams in  the  Appalachian and White mountains.  Before funds were 
d ispe rsed  to  the  s t a t e s ,  however, approval f o r  the  purchase o f  w a te r ­
shed land had to  be ob ta ined  from the  I n t e r i o r  Department. This p ro­
v i s io n  o f  p r i o r  fede ra l  approval o f  s t a t e  p r o je c t s  pe rm it ted  c l o s e r  
con t ro l  o f  g ran t  funds and assurance  t h a t  g ran ts  would be spen t  f o r
*6James A. Maxwell, The F isca l  Impact o f  Federal ism in  th e  United 
S t a t e s , (New York: Russe ll  and R u s s e l l ,  1970),  p. 73.
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th e  purpose t h a t  Congress in tended when enac t ing  the  l e g i s l a t i o n .*7 
Three y ea rs  l a t e r ,  th e  Smith-Lever Act completed a d m in i s t r a t i v e  con­
t r o l s  by e s t a b l i s h i n g  th e  concept o f  apportionment formulas and r e ­
q u i r in g  s t a t e s  to  match f ed e ra l  g ra n t s  d o l l a r  f o r  d o l l a r .  Under the 
terms o f  t h i s  Act,  each s t a t e  was to  r ece iv e  a minimum g ran t  o f  
$10,000 t o  f ina nce  programs g iv ing  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and p r a c t i c a l  demon­
s t r a t i o n s  in a g r i c u l t u r e  and home economics. In a d d i t io n  to  the  base 
g ran t  o f  $10, 000, each s t a t e  was e l i g i b l e  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in a fund o f  
$600,000 which was t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d  on the  b a s i s  o f  a s t a t e ' s  ru ra l  
popula t ion  as a percen tage  o f  the  ru ra l  popula t ion  o f  the  U. S. To 
r ece iv e  t h e i r  share  o f  the  v a r i a b l e  fund, however, s t a t e s  were requ i red  
to  match f e d e ra l  funds with s t a t e  funds.*®
By 1914, then,many o f  the  con t ro l  dev ises  t h a t  e x i s t  in to d a y 's  
g ran ts  were to  be found in  e x i s t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n .  A review o f  the 
Acts se rv ing  as v e h ic le s  f o r  developing con t ro l  p r o v i s io n s —M o r r i l l , 
Hatch, Weeks, Smith-Lever—i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  e a r l y  monetary g ran ts  
emphasized the  deepening o r  provid ing  more in t e n s iv e  support  to  e x i s t ­
ing programs r a t h e r  than widening o r  extending support  to  o th e r  a re a s .  
In 1916, an excep t ion  to  t h i s  t re n d  was i n s t i t u t e d  with the  passage 
o f  the  Federal Highway Act.  The major purpose o f  the  Highway Act was 
" to  g e t  farmers ou t  o f  the  mud" by e n te r in g  in to  agreements with s t a t e  
highway departments  t o  c o n s t r u c t  hard su rfaced  ru ra l  pos t  roads.  In 
an important  ex te n t io n  to  the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  p r i o r  f ed e ra l  approval o f
17I b i d . , pp. 245-247.
*®Graves, op. c i t . , pp. 449-501.
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s t a t e  p la n s ,  Congress demanded t h a t  a depar tment o f  highways in each 
s t a t e  be r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  adm in is te r ing  the  program. As a r e s u l t  o f  
t h i s  requirement ,  ten  s t a t e s  which had no fu n c t io n in g  highway d e p a r t ­
ments were forced  to  c r e a t e  them o r  f o r f e i t  t h e i r  share  o f  f u n d s . ^  
The f i n a l  major e x te n t lo n  o f  a id  p r i o r  to  the  World War I was in 
the  a rea  o f  vocat ional  educa t ion .  Under the  ausp ices  o f  the  Smith- 
Hughes Vocat ional  Education Act o f  1918, Congress committed i t s e l f  to  
support :
. . . vocat ional  educat ion  in schools  o f  l e s s  than 
c o l l e g e  grade . . . f o r  the  educat ion  o f  boys and 
g i r l s  who did  not  in tend  to  go to  c o l l e g e  and o f  
a d u l t  workers who needed i n s t r u c t i o n  no t  provided 
by a g r i c u l t u r e  and i n d u s t r y . 20
Aid was provided to  pay s a l a r i e s  o f  vocat ional  a g r i c u l t u r a l  t eachers  
and vocat ional  t r a d e s  teac h e r s  and to  suppor t  t e a c h e r  t r a i n i n g .  Aid 
to  each s t a t e  was determined by the  popula t ion  o f  each s t a t e  r e l a t i v e  
to  th e  popula t ion  o f  th e  United S ta te s , ,  with  the  s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  a t  
l e a s t  $10,000 would be given to  each s t a t e  in  each o f  t h r e e  s p e c i f i e d  
c a te g o r ie s  r e g a rd le s s  o f  popula t ion .
Following World War I to  th e  Great  Depress ion,  only  two new s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  programs were inaugura ted ,  both in the  a rea  o f  community 
h e a l th .  The f i r s t  o f  th e se  programs, the  Chamberlain-Kahn Venereal 
Disease Control Act o f  1918, was sparked by the  i n c re a se  in  venereal  
d i s e a se  which occurred dur ing  th e  war. The Chamberlain-Kahn Act p ro ­
vided $1 m i l l i o n  a y e a r  f o r  two y ea r s  to  be d i s t r i b u t e d  to  s t a t e s  on
^Maxwell ,  op. c i t . , pp. 185-186.
2 0 l b i d . , p .  8 2 .
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the  b a s i s  o f  popula t ion  d i sea se  con t ro l  programs. At th e  end o f  the 
two-year  p e r io d ,  Congress demonstrated l i t t l e  enthusiasm f o r  th e  p ro­
gram and i n i t i a l l y  c u r t a i l e d  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,  then s topped them com­
p l e t e l y .^1
Although funded more 1 ‘b e r a l l y  than Chamberlain-Kahn a t  i t s  incep­
t i o n ,  the  second ven ture  In pu b l ic  h e a l th  s u f f e re d  the  same u l t im a te  
demise. Passed in 1921, the  Shepherd-Towner Act supported maternal and 
c h i l d  h e a l th  c a re .  Grants were i n i t i a l l y  a p p ro p r ia ted  in the  amount 
o f  $1,240,000 a y e a r  f o r  f iv e  y e a r s .  Each s t a t e  was to  r e c e iv e  a 
$10,000 b a s ic  g ran t  with  the  remainder o f  the  a l l o c a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t e d  
to  s t a t e s  in  accordance to  popu la t ion .  Because o f  p o l i t i c a l  p ressu res  
brought  by " s t a t e s  r i g h t e r s , "  g ran ts  exp ired  in 1929.
In th e  y ea rs  between 1921 and 1933, the  fede ra l  government seemed 
con ten t  with the  e x i s t i n g  c a t e g o r ie s  o f  g r a n t s  f o r  no new programs were 
developed dur ing t h i s  pe r iod .  With the  advent  o f  the  Great  Depression, 
however, a wide range o f  new w el fa re  and economic s e c u r i t y  programs 
were enacted .  Although many o f  th ese  programs provided only emergency 
r e l i e f  and expired  in  th e  l a t e  t h i r t i e s  and e a r l y  f o r t i e s ,  seventeen o f  
the  bas ic  w e l fa re  g ran t  c a t e g o r ie s  t h a t  e x i s t  today were au tho r ized  be­
tween 1933 and 1944. Perhaps the  most important  o f  th e se  was the  Social 
S e c u r i ty  Act o f  1935. Encompassing the  th re e  major program a reas  o f  un­
employment in su ran ce ,  pu b l ic  a s s i s ta n c e ;  and maternal  and c h i ld  w e l fa re
2l I b i d . , p. 203.
22Ib id .
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c a r e ,  t h i s  Act provided the  b as ic  in g re d ie n t s  f o r  th e  United S t a t e s '  
program o f  pub l ic  a s s i s t a n c e .
From the  end o f  th e  second World War t o  1972, major new g ran ts  
were provided f o r  urban development,  environmental p r o t e c t io n ,  and 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  depressed a r e a s .  Addressing th e  problem o f  urban 
improvements, Congress i n i t i a t e d  g ra n t s  f o r  slum c lea ra n c e  and low 
income housing in 1945. I t  was no t  u n t i l  fo u r  y ea rs  l a t e r ,  however, 
t h a t  a s u f f i c i e n t  suppor t  could be ob ta ined  to  pass the  Housing Act 
o f  1949. Through t h i s  Act,  loca l  governments were given f in a n c i a l  
support  f o r  slum e r a d i c a t i o n  and f o r  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  low income hous­
ing u n i t s . 23
In the  a rea  o f  environmental p r o t e c t i o n ,  two pa th -b reak ing  Acts 
should be mentioned. The f i r s t  was passed in 1948 as th e  Water Pol­
l u t i o n  Control Act.  This  Act au th o r ized  $3 m i l l i o n  per  y e a r  f o r  a 
f i v e - y e a r  per iod  to  help  s t a t e s  f inance  the  c lean ing  o f  streams which
pA
were p o l lu te d  by c i t y  sewage o r  i n d u s t r i a l  waste.  The second p iece  
o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  was the  Air  P o l lu t io n  Control Act o f  1955. Designed 
to  a t t a c k  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  through re sea rch  and demonstra t ion p r o j e c t s ,  
th e  Act c a l l e d  f o r  an i n i t i a l  a p p ro p r ia t io n  o f  $8.5 m i l l io n  annual ly  
f o r  th r e e  y e a r s .  Grants were t o  be made a v a i l a b l e  to  th e  s t a t e s ,  to  
th e  D i s t r i c t  o f  Columbia, to  loca l  governments,  o r  to  p r i v a t e  o r  pub-
23I b i d . , pp. 203-204.
24I b i d . , p. 547.
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l i e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  suppor t  r e se a r c h ,  t r a i n i n g , a n d  demonstra t ion p ro ­
j e c t s  t o  c o m b a t  a i r  p o l l u t i o n . 25
The f in a l  major new g ra n t  a rea  dur ing t h i s  p e r io d ,  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
o f  depressed a reas  was funcM through the  Area Redevelopment Act o f  1961. 
E a r l i e r  ve rs ions  o f  t h i s  Act were passed by Congress in 1958 and 1960, 
but were v ic t im s  o f  veto£ by P re s id e n t  Eisenhower. Upon th e  assumption 
o f  the  p res idency  by John F. Kennedy, Senator  Paul Douglas in t roduced 
and ob ta ined  passage o f  h i s  b i l l  f o r  th e  t h i r d  time.  The b i l l  was f a v ­
o rab ly  rece ived  by P re s id e n t  Kennedy and was s igned  in to  law. The Act 
i n i t i a l l y  a l l o c a t e d  $50 m i l l io n  to  be used by the  s t a t e s  to  develop 
r a i l ,  bus , subway, o r  o t h e r  t r a n s i t  equipment and f a c i l i t i e s . 26 In 
l a t e r  y e a r s ,  t h i s  g r a n t  served as the  p ro to type  f o r  more ambitious 
u n der tak ings ,  such as t h e  e x te n s iv e  Applachian redevelopment program.
The f i n a l  major e x te n t io n  o f  the  g ran t  concept  occurred in 1972 
with  t h e  passage of  l e g i s l a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a system o f  revenue s h a r ­
ing .  For th e  f i r s t  t ime in  the  long h i s t o r y  o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  Congress 
heeded the  advocates  o f  uncondi t ional  g ra n t s  and passed th e  S t a t e  and 
Local F isca l  A ss is tance  Act o f  1972. Nominally, the  Act did  not c r e a t e  
an uncondi t ional  g r an t .  Rather ,  loca l  governments were r e s t r i c t e d  in 
t h e i r  use o f  funds to  c e r t a i n  " p r i o r i t y  e x p e n d i tu r e s . "  Quoting from 
the  Act:
For purposes o f  t h i s  t i t l e ,  th e  term " p r i o r i t y  
expend i tu res"  means only-
25I b i d . , p. 551.
26I b i d . , p. 673.
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( 1) o rd ina ry  and necessary  maintenance and oper ­
a t i n g  expenses f o r -
(a)  pu b l ic  s a f e t y  ( in c lu d in g  law enforcement,  
f i r e  p r o t e c t i o n ,  and bu i ld in g  code en­
fo rcem ent) ,
(b) environmental p ro te c t io n  ( inc lud ing  
sewage d i s p o s a l ,  s a n i t a t i o n ,  and p o l ­
l u t i o n  abatement) ,
(c)  pub l ic  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  ( in c lu d in g  t r a n ­
s i t  systems and s t r e e t s  and ro a d s ) ,
(d) healtlr
(e) r e c r e a t io n
( f )  l i b r a r i e s
(g) s o c ia l  s e rv ic e s  f o r  the  poor o r  aged, and
(h) f i n a n c i a l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ;  and
(2) o rd in a ry  and necessary  c a p i t a l  expend i tu res  
au th o r ized  by law / 7
The above enumerated expend i tu re  c a t e g o r i e s  a re  so broad, however, t h a t
th e  Act puts  very l i t t l e  e f f e c t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  use o f  revenue
shar ing  funds.  Commenting on th e  broad spending a u t h o r i t y  o f  local
governments,  William W il iner  and John P. Nichols have w r i t t e n :
The p r i o r i t y  a r e a s  a re  very broad,  and i t  would 
seem t h a t  only th e  o pe ra t ion  o f  schools  i s  ex­
c luded.  However, even schools  can be p a r t i a l l y  
f inanced through c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  c a p i t a l  f a c -  
c i l i t i e s  with revenue shar ing  fu n d s .28
Thus, s u b s t a n t i v e l y ,  revenue sha r ing  may be cons idered  an uncondi t ional
g ra n t  with one excep t io n —s t a t e  and loca l  governments a re  s p e c i f i c a l l y
p r o h ib i t e d  from using revenue shar ing  funds t o  s a t i s f y  th e  matching
requirements  o f  co n d i t io n a l  g r a n t s .
27U. S. Congress,  S t a t e  and Local F isca l  A ss is tance  Act o f  1972, 
Public  Law 92-512, 92nd Congress,  1972, p. 1.
28Will iam W il iner  and John P. N ichols ,  Revenue Sharing (Washington, 
D. C.:  Pro Plan I n te rn a t io n a l  L t d . ,  I n c . ,  l9>3) ,  p. 127.
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Unlike the  H e l l e r ^  and Pechman^ plans  which c a l l e d  f o r  a given 
percentage  o f  f ed e ra l  taxes  to  be made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  revenue sha r ing ,  
t h e  Act passed by Congress funded the  program a t  a given d o l l a r  amount 
($5.3  b i l l i o n  in  1972 and in c re a s in g  t h e r e a f t e r  to  $6.35 b i l l i o n  in 
1976). The t o t a l  amount o f  monies were t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d  among s t a t e s  
in accordance with a th r e e  o r  f iv e  f a c t o r  formula,  which ever  was most 
b e n e f i c i a l  to  the  s t a t e . U p o n  r e c e i p t  o f  revenue shar ing  funds,  
s t a t e s  were mandated to  a l l o c a t e  tw o - th i rd s  o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  
to  general  purpose loca l  governments.  The method o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  was 
once again  s p e c i f i e d  by formula with l i m i t s  on the  minimum and maximum 
amounts t h a t  could be rece ived  by loca l  governments.
One ad d i t io n a l  new f e a t u r e  o f  revenue shar ing  i s  t h a t  r e c i p i e n t  
governments a re  r eq u i red  to  pub l i sh  in a newspaper o f  general  c i r c u l a ­
t i o n  an account ing o f  how revenue sha r ing  funds were spen t .  The r e ­
s u l t i n g  high v i s a b i l i t y  o f  the  use o f  th ese  funds led many govern­
mental u n i t s  to  s o l i c i t  recommendations from i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  as  to 
how the  funds should be used. In t h i s  way, ex te n s iv e  community p a r t i ­
c i p a t i n g  in governmental a f f a i r s  was achieved.
Following a d e t a i l e d  debate  over  whether  or  not revenue shar ing  
should be continued beyond i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e l y  determined e x p i r a t io n  in
^ W a l t e r  H e l l e r ,  New Dimensions o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy* (Cambridge, 
M ass . : Harvard U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1966).
30Joseph Pechman, "Financing S ta t e  and Local Government," Pro­
ceedings o f  a Symposium on Federal Taxat ion (New York: American 
Bankers '  A s so c ia t io n ,  1965).
31The s p e c i f i c s  o f  th e se  formulas w i l l  be p resen ted  in  the  next 
s e c t io n  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r .
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321976, Congress passed the  S t a t e  and Local F isca l  A ss is tance  Act 
Amendments o f  1976 and breathed new l i f e  i n to  revenue sha r ing .  In 
a d d i t io n  to  extending the  program f o r  th re e  and t h r e e - q u a r t e r  ad d i ­
t i o n a l  y e a r s ,  the  amended Act made some important  changes in the  p ro ­
v i s io n s  o f  th e  e a r l i e r  Act.  F i r s t ,  a d d i t io n a l  p r o h ib i t i o n s  a g a in s t  
d i sc r im in a t io n  were added. O r ig in a l ly ,  only d i s c r im in a t io n  based on 
r a c e ,  c o l o r ,  n a t io n a l  o r i g i n ,  and sex was e x p l i c i t l y  forb idden .  To 
t h i s  l i s t  was added age ,  handicapped, and r e l i g i o n .  Second, a l l  
s t r i n g s  were removed from the  use of  shar ing  funds.  Th i rd ,  revenue 
shar ing  funds could be used to  meet the  matching p ro v is io n s  of  con­
d i t i o n a l  g r a n t s .  Fourth ,  pub l ic  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in determining the  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  sha r ing  funds was req u i re d .  F i n a l l y ,  r e c i p i e n t s  were 
requ i red  to  r e p o r t  to  the  S ec re ta ry  o f  the  Treasury  how revenue s h a r ­
ing funds were spen t .  Thus, through the  second and t h i r d  changes , 
revenue shar ing  was transformed in to  a t r u l y  uncondi t ional  g ran t .
Before ending t h i s  s e c t io n  on th e  development o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  
i t  i s  necessary  t o  mention a companion program to  general revenue 
s h a r in g ;  namely, sp ec ia l  revenue sha r ing .  As i t  was o r i g i n a l l y  de­
sc r ib ed  by P re s id e n t  Nixon, 33 s p ec ia l  revenue sha r ing  was in tended to  
c o n s o l id a te  the  v a r i e t y  to  e x i s t i n g  co n d i t io n a l  g ran t s  provid ing
•^Richard R. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, J r . ,  Revenue S h a r in g :
The Second Round (Washington, D. C.:  The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1977),
pp. 1-23.
J J U. S. Congress,  House, Message from th e  P re s id en t  o f  the  United 
S ta te s  Proposing a System o f  Special Revenue Sharing f o r  Law Ln to rce-"  
ment, 92nd Congress,  1 s t  Sess ion ,  19/1 ,  p. z .
136
funding in the  s ix  major a reas  o f  urban development,  ru ra l  development,  
ed u ca t io n ,  manpower, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  and law enforcement .  Under t h i s  
program, funds would be a l l o c a t e d  to  s t a t e s  w ithout  matching p rov is ions  
t o  be used f o r  p r i o r i t y  it^ms w i th in  each o f  the  major a r e a s .  The pu r ­
pose o f  the  program was t o  provide more f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  s t a t e  and local  
governments and to  re l ieve-  the  uncoordinated p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  cond i ­
t io n a l  g r a n t s .  Although spec ia l  revenue sha r ing  was f i r s t  proposed 
in 1971, Congress did  not enac t  the  f i r s t  enabl ing  l e g i s l a t i o n  u n t i l  
1973, with the  passage o f  the  Comprehensive Employment and Train ing  
Act.  Since 1973, fo u r  o th e r  p ieces  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  have been passed 
prov id ing  f o r  spec ia l  revenue sha r ing .  These inc lude  th e  Housing and 
Community Development Act and amendments to  th e  Social S ecu r i ty  Act 
o f  1935, both passed in  1974, and the  P a r tn e rsh ip  f o r  Health and the  
Safe S t r e e t  Act,  passed in 1976.^
A General D esc r ip t ion  o f  t h e  Grant Program
Four to p ic s  w i l l  be d iscussed  in t h i s  s e c t io n .  The f i r s t  t h re e  
concern co n d i t io n a l  g r a n t s  and inc lu d e :  (1) Types o f  G rants ;  (2) Mat­
ching Requirements; and (3) Levels o f  Funding. The l a s t  to p ic  i s  con- 
serned with formula a l l o c a t i o n  a s so c ia te d  with revenue shar ing .
Types o f  Grants
The ind iv idua l  g r a n t s  which comprise th e  United S t a t e s '  system 
o f  co n d i t io n a l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  may be c l a s s i f i e d  as e i t h e r  p r o j e c t  g ran t s
34Advisory Commission o f  Intergovernmental R e la t io n s ,  Block 
Grants : A Comparative Analysis  (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govern­
ment P r in t i n g  O f f ic e ,  1977), p. 6 .
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or  formula g r a n t s .  In the  former c a teg o ry ,  the  p o t e n t i a l  r e c i p i e n t  
government must assume the  i n i t i a t i v e  and apply f o r  a i d ,  which i s  then 
issued  on a com pe t i t ive  b a s i s .  By c o n t r a s t ,  once formula g r a n t s  have 
been a u tho r ized  and funded,  each lower governmental u n i t  w i l l  r ece iv e  
i t s  share  o f  th e  g r a n t  as s p e c i f i e d  in a s t a t u t o r y  a l l o c a t i o n  formula. 
The p ro v is io n s  w r i t t e n  i n to  the  formulas  f o r  ind iv idua l  g ran ts  a re  
t a i l o r e d  to  deal w ith  p a r t i c u l a r  problems and a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  widely 
d iv e rg en t .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  however, to  e s t a b l i s h  a very broad c l a s s ­
i f i c a t i o n  system f o r  a l l o c a t i o n  p ro v is io n s .  This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
system c o n s i s t s  o f  th e  fo l lowing two d i v i s i o n s .
1. Popula t ion of  lower government, weighted with 
r e s p e c t  t o  need and f i s c a l  c a p a c i ty .
2. Fixed percen tage  o f  c o s t ,  p lus  bonus to  induce 
h igher  s tan d a rd s .
Weighted popu la t ion  as th e  prime a l l o c a t i n g  b a s e . Grant programs 
which a r e  included in t h i s  ca tegory  employ formulas based on the  r a t i o  
o f  the  lower governmental u n i t ' s  popu la t ion  and income to  n a t io n a l  pop­
u l a t i o n  and income. The popu la t ion  f i g u r e  used i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h a t  
f o r  t o t a l  p o pu la t ion .  Indeed, most g r a n ts  d e f in e  a " t a r g e t "  popula t ion  
which i s  used as  the  b a s i s  f o r  a l l o c a t i n g  funds t o  lower l e v e l s  o f  gov­
ernment.  For example, i f  i t  i s  d e s i r e d  to  a id  th e  aged, a formula
based on the  percen tage  o f  aged popula t ion  might be used because t h i s
i s  the  group f o r  which a id  i s  in tended.
The fo l lowing  example demonstrates  how weighted popu la t ion  i s  
employed in c a l c u l a t i n g  g ra n t s .
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EXAMPLE l 35
Hospi ta l  and Medical F a c i l i t i e s  Cons t ruc t ion  
In t h i s  program, funds a r e  a l l o c a t e d  to  s t a t e s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  
th e  r a t i o  o f  a s t a t e ' s  popu la t ion  weighted by th e  square o f  i t s  a l l o t ­
ment percentage  to  th e  summed s i m i l a r l y  weighted popu la t ion  f o r  a l l  
s t a t e s .  The a l lo tm en t  pe rcen tage ,  in  t u r n ,  i s  def ined  as 100 percen t  
minus the  product  o f  50 p e rcen t  t imes th e  r a t i o  o f  a s t a t e ' s  per  c a p i t a  
income to  the  na t io n a l  per  c a p i t a  income, s u b je c t  t o  the  c o n s t r a i n t  
t h a t  the  a l l o c a t i o n  percen tage  be between 33^ and 75 p e rc e n t .  In math­
ematical  n o t a t i o n ;
2
G = i i- lt - and A = i.oo - .soli
1 nr» , 2 1 Vj_ZP-jA,* Yt
i= l  1
Where; = pe rcen t  o f  g r a n t  funds f o r  th e  i t *1 s t a t e ,
XL
P.j = popu la t ion  o f  th e  i s t a t e ,
Aj = a l l o c a t i o n  percen tage  o f  th e  i **1 s t a t e ,  
n = number o f  s t a t e s  = 50,
Y.j = per  c a p i t a  income o f  the  i **1 s t a t e ,
Yt  = na t io n a l  per  c a p i t a  income.
By m u l t ip ly in g  th e  va lue  ob ta ined  f o r  G by the  amount o f  ap p ro p r ia ted  
funds ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  determine the  amount o f  money to  be rece ived  
by each s t a t e .  In t h i s  formula ,  th e  g r e a t e r  a s t a t e ' s  popu la t ion  and 
sm al le r  i t s  income, th e  g r e a t e r  w i l l  be i t s  f in a n c i a l  a id .
35u. S . ,  Congress,  Health Program ExtentiOn Act o f  1973, Public  
Law 93-45, 93rd Congress,  1 s t  S ess ion ,  1973.
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Need and F isca l  Capacity  as  Prime A l lo c a t in g  Base. The a l l o c a t ­
ing base o f  t h i s  c l a s s  of  formulas  c o n s i s t s  p r im a r i ly  o f  p o p u la t io n ,  
t a r g e t  o r  t o t a l ,  and pe r  c a p i t a  income. In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  the  formu­
l a s  a re  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  ones d iscussed  in the  preceding s e c t io n .  The 
d i s s i m i l a r i l y  o f  t h e  groups and, hence,  th e  need f o r  two s e p a ra te  c l a s ­
s i f i c a t i o n s  l i e s  in  th e  d i r e c t  de te rm ina t ion  o f  th e  a l lo tm e n t  pe rcen­
tage  in the  e a r l i e r  group and th e  i n d i r e c t  o r  two-staged de te rm ina t ion  
o f  th e  a l l o c a t i o n  pe rcen tage  o f  the  p r e s e n t  group. Because of  th e  need 
concep t ,  the  p r e se n t  c l a s s  o f  formulas  must f i r s t  c a l c u l a t e  a r a t i o  f o r  
each s t a t e .  But be fo re  a s t a t e ' s  share  o f  a g r a n t  can be determined,  
i t  i s  necessary  t o  make an a d d i t io n a l  c a l c u l a t i o n  which measures the  
r e l a t i v e  value o f  t h e  s t a t e ' s  r a t i o  to  the  r a t i o  o f  a l l  o th e r  s t a t e s .
The fo l lowing  example i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  formula in t h i s  c l a s s ­
i f i c a t i o n .
EXAMPLE 236 
Alcohol Formula Grants
One- th ird  o f  a s t a t e ' s  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  based on need as measured 
by i t s  popu la t ion  r e l a t i v e  to  th e  popula t ion  o f  the  United S ta te s  and 
tw o - th i rd s  a re  based on f i s c a l  c a p a c i ty  as  measured by r e l a t i v e  per  
c a p i t a  income. In mathematical  n o t a t i o n :
36Executive O f f ice  o f  the  P r e s id e n t ,  O f f ice  o f  Management and 
Budget, 1976 Catalog o f  Federal A ss is tance  (Washington, D. C.:  U.
S. Government P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1976), p. 154.
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P ,
G = 1/3  L -  + 2/3
n „
Z pj 
i = l  1
Where: G-j = Grant r a t i o  f o r  the  i **1 s t a t e ,
= Popula t ion  in  th e  i **1 s t a t e ,
Yj = Per Capita  income in th e  i **1 s t a t e ,  
n = 50.
Fixed pe rcen tage  o f  c o s t ,  p lus  bonus to  induce h igher  s t a n d a r d s . 
The a l l o c a t i n g  base f o r  formulas  in  t h i s  c l a s s  c o n s i s t  o f  two p a r t s .  
F i r s t ,  th e  n a t io n a l  government pays to  each s t a t e  a f ixed  percentage  
o f  the  c o s t  of  p rov id ing  what i t  co n s id e rs  to  be a minimum s tandard  
f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v i c e .  Second, those  s t a t e s  p rov id ing  more than 
j u s t  a minimum leve l  o f  suppor t  o r  those  t h a t  provide  a d d i t io n a l  types  
o f  e l i g i b l e  b e n e i f t s  r e c e iv e  f u r t h e r  f e d e ra l  a id .  Example 3 i s  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h i s  f i n a l  c l a s s  o f  formulas .
EXAMPLE 337 
Maintenance A ss is tance
The bas ic  g ran t  i s  equal to  f i v e - s i x t h s  o f  th e  f i r s t  $18 o f  a s s ­
i s t a n c e  given by s t a t e s  to  a id  f a m i l i e s  with  dependent  c h i ld r e n .  Ass­
i s t a n c e  provided by s t a t e s  which exceed $18, up t o  $75, i s  e l i g i b l e  
f o r  a f i f t y  pe rcen t  subs idy  frcm th e  f ed e ra l  government. In a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  f ed e ra l  government w i l l  p rovide  f i f t y  p e r c e n t ,  up to  a maximum o f  
$500, o f  a id  given to  f a m i l i e s  f o r  home r e p a i r s .  The formula may be 
wri t t e n :
'1
n
i l l  v i
37Ib id ., p. 315.
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n 1
G. = .E, p .  {5/6 x $18 + .5 (X -  $18)} + E H. x .5Z 
1 J=1 J j=lJ
Where: Gj = Amount o f  g r a n t  rece ived  by the  i th  s t a t e ,
Pj = E l i g i b l e  r e c i p i e n t  o f  a id  in the  i **1 s t a t e ,
X = Amount o f  s t a t e  a s s i s t a n c e ,  maximum o f  $75,
Z = Amount o f  s t a t e  a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  home r e p a i r ,  maximum o f  
$1 ,000,
n = Number o f  persons rece iv in g  a s s i s t a n c e ,
1 = Number o f  homes r ece iv in g  a s s i s t a n c e ,
H = E l i g i b l e  homes to  r e c e iv e  a id  in the  i **1 s t a t e .
The choice o f  a l l o c a t i n g  formulas f o r  co n d i t io n a l  g ran ts  may 
g r e a t l y  in f lu e n c e  the  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  goal achievement by the  federa l  
government,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  the  choice i s  between the  t h i r d  c l a s s  o f  
formulas and e i t h e r  o f  the  f i r s t  two c l a s s e s .  Because cond i t iona l
g ra n ts  a r e  in tended to  in c re a se  the  supply o f  p a r t i c u l a r  goods, i t
i s  important  t h a t  loca l  r e c i p i e n t  governments not  simply s u b s t i t u t e  
na t io n a l  funding f o r  lo ca l  funding ,  but  t h a t  they  use the  g ran t  to  
expand s e rv i c e  l e v e l s .  Such an expansion i s  more l i k e l y  to  occur i f  
g ra n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  the  matching o f  na t io n a l  funds with local
O O
funds.  But cau t io n  must be ex e rc i se d  in  th e  use o f  such r e q u i r e ­
ments because o f  the  g r e a t e r  d i s t o r t i o n  on loca l  governments.  I t
3®An excep t ion  to  t h i s  general  tendency might e x i s t  in the  case 
o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  loca l  government support ing  a n a t i o n a l l y  favored func­
t i o n  a t  l e v e l s  h igher  than provided f o r  in  g r a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The 
"w indfa l l"  g r a n t  monies might simply be used to  r e l e a s e  loca l  funds 
from the  favored a c t i v i t y  and r e - a l l o c a t e d  to  some o th e r  fu n c t io n .
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must be recognized t h a t  the  more r igo rous  co n d i t io n s  reduce the  income 
e f f e c t  o f  a given leve l  o f  a id  and in c r ea se  the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t .  
Local governments w i l l  then  be confronted  with the  choice  o f  t r a d in g  
g r e a t e r  amounts o f  p o l i t i c *1 autonomy f o r  f ed e ra l  a id  than would have 
been t r u e  under l e s s  r igo rous  c o n d i t io n s .  This can be expected to  r e ­
s u l t  in l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  support  f o r  the  g r a n t  program.
Matching Requirements
S ta t e  matching o f  f e d e ra l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  i s  a common f e a t u r e  o f  
co n d i t io n a l  g r a n t s .  The preceding s e c t io n  o f  t h i s  paper a l luded  to  
t h i s  f e a t u r e  by demonstra t ing  how c e r t a i n  matching requirements  a re  
inco rpo ra ted  in to  g r a n t  formulas .  Indeed, the  requirement t h a t  r e ­
c i p i e n t  governmental u n i t s  match f ed e ra l  c o n t r ib u t io n s  i s  a common 
f e a t u r e  o f  g r an ts  r e g a rd le s s  o f  whether  they  a re  o f  the  formula or  
p r o j e c t  type.
I n i t i a l l y ,  a l l  g r a n t s  conta ined  t h e  requirement t h a t  s t a t e  and 
loca l  governments ob ta in in g  a id  would be requ i red  to  match fede ra l  
funds d o l l a r  f o r  d o l l a r .  Since 1935, however, th e r e  has been an i n ­
c rea se  in the  v a r i e t y  o f  matching requ irem ents .  In t h a t  y e a r ,  a 
t o t a l  o f  twelve new g r a n t - i n - a i d  programs were i n i t i a t e d .  Of t h i s  
t o t a l ,  one r eq u i red  t h i r t y - t h r e e  to  s ix ty - se v e n  pe rcen t  matching by 
r e c i p i e n t  governments,  fo u r  r equ i red  f i f t y  pe rcen t  matching, th re e  
r equ i red  seventeen to  f i f t y  pe rcen t  matching,  two had a s e v e n ty - f iv e  
pe rcen t  requ irem ent ,  one r equ i red  no matching,  and one conta ined  an 
undefined matching p ro v is io n .  As new g ran ts  were enac ted ,  the  v a r i a ­
t i o n  in  matching requirements  was con t inuous ly  expanded. As Table 5
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TABLE 5
MATCHING RATIOS, EXISTING PROGRAMS OF 
GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE OR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS AS OF 
CALFNnAR YEARS OF ORIGIN
Federal __________________ Number o f  Programs_________________






















some loca l  
p a r t  o r  a l l  
d e c l in in g  
v a r i a b l e
TOTAL 1 1 1 1 4  1 1 1 1
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TABLE 5 (cont.)
Federal Number o f  Programs


























some loca l  
p a r t  o r  a l l  
. d e c l in in g  
v a r i a b l e
TOTAL 1 3 1 12 2 13 5 4 1
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TABLE 5 (cont.)
Federal _______________ Number of Programs__________________


























4 2 1 4 1 9 1 10
some loca l  3 1 3
p a r t  o r  a l l  4 1
d e c l in in g
v a r i a b l e  1
TOTAL 14 2 1 13 1 19 1 21
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TABLE 5 (cont.)
Federal Number o f  Programs






















some loca l  
p a r t  o r  a l l  
d ec l in in g  













1 2 2 4 6
1
1 3 1 9 4
3
1 5 7 2
1
9 3 16 41 19
1 2 2 10
1 1 2 3 6
1 1 10
TOTAL 17 20 40 109 53 4
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TABLE 5 (cont.)
Federal Number of Programs







50 2 2 2
50- 67
50- 70






67- 75 1 1 1
75 1 3 1 2
80 1 1 2
90 1 1
91
100 1 1 1 1 1 1
some local  1 2 1 1
p a r t  o r  a l l  
d e c l in in g
v a r i a b l e  2 3 12 8 4 4
TOTAL 4 11 9 23 13 7 3 6
TABLE 5 (cont.)























some loca l  32
p a r t  o r  a l l  18
d e c l in in g  12
v a r i a b l e  3 36
TOTAL 7 472
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shows, by 1978 th e  matching p ro v is io n s  o f  g ran ts  had become so p ro­
l i f e r a t e d  t h a t  s t a t e  and loca l  governments were confronted  with match­
ing r a t i o s  r e q u i r in g  from zero  to  e ig h ty  pe rcen t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
At the  r i s k  o f  being redundant ,  i t  i s  necessary  to  p o in t  out two 
important  a spec ts  of  v a r i a b l e  matching r a t i o s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  they  
a re  used to  implement fonnJu/a a l l o c a t i o n  p ro v is io n s .  Assume, f o r  ex­
ample, t h a t  a g r a n t  program provid ing  a id  f o r  dependent ch i ld re n  has 
been enacted .  The p rov is ion  o f  the  a l l o c a t i n g  formula i s  devised to  
d i s t r i b u t e  a id  in v e r s e ly  to  a s t a t e * s  per  c a p i t a  income so t h a t  lower 
income s t a t e s  would be a l l o t e d  more funds than high income s t a t e s .
Now, i f  matching p ro v is io n s  r e q u i re  s t a t e s  to  match f e d e ra l  g ran ts  
d o l l a r - f o r - d o l l a r ,  the  poorer  s t a t e s  f o r  whom most a id  was intended 
might be unable to  meet the  matching requirements  and may have to  f o r ­
f e i t  a p o r t ion  o f  t h e i r  earmarked funds. To avoid t h i s  dilemma, v a r ­
i a b l e  matching may be w r i t t e n  in to  the  g ran t  to  al low the  "poorer" 
s t a t e s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  a t  sm a l le r  r a t e s  t h a t  those  which apply to  the  
" r i c h e r"  s t a t e s .
The second a s p e c t  o f  matching r a t i o s  i s  t h a t  they a r e  used as 
in c e n t iv e s  f o r  s t a t e  and loca l  governments to  meet a d e s i r a b l e ,  but 
not  mandatory, leve l  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  An ac tua l  example o f  t h i s  i s  
found in the  Federal Water P o l lu t io n  Control Act. Under the  p ro v i ­
s ions  o f  t h i s  a c t ,  a m uncipa l i ty  may ob ta in  a g ra n t  f o r  up to  t h i r t y  
pe rc en t  o f  th e  t o t a l  c o s t  of  sewage t re a tm en t  p l a n t .  I f  th e  s t a t e  
in which the  m uncipa l i ty  i s  loca ted  c o n t r ib u t e s  a t  l e a s t  t h i r t y  p e r ­
cen t  o f  the  c o s t  o f  the  p r o j e c t ,  the  f ed e ra l  share  may be increased
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to  f o r t y  pe rcen t  o f  the  c o s t  o f  the  p r o j e c t .  Another p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  
t h a t  i f  the  p r o j e c t  conforms with en fo rceab le  water  q u a l i t y  s tan d a rd s / 
and i f  the  s t a t e  c o n t r ib u t e s  a t  l e a s t  tw en ty - f iv e  p e rc e n t ,  fede ra l  
c o n t r ib u t io n s  may be e x p a n d ^  to  f i f t y  pe rcen t  o f  the  p r o j e c t ' s  c o s t .  
Moreover,  i f  the  p r o j e c t  conforms with a comprehensive m et ropo l i tan  
p lan ,  f ede ra l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  /nay be increased  by ten  p e rcen t .
Level o f  Funding
Table 6 p r e se n t s  h i s t o r i c a l  f in a n c i a l  data  showing the  fede ra l  
government 's  support  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  governments through g r a n t s -  
i n - a i d .  The data  a re  d isp layed  to  i d e n t i f y  not  only aggregate  a id  
f i g u r e s ,  but a l so  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a id  among supported fu n c t io n s .
In re fe re n c e  to  the  l a s t  column in Table 6 , which con ta ins  the  
t o t a l  amount of  g r a n t  su p p o r t ,  i t  i s  seen t h a t  in 1902, f ed e ra l  g ran ts  
to  s t a t e  and loca l  governments amounted to  only $3.0  m i l l i o n .  Although 
in c r e a s in g  by a s u b s t a n t i a l  percentage amount between 1912 to  1920, and 
1920 to  1925, d o l l a r  in c rea se s  were l e s s  im press ive .  R e f lec t in g  the  
d i r e  economic co n d i t io n s  o f  the  depress ion  o f  the  1930 's ,  a id  in 1934 
inc reased  by 855 p e rc en t  over  the  previous  y e a r .  In the  mid-1950's  
highways and urban renewal p r o je c t s  r e s u l t e d  in  major in c rea se s  in 
f e d e ra l  a id  which cont inued through the  end of  t h a t  decade. F i n a l l y ,  
the  "New F ro n t i e r "  and "Great Socie ty"  programs of  the 1960 's  led  to  
a f u r t h e r  expansion cu lminat ing  in an es t im a ted  expend i tu re  in 1980 
o f  $74,755 m i l l io n .
In a d d i t io n  t o  the  important  t re n d  in t o t a l  expend i tu res  on 
g r a n t s - i n - a i d  by the  f ed e ra l  government, Table 6 r e v ea l s  a second
TABLE 6
FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY, 1902-1980 
(m i l l io n s  of  d o l l a r s )
Veterans 
Serv ices  & 
Benefi ts
Health 





A g r ic u l tu re  & 







T ran sp o r ta t io n Total
$ % $ %
1902 33.3 0 0 1 40.0 1 26.7 0 0 J 0 3
1912 22.6 0 0 2 47.2 2 30.2 0 0 0 0 5
1920 3.2 2 5.3 5 13.6 6 17.4 0 0 20 60.5 34
1925 1.5 1 1.3 8 7.5 7 6.4 1 0.3 95 83.9 114
1929 0.5 1 1.4 9 8.6 11 10.0 1 1.0 86 78.5 110
1930 0.6 1 0.7 10 9.6 12 11.4 1 1.2 80 76.5 104
1931 0.3 21 11.5 11 5.7 13 7.0 2 0.9 138 60.4 185
1932 0.4 60 27.4 11 5.1 13 5.9 2 0.8 132 54.0 218
1933 0.4 63 32.7 10 5.3 13 6.7 2 0.8 104a c 193
1934 c 1817 98.7 10 0.5 13 0.7 2 0.1 Oa c 1842
1935 c 2244 98.8 13 0.6 13 0.6 2 0.1 Oa 1.2 2271
1936 c 2248 97.2 13 0.6 22 0.9 2 0.1 28a 3.0 2313
1937 c 2547 95.6 14 0.5 22 0.8 2 0.1 79a 6.6 2664
1938 c 1972 90.7 24 1.1 33 1.5 2 0.1 143 5.6 2775
1939 c 2622 90.3 25 0.9 92 3.2 3 0.1 161 6.4 2904
TABLE 6
Veterans 
Services  & 
Benefi t s
Health 





$ % $ % $ %
1940 1 0.1 2066 86.3 24 1.0
1941 1 0.1 1771 85.0 25 1.2
1942 1 0.1 1506 82.8 26 1.4
1943 1 0.1 903 70.2 26 2.0
1944 1 0.1 616 61.4 26 2.5
1945 1 0.1 570 63.1 25 2.8
1946 20 2.3 568 63.5 25 2.8
1947 59 3.5 902 54.0 32 1.9
1948 85 5.3 1024 63.4 37 2.3
1949 32 1.7 1231 66.8 37 2.0
1950 15 0.6 1562 70.5 39 1.7
1951 9 0.4 1637 53.0 49 2.2
1952 7 0.3 1662 70.0 122 5.1
1953 6 0.2 1811 65.6 231 8.4
1954 7 0.2 1890 63.7 203 6.8
(cont.)
A g r icu l tu re  & Other Commerce
A g r icu l tu ra l  Natural Housing, &
Resources Resources T ran sp o r ta t io n  Total
$ % $ % $ % $
143 6.0 6 0.3 153 6.4 2395
110 5.3 4 0 . 2 . 171 8.2 2083
78 4.3 4 0.2 204 11.2 1820
48 3.7 9 0.7 3d0 23.3 1286
66 6.6 7 0.7 287 28.6 1003
82 9.1 8 0.8 218 24.1 904
92 10.3 8 0.8 180 20.2 895
65 3.9 10 0.6 602 36.0 1670
71 4 .4 12 0.7 388 24.0 1617
87 4.7 14 0.8 442 24.0 1843
106 4.8 17 0.8 475 21.4 2214
98 4.4 18 0.8 434 19.3 2245
84 3.5 20 0.8 482 20.3 2376
87 3.5 23 0.8 594 21.5 2763




Services  & Welfare!, & & General
Benefi t s Labor Research
$ % $ % $ %
1955 8 0.2 1854 59.8 239 7.
1956 8 0.2 2109 58.3 208 5.
1957 8 0.2 2179 57.1 205 5.
1958 8 0.2 2523 53.3 166 3.
1959 8 0.1 2777 44.0 297 4.
1960 8 0.1 2924 42.7 364 5.
1961 9 0.1 3134 42.9 378 5.
1962 6 0.1 3540 45.9 405 5.
1963 8 0.1 3813 45.7 465 5.
1964 7 0.1 4259 43.1 479 4.
1965 8 0.1 4477 42.0 610 5.
1966 9 0.1 5781 45.5 1525 12.
1967 10 0.1 6974 48.7 2299 16.
1968 13 0.1 8208 44.8 3101 16.

















A g r ic u l tu re  & Other
A g r ic u l tu ra l  Natural
Resources Resources
$ % $ %
248 8.0 26 0 .
389 10.8 27 0
382 10.0 28 0 ,
278 5.9 31 0 .
332 5.1 34 0 .
275 4.0 35 0 .
398 5.4 33 0 ,
538 7.0 35 0 .
521 6.2 54 0 .
656 6.6 45 0.
518 4.9 107 1.
369 2.9 227 1.
448 3.1 288 2 .
581 3.2 478 2 .
804 4.1 338 1.
Commerce 
Housing, & 


































Ser ivces  & 
Benefi ts
Health 





A g r ic u l tu re  & 
A g r icu l tu ra l  
Resources
Other 




Tran sp o r ta t io n Total
$ % $ % $ % $ % $ % $ % $
1970 18 0.1 12522 53.2 2493 10.6 601 2.6 606 2.6 7298 31.0 23538
1971 23 0.1 17009 57.8 2885 8.4 668 2.3 877 3 0 8370 28.4 29432
1972 26 0.1 19410 58.5 2238 6.7 739 2.2 1532 *.6 9218 27.8 33163
1973 20 0.1 17534 47.0 6554 17.5 1297 3.5 1243 S .  3 10r 77 28.6 37325
1974 26 0.1 17313 49.0 8721 22.1 511 1.3 2137 b.4 8/07 22.1 29415
1975 32 0.1 18888 44.2 11638 27.2 404 0.9 2479 5.8 9309 21.8 42150
1976 52 0.1 22673 43.6 13761 26.5 425 0.8 3082 5.9 11943 23.0 51936
1977 79 0.1 25526 43.3 15753 26.7 371 0.6 4263 7.2 12967 22.0 58959
1978 76 0.1 27738 40.3 20557 29.8 426 0.7 4078 5.9 15992 23.2 68867
*1979 78 0.1 29711 40.2 22676 30.7 436 0.6 4363 5.9 16603 22.5 73867
*1980 87 0.1 30877 41.3 22320 29.8 405 0.5 5132 6.9 15934 21.3 74755
Federal a id  highway program financed  f o r  th ese  y ea rs  out o f  emergency r e l i e f  funds.  
$5-$7 m i l l io n  f o r  s e rv ic e s  to  Indians embracing both educat ion  and w e l fa re  fu n c t io n s .  
Less than .05%.
Estimates .
Source: Years 1902 - 1960: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental R e la t io n s ,  P er iod ic  Congressional
Reassessment o f  Federal Grants-In-Aid to  S t a t e  and Local Governments (Washington, D. C.:  U. S.
Government P r in t in g  O f f ic e ,  1961), pp.. 12-13.
Years 1961 - 1980 Calcu la ted  from: Executive Off ice  o f  the  P r e s id e n t ,  Special  Analyses of  the
Budget of  the  United S ta te s  Government (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ) . U1
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i n t e r e s t i n g  f a c e t  o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d —t h a t  o f  changing fu nc t iona l  empha­
s i s .  As e x h ib i te d  in the  t a b l e ,  v e t e r a n s '  s e rv ic e s  and b e n e f i t s ,  edu­
c a t io n  and a g r i c u l t u r e  were the  fu n c t io n s  favored by the f ed e ra l  govern­
ment in  i t s  i n i t i a l  g ran ts .  By 1920, however, a id  was r e d i r e c t e d  to 
the  area  o f  commerce, hous ing, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  with th ese  func t ions  
r e ce iv in g  60.5 p e rcen t  o f  a l l  g ran t  funds. The advent  o f  the  Great
Depression i n i t i a t e d  a second major change in fu nc t iona l  emphasis o f
g r a n t s .  This t ime the  favored a reas  were h e a l t h ,  w e l f a r e ,  and labor .
As a percentage  o f  t o t a l  g r a n t s ,  support  f o r  th e se  func t ions  reached 
i t s  peak in 1935. In t h a t  y e a r ,  98.8 cen ts  out  o f  every f ed e ra l  g ran t  
d o l l a r  was a l l o c a t e d  to  support  those  th re e  fu n c t io n s .  The per iod 
from 1935 to  the  p r e se n t  has witnessed a continued d ec l in e  in  the 
percentage  o f  funds a l l o c a t e d  to  h e a l t h ,  w e l f a r e ,  and labo r  and a con­
c u r r e n t  i n c re a se  in th e  percentage  of  funds a l l o c a t e d  to  commerce, 
housing, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  Also,  in the  decade o f  the  1970 's ,  th e re  
was a growing emphasis on the  support  of  educa t iona l  s e rv i c e s .
While the  da ta  in Table 6 r ev ea l s  i n t e r e s t i n g  f in a n c i a l  f a c t s  
about the  d o l l a r  value of  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  i t  does not  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
e x te n t  to  which lower l e v e l s  of  government have grown to  depend on 
t h i s  source o f  revenue. Such information  i $  conta ined  in Table 7,
which d i sp la y s  f ed e ra l  g ran ts  as a pe rcen t  o f  t o t a l  s t a t e  and loca l
revenues f o r  s e le c t e d  y e a r s .  As i n d ic a te d  in th e  t a b l e ,  federa l  
g ran ts  c o n t r ib u te d  only very modestly to  s t a t e  and loca l  revenue 
u n t i l  the  Great Depression.  Since t h a t  t ime,  f ed e ra l  g ran ts  as a
TABLE 7
FEDERAL GRANTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL
STATE AND LOCAL REVENUE, 1902-1980
Year Percent Year Percent
1902 1 1962 12
1913 1 1963 13
1922 r>L 1964 13
1332 3 1965 13
1934 13 1966 14
1936 11 1967 15
1938 9 1968 17
1940 10 1969 17
1942 8 1970 18
1944 9 1971 20
1946 7 1972 22
1948 11 1973 24
1950 12 1974 23
1952 10 1975 23
1954 10 1976 24
1956 10 1977 26
1958 12 1978 27
1959 14 *1979 25
1960 13 *1980 24
1961 12
*Estimates
Source: Years 1902-1956: United S ta t e s  Depar t­
ment o f  Commerce, H i s to r i c a l  S t a t i s t i c s  
o f  th e  United S t a t e s ,  Colonial Times to  
1957 (Washington, D. C.:  U. S. Govern- 
ment P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1960), p. 726.
Years 1958-1980: Executive Off ice  o f
th e  P r e s id e n t ,  Special Analyses o f  the  
Budget o f  the  United S t a t e s  Government 
(Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government
P r in t in g  O f f i c e ) .
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percentage  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  revenue have e x h ib i t e d  on/j a very gradual 
i n c r e a s e ,  f i n a l l y  exceeding f i f t e e n  p e rcen t  by 1967. The es t im ated  
c o n t r ib u t io n  to  s t a t e  and loca l  revenues in 1980 i s  24 p e rcen t .
A l lo ca t io n  o f  Revenue Sharing Funds
The a l l o c a t i o n  o f  revenue shar ing  funds to  the  var ious  s t a t e  and 
loca l  governments i s  e f f e c t e d  through a t h r e e - s t a g e d  a l l o c a t i n g  formula. 
In the  f i r s t  s t a g e ,  funds a re  a l l o c a t e d  among s t a t e  governments.  The 
second s tag e  r e q u i re s  a l l o c a t i o n s  to  be made among co u n ty /p a r i sh  gov­
ernments.  F i n a l l y ,  in  the  t h i r d  s t a g e ,  funds a re  a l l o c a t e d  to  general 
purpose governments w i th in  each c o u n ty /p a r i s h .  But the  numbers gener­
a ted  by th e  r e s p e c t i v e  formulas a re  not  i n v i o l a t e .  Minimum and maxi­
mum l i m i t s  a re  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  the  amount o f  funds a loca l  governmental 
u n i t  can r e c e iv e  and th e r e  a re  sp ec ia l  p ro v is io n s  when townships ,  In­
dian t r i b e s ,  o r  Alaskan n a t iv e  v i l l a g e s  e x i s t  w i th in  a county.
In determin ing the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  revenue shar ing  funds among
s t a t e s ,  a th r e e  f a c t o r  formula or  a f iv e  f a c t o r  formula may be used ,
depending on which i s  most advantageous to  the  s t a t e .  The th re e  f a c ­
t o r  formula cons ide rs  the  v a r i a b l e s :  p o p u la t io n ,  tax  e f f o r t ,  and r e l a ­
t i v e  income. These v a r i a b l e s  a re  combined as fo l low s :
= pi x Ti X Yi x A
A ' w v
where: Xn* = share  o f  funds going to  the  i **1 s t a t e ,
A = t o t a l  ap p ro p r i a t e d  f o r  revenue sh a r in g ,
P.. = popu la t ion  in the  i **1 s t a t e ,
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T. = tax  e f f o r t  in  the  i t *1 s t a t e  as determined by n e t  s t a t e  
and loca l  taxes  c o l l e c t e d  d iv ided  by s t a t e ' s  t o t a l  p e r ­
sonal income,
= r e l a t i v e  income o f  the  i **1 s t a t e  as determined by per  
c a p i t a  income in  t h e  United S t a t e s  d iv ided  by p e r  c a p i t a ,
n = 51 ( f i f t y  s t a t e s  p lus  Washington, D. C.) .
The f iv e  f a c t o r  formula i s  s l i g h t l y  more complicated in  t h a t  i t  
i s  d iv ided  in to  two p a r t s  a s  fo l low s :  A p o r t io n  o f  revenue shar ing
funds i s  a l l o c a t e d  on the  b a s i s  o f  t o t a l  p o p u la t io n ,  urbanized popu­
l a t i o n ,  and popu la t ion  weighted f o r  per  c a p i t a  income. The remaining 
funds a re  a l l o c a t e d  on the  b a s i s  o f  s t a t e  income taxes  and general  tax 
e f f o r t .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  the  f i v e  f a c t o r  formula r e q u i r e s  the  fol lowing 
c a l c u l a t i o n s :
S, = 1/3A x Pi + 1/3A x — ^ —  + 1/3A Pi x Yi 
n n n
.Z P, Z Un- Z Y,-
i = l  1 i = l  1 i = l  1
+ 1/2A1 x ___ + 1/2A1 x L Ein m  ~
i i i  T’ iSi Ei
where: = d o l l a r  amount o f  revenue sha r ing  o f  the  i *̂1 s t a t e ,
A = amount of  revenue sha r ing  funds a l l o c a t e d  on th e  bases o f
p o p u la t io n ,  urbanized p o p u la t io n ,  and popula t ion  weighted 
f o r  per  c a p i t a  income,
A* = amount o f  revenue shar ing  funds a l l o c a t e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  
s t a t e  income tax  and tax  e f f o r t ,
P.,- = popula t ion  o f  the  i th  s t a t e ,
U.j = urban popu la t ion  o f  the  i **1 s t a t e ,
Yi = popula t ion  weighted by per  c a p i t a  income as def ined  by
s t a t e  popu la t ion  x na t io n a l  per  c a p i t a  income div ided  by 
s t a t e  per  c a p i t a  income,
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T = s t a t e  income t a x ,
E = general  tax  e f f o r t  as determined by n e t  taxes  c o l l e c t e d  
d iv ided  by personal income,
n = 51 ( f i f t y  s t a t e s  p lus  Washington, D. C.)
A f te r  data  f o r  each s t a t e  a re  s u b s t i t u t e d  i n to  both formulas ,
the  g r e a t e r  of  the  two amounts i s  ass igned  as the  s t a t e ' s  share  of  
funds. I f  the  t o t a l  assignment to  s t a t e s  i s  g r e a t e r  than ap p ropr ia ted  
amounts,  each s t a t e ' s  share  i s  reduced p r o p o r t i o n a t e ly ;  i f  t o t a l  s t a t e  
assignment i s  l e s s  than ap p ro p r ia te d  amounts,  each s t a t e ' s  share  i s  
inc reased  p r o p o r t i o n a t e ly .
A f te r  a s t a t e ' s  share  has been determined,  tw o - th i rd s  o f  the  
t o t a l  must be a l l o c a t e d  to  loca l  u n i t s  o f  government according to  
the  fo llowing s p e c i f i c a t i o n s :
County Areas .
C, = Pi x Ti x Yi x S 
1 n
2 (P.- x T- x Y•)
i= l  1 1
where: C-j = county area  a l l o c a t i o n  out  o f  tw o - th i rd s  o f  t o t a l  s t a t e
a l l o c a t i o n  in i™  county a r e a ,
*t"h
P.,* = popula t ion  o f  the  i county a r e a ,
Ti = tax  e f f o r t  o f  the  i ^  county area  as determined by ne t
county area  taxes  c o l l e c t e d  d iv ided  by s t a t e  tax  c o l l e c ­
t i o n ,
Yi = r e l a t i v e  income o f  the  county a r e a ,
S = tw o - th i rd s  o f  s t a t e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n ,
n = t o t a l  general purpose loca l  governmental u n i t s .
County Governments.
Gi = Ci x ATi 
AT
where: = county governments'  share  o f  a county area  a l l o c a t i o n ,
C.j = the  county area  a l l o c a t i o n ,
AT̂  = ad ju s ted  taxes  o f  the  county government,
AT = a d ju s ted  taxes  of  a l l  local  governments in the  county
area
Other Local Governments.
L,- -  C,- - G-: —i 1 i n
P-j x Ti x Yi
i=l  (Pi x Ti x V
where: Li = share  o f  th e  i*^ governmental u n i t  from county area
a l l o c a t i o n ,
Cj = a l l o c a t i o n  to  the  county a r e a ,
Gi = county governments share  o f  county area  a l l o c a t i o n ,
P- = popula t ion  o f  th e  i ^  local  governmental u n i t ,
Ti = tax  e f f o r t  o f  th e  i *̂1 loca l  government as determined by 
ne t  taxes  c o l l e c t e d  d iv ided  by ne t  county areas  taxes  
c o l l e c t e d ,
Y.j = r e l a t i v e  income o f  the  i *̂1 governmental u n i t ,  
n = number of general  purpose loca l  governmental u n i t s .
The funds a l l o c a t e d  to  loca l  governments v ia  the  above formula 
a re  su b je c t  to the  fo l lowing r e s t r i c t i o n s :
(1) Per c a p i t a  a l l o c a t i o n s  to  loca l  governmental u n i t s  within  
s t a t e  must be a t  l e a s t  20 p e r c e n t ,  but not  more than 145 pe rcen t  of  
tw o - th i rd s  o f  the  s t a t e ' s  a l l o tm e n t ,  d iv ided  by the  s t a t e ' s  popula t i
(2) No loca l  government may r ec e iv e  revenue shar ing  funds in 
excess o f  50 pe rcen t  o f  the  government 's  a d jus ted  tax es  plus  i n t e r ­
governmental t r a n s f e r s  o f  funds to  the  government.
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(3) I f  the  formula e n t i t l e m e n t  of  a loca l  government o th e r  than 
a county government i s  l e s s  than $200, the  e n t i t l e m e n t  i s  given to  
the  county government in which th e  u n i t  i s  lo c a te d .
Summary
Rather  than being the  product  o f  a well des igned ,  coord ina ted  
planning p ro cess ,  the  Unifed S t a t e s '  system o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  has 
evolved in response to  ind iv idua l  problems which have su rfaced  a t  
var ious  times throughout  the  h i s t o r y  o f  the  country .  P r io r  to  the  
S ta t e  and Local F isca l  A ss is tance  Act of  1972, g r a n ts  were co n d i t io n a l  
in na tu re  and were issued  as e i t h e r  p r o j e c t  g ran ts  or  formula g ra n t s .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  between the  two i s  t h a t  p r o j e c t  g ran ts  a re  issued  on a 
com pet i t ive  bas is  whereas formula g ran ts  a re  i s sued  to  a l l  q u a l i f i e d  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
One key f e a t u r e  o f  c o n d i t iona l  g r a n t s  i s  t h a t  s t a t e  and local  
r e c i p i e n t  governments a r e  u s u a l ly  r eq u i red  to  match f e d e ra l  expendi­
t u r e s .  I n i t i a l l y ,  the  ty p ic a l  match was f i f t y  pe rcen t  o f  a p r o j e c t ' s  
t o t a l  c o s t .  To provide  more f l e x i b i l i t y ,  matching requirements  have 
become more v a r i a b l e  and, under c e r t a i n  g r a n t s ,  a re  n e g o t ia b le  between 
the  f ede ra l  government and s t a t e - l o c a l  governments.
F i n a l l y ,  funding f o r  g ran ts  has inc reased  in both a b so lu te  and 
r e l a t i v e  terms. Between 1902 and 1980, the  d o l l a r  value of  g ran ts  
has increased  from $3 m i l l io n  to  an es t im a ted  $74,755 m i l l i o n .  During 
the  same p e r io d ,  g ra n t s  have increased  from one percen t  to  an es t im ated  
twenty-four  pe rcen t  o f  s t a t e  and local  revenue.
Chapter V
THE ROLE OF GRANTS IN SECURING AN EFFICIENT 
LEVEL OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD PRODUCTION 
THROUGH COOPERATION
Previous chap te r s  o f  t h i s  paper  have in v e s t ig a t e d  problems 
a s s o c i a t e d  with the  e f f i c i e n t  product ion of  loca l  pub l ic  goods 
when r e c ip ro ca l  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  e x i s t e d  and with the  development 
and major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  g ra n ts  in the  United S t a t e s .  In the  
c h ap te r  dea l ing  with th e  h i s t o r i c a l  development of  g r a n t s ,  i t  was 
demonstrated t h a t  new g r a n t s  were i n i t i a t e d  in response to  s p e c i f i c  
problem areas  which were brought to  the  a t t e n t i o n  of  Congress. I t  
i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  in th e  e v o lu t ion  of  the  g ra n t  system the  func­
t i o n a l  purpose o f  a ided a c t i v i t i e s  changed over t ime from general  
purpose ,  i . e . ,  land g r a n t s  to  support  pub l ic  ed u ca t io n ,  to  s p e c i f i c  
purpose,  i . e . ,  venereal d i s e a s e ,  and now appears  to  be swinging back 
to  general  purpose v ia  revenue shar ing .  Perhaps the  most in ten se  
per iod  of  new c a t e g o r i c a l  g ra n t  a u th o r i z a t io n s  was in the  mid 1960's 
under the  umbrel la o f  P re s id e n t  Johnson 's  Great S o c i e t y . * In 1965 
a lo n e ,  Congress passed 109 new c a te g o r i c a l  g r a n t s .  U n fo r tuna te ly ,  
dur ing t h i s  per iod  l e g i s l a t i o n  was passed on i t s  own ind iv idua l  m e r i t
*James L. Sundquis t ,  Making Federalism Work (Washington, D. C.:  
The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1969), pp. 12-13.
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without  concern over  d u p l i c a t i o n ,  c o o rd in a t io n ,  o r  c o n f l i c t s .  As s t a t e d  
by James Sundquist :^
When the  f ed e ra l  s t r u c t u r e  was transformed in the  
1960 's ,  i t  was not r e c a s t  according to  anybody's master  
p lan .  Nobody had onp. Indeed, in the  enactment o f  new 
programs o f  f ed e ra l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  s c an t  a t t e n t i o n  was paid 
to  the  p a t t e r n  o f  f e d e r a l - s t a t e - l o c a l  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  was 
emerging. At every  l e v e l —in the  execu t ive  department ,  
in the  White House in the  Congress- - the  co ncen t ra t ion  
was upon the  subs tance  o f  the  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  the  admini­
s t r a t i v e  language was i n s e r t e d  almost  i n c i d e n t a l l y .  "We 
have no o rg a n iz a t io n a l  phi losophy ,  only a program p h i l o ­
sophy,"  one high fede ra l  o f f i c i a l  put  i t .  In the  absence 
o f  a common d o c t r in e ,  the s t r u c t u r e  of  f ed e ra l i sm  embodied 
in a p a r t i c u l a r  b i l l  r e f l e c t e d  the  ideas  o f  whatever  p a r ­
t i c u l a r  group o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  draf tsmen worked on t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  measure and what laws they used as p re c e d e n t s . 3
The rap id  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  g ran t s  w i thout  p ro v is io n s  f o r  coord ina t ion  
began to  change in  the  l a t e  I 9 6 0 ' s .  More and more f r e q u e n t ly ,  p a r t  
of  the  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  procedure in secur ing  g ran ts  r equ i red  t h a t  po­
t e n t i a l  r e c i p i e n t s  co o rd in a te  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  through a regional  agency.
As a r e s u l t ,  c o n f l i c t i n g  programs could be e l im ina ted  and complimen­
t a r y  programs could be encouraged to  make the  o v e ra l l  f i s c a l  process  
more e f f i c i e n t .  In the  remainder o f  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  wil l  
be analyzed with  r e s p e c t  to  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on coopera t ion  among local  
governments.^
^An a n a ly s i s  o f  t h i s  piecemeal approach to  the  development o f  g ran t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  u t i l i z i n g  the  theory  o f  the  second b e s t  can be found in :  
Tatsuo Hatta ,"A Theory o f  Piecemeal Po l icy  Recommendations," The Review 
o f  Economic S t u d i e s , XLIV (February ,  1977), pp. 1-22.
31bid. ,  p. 13.
^ I t  should be emphasized t h a t  using g ran ts  to  encourage coopera t ion  
i s  s t i l l  in the  development and exper imenta t ion  s tag e .  See, Robert D. 
Thomas, "Implementing Federal Programs a t  the  Local Level ,"  P o l i t i c a l  
Science Q u a r t e r ly , XCIV ( F a l l ,  1979), pp. 419-435.
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Grant Goals
The f i r s t  o b j e c t iv e  o f  t h i s  c h ap te r  i s  to  i d e n t i f y  the  goals  of 
America's  fede ra l  g ra n t  system. Reading the  enabl ing  l e g i s l a t i o n  fo r  
g r a n t s - i n - a i d  c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  Congress i n s t i t u t e d  and cont inues  
to  use g ran t s  as a tool  to  i n c r ea se  the  supply o f  goods which a re  pro­
vided by lower governmental un i ts .®  I t  would be a s e r ious  e r r o r ,  
though, to  assume t h a t  t h i s  i s  the  s o le  o b j e c t iv e  o f  g r a n t s .  Rather ,  
the  o b j e c t iv e  o f  i n c r ea s in g  f e d e r a l l y  favored s e rv ice s  i s  cons t ra ined  
by a fundamental c o n s id e ra t io n  which i s  based on the  ph i losoph ica l  
framework o f  the  United S t a t e s '  system o f  government.  B a s ic a l ly ,  
t h i s  philosophy adheres  to  the  premise t h a t  whenever p o s s ib le  d e c i ­
s ion making should be d e c e n t r a l i z e d  r a t h e r  than c e n t r a l i z e d ,  and i t  
i s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  as a f ede ra l  system o f  government.® Accordingly, 
even though the  f ed e ra l  government may have a s p e c i f i c  u t i l i t y  func­
t i o n  f o r  l o c a l l y  provided s e r v i c e s ,  p lans  to  achieve g r e a t e r  l e v e l s  
o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  should be executed through a program which s t reng thens  
the  f ed e ra l  system. Commenting on the  use o f  na t io n a l  g ran ts  to  pro­
mote v ia b le  loca l  governments in a fede ra l  system, the  Commission on
®It i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note t h a t  a r e ce n t  s tudy has found t h a t  i n ­
d iv idual  congressmen do not  have p ro v in c ia l  vot ing records  on g r a n t s .  
National i s su es  a r e  cons idered  on m er i t  r a t h e r  than on the  bas is  o f  
narrowly focused loca l  a t t i t u d e s .  See, Denetr ios  Caraley ,  "Congress­
ional  P o l i t i c s  and Urban Aid: A 1978 P o s t s c r i p t , "  P o l i t i c a l  Science
Q u a r t e r ly , XCIII ( F a l l ,  1978) pp. 411-419.
®Many g ran t  programs a re  adm in is te red  by execu t ive  agencies  and
departments which fo l low  such r i g i d  procedural  r u le s  t h a t  rea l  decen­
t r a l i z a t i o n  does not  occur .  See, Richard P. Nathan and Paul R. Dommel, 
"Federal-Local R e la t ions  under Block G ran ts ,"  P o l i t i c a l  Science Quar­
t e r l y ,  XCIII ( F a l l ,  1978) pp. 421-442.
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Intergovernmental Re la t ions  wrote:
The common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a l l  forms o f  g ran ts  
i s  t h a t  the  c e n t r a l  government provides  a id  without  
supp lan t ing  sm a l le r  u n i t s  as the  governments which 
br ing  the  aided  s e rv ic e s  to  the  p u b l i c . 7
Fur the r  emphasis o f  t h i s  p o in t  was provided by L. H. Fountain ,  Congress­
ional R epresen ta t ive  from North C aro l ina ,  when he t e s t i f i e d  before  the 
House Subcommittee on Governmental o p e ra t io n s .  His tes t im ony,  given in 
support  o f  a b i l l  whose purpose was ". . . t o  in su re  t h a t  ( 1) the  e f f e c ­
t iv e n e s s  o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  as ins truments  o f  Federa l -S ta te -Loca l  cooper­
a t i o n ^  i s  improved and enhanced . . . s t a t e d :
. . . enactment  o f  the  B i l l  would make a p o s i t i v e  
c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the  S ta te s  and l o c a l i t i e s  in terms 
of  t h e i r  e f f i c i e n t  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  Federal funds 
and would e f f e c t  g r e a t e r  Federal i n t e r e s t  in 
s t reng thened  government--a t  the  S t a t e  and local  
l e v e l s .
Mr. Chairman, coopera t ive  f e d e ra l i sm ,  our 
Federal system of  checks and ba lances  a t  a l l  
l e v e l s ,  in  f a c t  our  very c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  system 
i t s e l f ,  i f  i t  i s  to  su rv ive  the  p e r i lo u s  days 
ahead, demands no t  j u s t  g r e a t e r  i n t e r e s t  i n ,  
but more agg ress ive  ac t io n  toward, s t ro n g e r  
and more e f f e c t i v e  government a t  the  local  
and S ta t e  l e v e l s . 10
7The Commission on Intergovernmental R e la t io n s ,  The Final Report 
o f  the  Commission on Intergovernmental  R e la t io n s ,  Persuant  to  Publ ic  
Law 109, 83d Congress (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government P r in t in g
O ff ic e ,  1955), p. 118.
8Emphasis mine.
°U. S. Congress,  House, Committee on Governmental O pera t ions ,
Hearings Before a Subcommittee o f  the  Committee on Government 
O p era t io n s , 89th Congress,  2d Sess ion ,  (Washington-, D. C . : DT S,
Government Printing O ffice, 1966), p, 38.
1QIb id . , p. 188.
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The concept o f  s t r en g th e n in g  the  r o le  o f  s t a t e  and local  govern­
ments in America's  f ed e ra l i s m ,  while  a t  the  same time reducing federa l  
in f lu en c e ,  was a major argument used by P re s id e n t  Nixon in h is  message 
to  Congress advocating the  passage o f  h is  recommended revenue shar ing  
program.H In t h a t  message, P re s id e n t  Nixon commented:
The growing f i s c a l  c r i s e s  in our  S ta t e s  and 
communities i s  the  r e s u l t  in l a rg e  measure o f  a 
f i s c a l  mismatch; needs grow f a s t e r  a t  one level  
while  revenues grow f a s t e r  a t  ano ther .  This f i s ­
cal mismatch i s  accompanied, in t u r n ,  by an " e f ­
f i c i e n c y  mismatch"; taxes  a re  c o l l e c t e d  most 
e f f i c i e n t l y  by the  h igh ly  c e n t r a l i z e d  Federal 
tax  system while  pub l ic  funds a re  o f te n  spen t  
most e f f i c i e n t l y  when d e c i s io n s  a re  made by 
S ta t e  and loca l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
What i s  needed,  th en ,  i s  a program under which 
we can enjoy the  b e s t  of  both wor lds ,  a program which 
w i l l  apply f a s t  growing Federal revenues to  f a s t  grow­
ing S ta t e  and loca l  r equ irem ents ,  a program t h a t  w il l  
combine the  e f f i c i e n c i e s  of  a c e n t r a l i z e d  tax  system 
with the  e f f i c i e n c i e s  of  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  expendi tu re .
What i s  needed,  in  s h o r t ,  i s  a program f o r  shar ing  
Federal tax  revenues with S ta t e  and loca l  governments.
At t h i s  j u n c t u r e ,  i t  i s  important  to  recognize  t h a t  a fundamental 
change occurred in the  na t io n a l  government 's  concept o f  coopera t ion .  
P r io r  to  revenue s h a r in g ,  g ran ts  were designed to  promote s p e c i f i c  
goods favored by the  fddera l  government but  supp l ied  by local  govern­
ments.  As g ran t s  evolved ,  the  concept of coopera t ion  grew from t h a t  of
HAn ex pos t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of  t h i s  con ten t ion  can be found in :  
Ber t  Mason and Varden F u l l e r ,  "Small Communities and th e  New F ed e ra l ­
ism: Some Observat ions  from General Revenue Shar ing ,"  P u b l iu s , VIII
( F a l l ,  1978),  pp. 113-128.
^ l ) .  S. Congress,  House, Message from the  P re s id en t  of  the  United 
S ta t e s  R e la t ive  to  Revenue Shar ing ,  Document No. 92-44, 92d Congress,  
1 s t  Sess ion ,  1971, p. 3.
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simply supplying funds to  independent ly  a c t in g  loca l  governments,  sub­
j e c t  t o  matching and use c o n d i t i o n s ,  to  t h a t  o f  promoting d ia logue  and 
j o i n t  d ec is ion  making among loca l  u n i t s  in an impacted a rea .  Then, a l l  
a t  once, a major new g ra n t  program—revenue sh a r in g —broke the  concept 
of  o v e r t ly  encouraging coopera t ion  among loca l  governments.  Monies 
under the  new program were issued  to  loca l  governments as  a m at te r  of  
r i g h t ,  under the  ausp ices  o f  an im par t ia l  formula.  Under the  new pro­
gram, r e c i p i e n t  governments could independent ly  determine how t h e i r  
funds would be spen t  and the  cause of  cooperat ion  was d e a l t  a severe  
s e t  back. -*-3
E f fe c t  of Close Ended Grants
As was exp la ined  in Chapter IV, f ede ra l  g ran t s  may be funded w i th ­
out  d o l l a r  l i m i t  (open ended) or  with d o l l a r  l i m i t  ( c lo se  ended) .  I f  
the  purpose of  g ran t s  i s  to  in c rease  general w e l f a re ,  e i t h e r  funding 
method could be used with equal e f f i c i e n c y .  The only d i f f e r e n c e  would 
be the  e x t e n t  to  which general  w e l fa re  was promoted. I f ,  however, the 
purpose o f  fede ra l  g ra n ts  i s  to  in c rease  s p e c i f i c  w e l f a re ,  c lo se  ended 
funding may e l im in a te  the  advantages o f  cond i t iona l  g ran ts  over  uncon­
d i t i o n a l  ones f o r  t h a t  purpose. That i s ,  the  c lo se  endedness o f  a con­
d i t i o n a l  g ra n t  may cause the  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i s  g ra n t  to  be i d e n t i c a l  to
1 O
Examples of  the  e f f e c t s  o f  revenue shar ing  on loca l  dec is ion  
making choices  may be found in :  Gerald R, Wheeler, "The P o l i t i c s  of
New Federa l ism,"  Publ ic  W elfare , XXXV (Spring ,  1977), pp. 38-42 and 
R. Lynn Rettenour and Joseph E. P lu t a ,  "Theory of  Intergovernmental 
Grants and Local Government," Growth and Change, VIII ( J u ly ,  1977), 
pp. 31-37.
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the  e f f e c t s  o f  an uncondi t ional  g r a n t .  But,  in t h i s  c a se ,  the  induce­
ment to  cooperate  w i l l  be g r e a t e r  than would be t r u e  i f  an uncondi t ional  
g ra n t  were provided.
To demonstrate t h i s ,  a cciime as in Figure 16 t h a t  the  government 
wants to  in c rease  the  supply o f  a pub l ic  good which i s  measured on the  
v e r t i c a l  a x i s .  I f  a program of  open ended c o n d i t iona l  g r an ts  i s  i n s t i ­
t u t e d ,  the budget c o n s t r a i n t  w i l l  s h i f t  from AD to  a p o s i t i o n  such as 
CD and an in c re a se  in p u b l ic  goods from Ŷ  to  w i l l  be e f f e c t e d .  In 
c o n t r a s t ,  i f  a c lo se  ended g ra n t  i s  g iven ,  the  budget c o n s t r a i n t  may 
s h i f t  to  a p o s i t i o n  such ad BED and the  e f f e c t  of  the  g r a n t  would be 
i d e n t i c a l  to  t h a t  of  an uncondi t ional  g r a n t  in the  amount of  the  imposed 
d o l l a r  l i m i t a t i o n .  The l i n e  BED was formed under the  assumption t h a t  
the  fede ra l  government would provide a subsidy of  a given p ropor t ion  
of  the  pub l ic  good's  c o s t ,  up to  a leve l  o f  Y4 . Beyond Y^, no a d d i ­
t io n a l  subsidy would be given.  T he re fo re ,  the  budget c o n s t r a i n t  which 
inc ludes  the  f ed e ra l  government subsidy would run p a r a l l e l  to  the  bud­
ge t  c o n s t r a i n t  w ithou t  th e  f e d e ra l  government subsidy .  I f  t h i s  p o in t  
i s  recognized in g r a n t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  the  fede ra l  government could be 
ab le  to  achieve the  w e l fa re  in c re a se s  a s so c ia te d  with uncondi t ional  
g r a n t s ,  while i n s t i t u t i n g  coopera t ion  requirements  to  ob ta in  the  g r a n t s .  
As a p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  however, i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  the  d o l l a r  l i m i t a t i o n s  
on g ran ts  would have to  be so small t h a t  the  bas ic  i n t e n t  of  in c rea s in g  
the  q u a n t i t y  o f  the  subs id ized  good would be compromised.
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Figure 16
Federal Grants with Dollar Limitations
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Bargaining and Grants 
Analyses p resen ted  in Chapter I I I  demonstrated t h a t  except  f o r  the 
case in which local  governments were i d e n t i c a l ,  a move from re a c t io n  
e q u i l ib r iu m  to  equal c o s t  shar ing  coopera t ion  eq u i l ib r iu m  would r e s u l t  
in gains  of  w e l fa re  f o r  one government and lo s se s  in we l fa re  fo r  the  
o th e r .  Thus, t h e r e  would e x i s t  a barga in ing  range w i th in  which nego­
t i a t i o n s  between the communities could occur to  exhaust  p o t e n t i a l  gains  
from t r a d e .  The barga in ing  p ro cess ,  however, would be more r e s t r i c t e d  
and c o s t l y  between governmental u n i t s  than i t  would be between i n d i v i ­
d u a l s ,  and i f  t h e r e  were an in c rease  in the  number o f  governments p a r ­
t i c i p a t i n g  in the  barga in ing  p rocess ,  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and c o s t s  would i n ­
c rease  a c c o r d i n g l y . The reason f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  intergovernmental 
barga in ing  inc ludes  p o l i t i c a l  as well as economic elements.  On an 
ind iv idua l  l e v e l ,  b a rga ine rs  a t tempt  to  gain f o r  themselves the  g r e a t e s t  
amount o f  economic b e n e f i t s  in the  form of  consumable goods and s e rv i c e s .  
Governments and p o l i t i c i a n s ,  though, a re  not  only concerned with con­
sumable goods and s e r v i c e s ,  but  with spheres  of  j u r i s d i c t i o n  a l s o .
Hence, a governmental u n i t  w i l l  be l e s s  w i l l i n g  than an ind iv idua l  to  
s t r i k e  a bargain ing  agreement which economically  might c a l l  f o r  a t r a n s ­
f e r  o f  the  ac tua l  p rov is ion  o f  a s e rv i c e  fu n c t io n  to  some o th e r  economic 
u n i t .
^R o land  J .  McKean, Public  Speaking (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1968), p. 164.
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In a d d i t io n  to  governments wanting to  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  sphere of  
in f lu e n c e ,  the  a c t io n  o f  p re s su re  groups may a l so  work to  h inder  co­
o p e ra t io n .  Vested i n t e r e s t  c i t i z e n  groups and municipal employee 
a s s o c i a t i o n s  have co n s id e ra b le  impact on the  e s ta b l i sh m en t  of  budget 
p r i o r i t i e s . W h e r e  e f f i c i e n c y  through coopera t ion  c o n f l i c t s  with the  
d e s i r e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  groups,  choices  must be made. Unless advocates  
f o r  e f f i c i e n c y  can demonstrate  wider  support  f o r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  than 
o th e r  p re ssu re  groups can f o r  t h e i r s ,  the  cause of  e f f i c i e n c y  w il l  
s u f f e r .  Commenting on the  impact o f  p re ssu re  groups in determining 
the  budgets o f  s t a t e  and loca l  government,  James O'Connor has w r i t t e n :
The dominate p r iv a t e  i n t e r e s t s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  
lead ing  i n d u s t r i e s )  predetermine the  volume of  s t a t e  
spending and th e  major budgetary p r i o r i t i e s .  There i s  
l i t t l e  p lanning a t  the  s t a t e  and loca l  l e v e l s ,  and the  
r o le  o f  f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t i s e  and i n t e g ra te d  dec is ion  
making (so important  a t  the  f ed e ra l  l e v e l )  i s  minimal . 15
Among o th e r  d e t e r r e n t s  to  coopera t ion  between governments,  i t  has 
been found t h a t  governmental u n i t s ,  l i k e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  in many in s tan ce s  
tend to  g r a v i t a t e  toward an a s s o c i a t i o n  with s i m i l a r l y  s i t u a t e d  govern­
ments.  Commenting on the  r e s u l t s  of  a s tudy dea l ing  with t h i s  problem, 
John C. Bollens and Henry J .  Schmandt wrote:
•^An e x c e l l e n t  example may be found in the  exper iences  o f  publ ic  
hear ings  held f o r  the  purpose o f  c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  a l l o c a t i n g  
revenue shar ing  funds.  Despi te  c i t i z e n  review, c i t y  managers were 
found to  be ab le  to  s t r o n g ly  in f lu en c e  the  expend i tu re  o f  shared funds.  
See, Timothy A. Almy> "City Managers, Public  Avoidance, and Revenue 
Shar ing ,"  Public  Adm inis t ra t ion  Review, XXXVII ( January /February ,  1977), 
pp. 19-27.
15james O'Connor, The F isca l  Cr ises  o f  the  S ta t e  (New York:
S t .  M ar t in ' s  P re s s ,  1973), p. 87.
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School coopera t ion  tends  to  develop between governments 
o f  s i m i l a r  s o c ia l  rank and f in a n c i a l  r e so u rc e s ,  Sewage 
agreements a l so  occur  more f r e q u e n t ly  between u n i t s  of  
comparable s o c ia l  s t a t u s  and, where a range o f  choice  
e x i s t s ,  t h i s  f a c t o r  appears  more important  than the  
tax ab le  re sou rces  o f  the  r e s p e c t iv e  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 1'
With d e c i s io n s  being based on so c ia l  c o m p a t ib i l i ty  r a t h e r  than economic 
r a t i o n a l i t y ,  independent  coopera t ion  cannot be r e l i e d  upon to  provide  
an economical ly  e f f i c i e n t  s o lu t io n  to  problems r e q u i r in g  j o i n t  e f f o r t s . 1^ 
Perhaps the  b ro ad es t  ind i tement  o f  independent ac t io n  among p o l i t i ­
cal u n i t s  as  an agent  to  provide economic e f f i c i e n c y  was provided by 
L. C. Ecker-Racz in th e  fo l lowing:
Publ ic  o f f i c i a l s  a re  committed to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
m iss ions .  The ir  l o y a l i t i e s  a re  to  t h e i r  own jo b s .  They 
do t h e i r  b e s t  to  m er i t  the  approval o f  t h e i r  s u p e r io r s .
Those exposed to  pub l ic  view crave the approval o f  t h e i r  
c o n s t i t u e n t s .  But c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  tend to  r a t e  t h e i r  p o l i ­
t i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in terms of  narrow personal  i n t e r e s t s ;  
and the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  one c o n s t i tu e n c y ,  one community, or  one 
s t a t e ,  as p o p u la r ly  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  may c o n f l i c t  with i n t e r e s t s  
o f  o th e r  communities or  s t a t e s ,  o r  with  those  of the  n a t i o n . 19
Commenting f u r t h e r ,  Bryan T. Downes has suggested:
Each loca l  government has i t s  own j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  fu n c t io n s  
or  s e rv ic e s  to  provide .  All have been e s t a b l i s h e d  under
^ J o h n  C. Bollens and Henry J .  Schmandt, The M etropol is :  I t s
People,  P o l i t i c s  and Economic L ife  (New York: Harper and Row PuF-
l i s h e r s ,  1970), p. 357.
18The tendency f o r  coopera t ion  to  take  p lace  among s im i l a r  e n t i t i e s  
was emphasized with r e s p e c t  to  f i s c a l  h i s t o r i e s  in ;  Robert E. F i r e s t i n e ,  
Bernard L. Weinste in ,  and S h i l l y  M, Hayden, "Intergovernmental  F isca l  
Cooperation in Growing M etropol i tan  Economies," The Annals o f  Regional 
S c ience , XII (November, 1978), pp. 12-20.
19L. C. Ecker-Racz, The P o l i t i c s  and Economics o f  S ta te-Local  F i -  
nance,  (Englewood C l i f f s ,  New J e r s e y :  P re n t i c e -H a l1, I n c . , 1970),
p. 155.
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th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r  s t a t u t o r y  p ro v is io n s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  
s t a t e .  T y p ic a l ly ,  they  pursue t h e i r  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t s ,  
provide s e rv i c e s  t o  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  and sometimes com­
pe te  with neighboring l o c a l i t i e s  f o r  t ax ab le  wealth ,  Most, 
however, d i s r e g a rd  t h e i r  neighbors  and problems t h a t  
s p i l l  over  governmental boundar ies .  The tendency i s  
to  view loca l  problem: as unique with r e l a t i o n  to  
those  in a d ja c e n t  communities.  Hence, coordina ted  
and coopera t ive  proLlem so lv ing  by local  governments 
seldom o ccur . ^
Under these  c o n d i t i o n s ,  f ede ra l  g r an ts  could be used to  overcome 
the  e f f e c t s  o f  r e c a l c i t r a n c e  by loca l  governments to  bargain  among them­
s e lv e s .  Consider,  f o r  example, the  case  of  unequal incomes in two 
communities producing r e c ip ro c a l  s p i l l  o u t s .  As dep ic ted  in Figure 17, 
Westbank the  w e a l th i e r  community, would be ab le  to  ob ta in  a leve l  of  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  as i d e n t i f i e d  by w e l fa re  fu n c t io n  Iw in r e a c t io n  e q u i l i ­
brium. I f  Westbank and Eastbank were to  coopera te  in producing the  
pub l ic  good and were to  agree to  an equal shar ing  o f  c o s t s ,  Westbank's 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  would in c r e a se  to  I I W. From Eastbank 's  p o in t  of  view, a 
change from re a c t io n  e q u i l ib r iu m  to  equal c o s t  shar ing  coopera t ion  
would r e s u l t  in a reduc t ion  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  from Ie to  I I e . C le a r ly ,  
coopera t ion  under th e se  circumstances  would not occur a u to m a t ica l ly ,  
but  only  a f t e r  c o s t  shar ing  n e g o t i a t io n s  between communities have
2 ° B r y a n  T. Downes, P o l i t i c s ,  Change, and the  Urban Cr ises  (North 
S c i t u a t e ,  M assachuset ts :  Dusbury P res s ,  1976), p, 42,
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Figure 17
Communities with Unequal Resource Bases
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taken p l a c e . I f  the  c i t i e s  r e fu s e  to  n e g o t i a t e  because o f  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n s id e r a t i o n s ,  g ra n t  programs could be des igned to  cause the  commun­
i t i e s  to  a c t  in  such a way as to  exhaus t  the  p o t e n t i a l  gains  from t r a d e .  
To achieve t h i s  r e s u l t ,  howeyer, g r a n t  p ro v is io n s  would n e c e s s a r i l y  
grow in complexi ty .
Under th e  co n d i t io n s  o f  F i g u r e  17, the  f ed e ra l  government could
4 3o f f e r  a c o n d i t io n a l  g r a n t  to  Westbank e q u a l l in g  pe rcen t  o f  i t s
W
expend i tu res  o f  dredging.  Westbank would than be ab le  to  move to  wel-
3
f a r e  fu nc t ion  I I .  I t s  t o t a l  consumption would equal Dw u n i t s  o f  dred­
ging and Fw u n i t s  o f  food. Of th e  t o t a l  amount o f  dredging consumed,
i 4 3
OD1 would be produced by Westbank from i t s  own income and D D would w r  w w
r e s u l t  from the  g ra n t .  But Eastbank would o b ta in  g r e a t e r  s p i l l  in s  from 
th e  inc reased  q u a n t i t y  o f  dredging and would no t  want t o  con t inue  pro­
ducing a t  i t s  c u r r e n t  l e v e l .  With s p i l l  in s  from Eastbank f a l l i n g  below 
1 4D, D Westbank would no t  be ab le  to  remain on II, ,  un less  i t  r ece ived  ad- w w w
d i t i o n a l  a id  o r  un less  Eastbank rece ived  a id  to  induce i t  to  produce
1 4
D D u n i t s  of  dredqing,  o r  some combination o f  the  two. 
w w ■ 3
^ S u c h  c o s t  sha r ing  n e g o t i a t i o n  w i l l  be very d i f f i c u l t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i f  one community i s  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  nega t ive  s p i l l  ou ts  to  ano the r .  For 
a t re a tm e n t  o f  t h i s  problem, s e e ,  J e r a l d  R. Barnard, " E x t e r n a l i t i e s  from 
Urban Growth: The Case o f  Increase  Storm Runoff and Flooding,"  Land
Economics, LIV (August,  1978), pp. 298-315 and Ei than  Hochman, David 
Pines  and David Zilberman,  "The E f fe c t s  o f  Po lu t ion  Taxation on the  
P a t t e rn  o f  Resource A l lo c a t io n :  The Downstream Dif fus ion  Case,"
Q u ar te r ly  Journal  o f  Economics, XCI (November, 1977), pp. 625-638.
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A second p o s s ib le  approach to  the problem would r e s u l t  in  the  fe d ­
e ra l  government o b ta in in g  an agreement between the  two communities to  
coopera te  f u l l y  with an equal shar ing  o f  c o s t s .  Then, to  compensate 
Eastbank f o r  i t s  w e l fa re  l e s s ,  an uncondi t ional  g ran t  could be given 
to  permit  a r e tu rn  to  the  p r e -co o p e ra t io n  leve l  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  In 
e i t h e r  c a se ,  one f a c t o r  which should be recognized i s  t h a t  fede ra l  p a r ­
t i c i p a t i o n  tnrough g ra n t s  w i l l  g e n e ra l ly  r e s u l t  in a g r e a t e r  level  of  
pub l ic  good product ion  than  would e x i s t  under pure coopera t ion  between 
the  local  governments.  P o ss ib le  excep t ions  to  t h i s  general  r u le  inc lude  
the  case in  which income e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  the  p r iv a t e  good i s  z e ro ,  or  the 
case in which r e c e i p t  o f  fede ra l  funds was condi t ioned  with an abso lu te  
requirement t h a t  loca l  governments main ta in  t h e i r  p r e -g r a n t  leve l  o f  
spending on the  p u b l ic  good out  of  t h e i r  own revenues .
P rov is ions  f o r  Cooperation in Grant L e g is l a t io n  
An ev a lu a t io n  o f  America 's  system o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  in terms of  
t h e i r  e f f e c t  on coopera t ion  among local  u n i t s  o f  government i s  mixed. 
Cer ta in  a t t r i b u t e s  can be po in ted  to which have a ided  coopera t ion  while 
o th e r  a t t r i b u t e s  have been n eu t ra l  or  even adverse to  co o pera t ion .  Re­
i t e r a t i n g  an e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n ,  i t  i s  important  to  note t h a t  e a r l y  in 
the  ev o lu t io n a ry  process  o f  g ra n t  development l i t t l e  c o n s id e ra t io n  was 
given to  any form o f  coopera t ion  except  f o r  t h a t  which e x i s t e d  between 
donor and r e c i p i e n t  governments.  When a problem arose  t h a t  had s u f f i ­
c i e n t  support  to  r e c e iv e  fede ra l  funding ,  monies were provided to  a t t a c k
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the  problem d i r e c t l y  and in i s o l a t i o n  o f  any o th e r  problem o r  program.22 
As a r e s u l t  o f  dea l ing  with problems on a piecemeal b a s i s ,  t h e r e  d eve l ­
oped an over lapping  and c o n f l i c t i n g  g r a n t  system. Emphasizing the  lack 
o f  co o rd in a t io n  in e a r l y  g r a n t s ,  James L. Sundquist  has s t a t e d :
The f e d e r a l l y  n i t i a t e d  community mechanisms d i f f e r e d  
not  j u s t  in name, s t r u c t u r e ,  and func t ion  but a l s o  in e l e ­
ments o f  the  commUhiTies' s o c i a l ,  economic, and p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  upon which they  were based.  Each r e f l e c t e d  the 
p a r t i c u l a r  c l i e n t e l e  o f  i t s  pa ren t  agency, as well as t h a t  
agency 's  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  t r a d i t i o n s  and customary channels  
o f  communication. Thus, HUD r e l i e d  on e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  urban mayors,  and b u i l t  i t s  mechanisms around 
loca l  governments—but even so ,  in the  case o f  model c i t i e s ,  
r e q u i re d  c r e a t i o n  o f  the  c i t y  demonstrat ion agenc ies .  The 
O ff ice  o f  Economic Oppor tunity ,  s k e p t i c a l  o f  the t rea tm en t  
t h a t  i t s  c l i e n t e l ,  the  poor ,  would r e ce iv e  a t  the  hands of  
loca l  government,  c re a te d  in i t s  community a c t io n  agencies  
a new kind o f  i n s t i t u t i o n  whose con tro l  was to  be shared 
by pu b l ic  o f f i c i a l s ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  p r i v a t e  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n s  and the  poor themselves .
Thus, monies were channeled in to  communities and d i f f e r e n t  groups were 
given the  a u t h o r i t y  to  make expendi tu re  d e c i s io n s .  The d iv e r se  groups,  
fo llowing t h e i r  own sp ec ia l  i n t e r e s t s ,  could no t  be expected to  e s t a b ­
l i s h  a coord ina ted  p a t t e r n  o f  expend i tu res  w i th in  a s in g l e  community or 
among severa l  communities.  I t  was not  u n t i l  1964, when the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental  Re la t ions  prepared a s tudy d e t a i l i n g  
the  lack o f  coopera t ion  and c o o rd in a t io n  among ind iv idua l  g r a n t s ,  t h a t
77 Even in t h i s  c a se ,  i t  has been demonstrated t h a t  un less  goals  
a re  shared be r e c i p i e n t  governments and th e  f ed e ra l  government, th e r e  
a re  s e r io u s  ques t ions  as t o  whether  o r  no t  the  r e c i p i e n t  government 's  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  change s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  See, Helen Ingram, "Policy 
Implementation Through Bargaining:  The Case o f  Federal G ran ts - In -  
Aid,"  Public  P o l i c y , XXV ( F a l l ,  1977),  pp. 499-526.
^Sundquist, op. c i t . ,  pp. 25-26.
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any s u b s t a n t iv e  remedial a c t io n  was undertaken.  Following the  p u b l i c a ­
t i o n  o f  the  Commission's s tudy ,  hear ings tn  both Houses o f  Congress 
culminated in  the  passage o f  the  Intergovernmental Cooperation Act o f  
1 9 6 8 . One o f  the  major p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  Act was:
To th e  maximurr e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e ,  c o n s i s t e n t  with na­
t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  a l l  Federal a id  f o r  development purposes 
s h a l l  be c o n s i s t e n t  with and f u r t h e r  the  o b je c t iv e s  o f  S t a t e ,  
r e g io n a l ,  and loca l  comprehensive planning.  Considera t ion  
sh a l l  be given to  a l l  developmental aspec ts  of  our t o t a l  na­
t io n a l  community, inc lud ing  but  no t  l im i t e d  to  housing,  t r a n s ­
p o r t a t i o n ,  economic development,  n a tu ra l  and human resources  
development,  community f a c i l i t i e s ,  and th e  general  improvement 
o f  l i v i n g  environments.  5
Subsequently ,  a l l  g r a n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  were processed through reviewing
agencies  to  c e r t i f y  t h a t  requirements  o f  th e  Act were being complied
with .  Where c o n f l i c t s  among u n i t s  o f  government developed,  i t  became
necessary  f o r  the  c o n f l i c t  to  be re so lved  before  an a p p l i c a t i o n  would
be approved by th e  reviewing agency.
This major e f f o r t  toward co o p e ra t io n ,  however, has no t  been con­
t in u ed  uniformly. A severe  break occurred  in  1972 with th e  passage of 
revenue sha r ing .  Rec ip ien ts  o f  sha r ing  funds were not  r equ i red  to  sub­
mit  coord ina ted  plans  f o r  p ro je c te d  use. Indeed, no use plans  were r e ­
qu ired  to  be submitted  a t  a l l .  Governments were s l a t e d  to  r ece iv e  a 
p o r t io n  o f  th e se  funds as a r i g h t ,  with a l l o c a t i o n  depending on the  
r e s u l t s  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g  r e s p e c t iv e  da ta  i n to  a f ixed  formula.  In t h i s
^ A d v i s o r y  Commission on Intergovernmental R e la t io n ,  Impact of  
Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government Organizat ion 
and Planning (Washington, D. C,:  U.S. Government P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1964).
pc
3U. S. Congress,  Intergovernmental Cooperation Act o f  1968, Publ ic  
Law 90-577, 90th Congress,  1968, p. 5.
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way, governments were given a green l i g h t  to  go t h e i r  own way and make 
expendi tu res  d ec i s io n s  independent  o f  any o th e r  governmental u n i t .
Maintenance o f  E f f o r t
Maintenance o f  loca l  e f f o r t s  in support  o f  func t ions  subs id ized  by 
the  Federal government i s  c l o s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  matching requirements  of  
g r a n t s - i n - a i d .  In the  p r e se n t  c o n te x t ,  i t  i s  th e  source  o f  matching 
funds t h a t  i s  importan t .  P oss ib le  sources  inc lude  inc reased  tax  reve ­
nues, the  s h i f t  o f  funds from fu n c t io n s  no t  funded by g r a n t s ,  th e  s h i f t  
o f  funds from programs which in the  p a s t  have been p a r t i a l l y  funded 
through g r a n t s ,  o r  th e  r e - a l l o c a t i o n  o f  funds from one component o f  
a fu n c t io n a l  expend i tu re  not  e l i g i b l e  f o r  g ran t  funds to  a component 
which i s  e l i g i b l e  f o r  support .  P r e s e n t ly ,  t h e r e  i s  not  e f f e c t i v e  con­
t r o l  over  the  leve l  o f  loca l  suppor t  f o r  programs subs id ized  through 
g ra n t s .  This lack o f  con t ro l  may cause loca l  governments to  be unwil­
l in g  to  t i e  themselves t o  coope ra t ive  agreements with o th e r  governments 
in o rde r  to  r e t a i n  t h e i r  f l e x i b i l i t y  in s h i f t i n g  funds from one program 
t o  ano ther  to  gain a d d i t io n a l  g ra n t s .
One approach t h a t  might be taken to  provide f o r  maintenance of  
e f f o r t  by loca l  governments i s  th e  use o f  an incremental cond i t iona l  
g ran t .  The workings o f  t h i s  type  o f  g r a n t  may be demonstrated in 
re fe ren c e  to  Figure 18. In t h i s  f i g u r e ,  eq u i l ib r iu m  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
a t  the  p o in t  o f  tangency between the  budget c o n s t r a i n t  AB and the  
w e l fa re  curve Ŵ . I f  t h e  n a t io n a l  government wishes to  in c re a se  the  
leve l  o f  the  pub l ic  good S, i t  could design a g ran t  program which would 
su b s id iz e  only  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  S g r e a t e r  than Sj u n i t s .  Such a g ran t
Figure 18 
Incremental Condit ional  Grants
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would s h i f t  the  community's budget c o n s t r a i n t  t o  ACD and e f f e c t  an i n ­
c rease  in S to  S2 u n i t s .  In t h i s  way, th e  d e s i r e d  e f f e c t s  o f  a condi­
t i o n a l  g r a n t  would be obta ined  a t  th e  l e a s t  c o s t  to  the f ed e ra l  govern­
ment.
The d e s i r e  o f  the  f ed e ra l  government to  encourage loca l  governments 
to  suppor t  funded programs out  o f  loca l  funds was demonstrated in the  
S t a t e  and loca l  F isca l  A ss is tance  Act o f  1972. The Act p r o h ib i t ed  
revenue shar ing  funds t o  be used to  s a t i s f y  matching requirements  f o r  
c o n d i t io n a l  g r a n t s .  However, s tanda rds  f o r  judg ing  whether  or  not  a 
loca l  government used revenue shar ing  funds f o r  such a purpose were so 
nebulous as to  be i n e f f e c t i v e .  The Act s a i d ,  f o r  example, t h a t :
No s t a t e  government o r  u n i t s  o f  loca l  government 
s h a l l  be determined to  have used funds in v i o l a t i o n  of  
subsec t ion  (a)  with r e s p e c t  to  any funds rece ived  fo r  
any e n t i t l e m e n t  per iod  to  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  the  n e t  r ev e ­
nues rece ived  by i t  from i t s  own sources  dur ing such 
per iod  exceed the  n e t  revenues r ec e iv in g  by i t  from i t s  
own sources  dur ing  th e  one-year  per iod  beginning Ju ly  1,
1971 (o r  o n e - h a l f  o f  such n e t  revenues ,  in the  case  of  
an e n t i t l e m e n t  per iod  o f  6 months).  6
There fo re ,  the  only proof  t h a t  a loca l  government needed to  demonstra te
t h a t  i t  d id  not  use sh a r in g  funds to  meet matching requirements  f o r
o th e r  g ra n t s  was an in c r e a s e  in i t s  t ax  c o l l e c t i o n .  Under amendments
passed in 1976, even t h i s  minor r e s t r i c t i o n  was removed from purposes
f o r  which revenue sh a r in g  funds would be used.
26U. S. Congress,  An Act to  Provide F isca l  A ss is tance  to  S ta t e  
and Local Governments, Publ ic  Law 92-512, 92nd Congress,  1972, p. 2,
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Formula E f fec ts
As i d e n t i f i e d  in the  previous  c h a p te r ,  p ro v is io n s  in  the  a l l o c a t i n g  
formulas used to  d i s t r i b u t e  g r a n t  funds do not  con ta in  a "cooperat ion" 
v a r i a b l e .  Rather ,  the  formulas a re  designed to  recognize  need and f i s ­
cal e f f o r t  o f  r e c i p i e n t  governments.  Two importan t  f a c t o r s  which a c ­
count f o r  the  choice o f  V ar iab les  a re  pr imary i n t e n t  o f  g ran ts  and 
p r a c t i c a l i t y .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  a f t e r  the  f e d e ra l  government has i d e n t i ­
f i e d  an area  which i t  deems worthy of  n a t io n a l  a t t e n t i o n ,  emphasis i s  
placed on g e t t i n g  funds to  the  proper  governmental u n i t  to  begin r e ­
medial a c t io n .  Along with  t h i s  emphasis ,  but  only o f  secondary impor­
ta n c e ,  a re  p rov is ions  t o  a t t a i n  o th e r  goa ls  such as nond isc r im ina t ion  
in spending fede ra l  funds ,  minimum wages, and coopera t ion  among govern­
mental u n i t s . ^  Because the  primary c o n s id e ra t io n  i s  to  i n c r e a se  loca l  
spending,  i t  i s  unders tandab le  t h a t  v a r i a b l e s  chosen as a l l o c a t i n g  c r i ­
t e r i a  would be a s s o c i a t e d  with need and f i s c a l  e f f o r t .  Also, on a more 
p r a c t i c a l  bases ,  need and f i s c a l  e f f o r t  a re  more e a s i l y  q u a n t i f i e d  than 
a concept such as co o pera t ion .  Thus, to  avoid the  p i t f a l l s  o f  a t t e m p t ­
ing to  de f in e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  v a r i a b l e s  t o  measure q u a l i t a t i v e  phenomena, 
non-formula c o n d i t io n s  a re  w r i t t e n  i n to  enab l ing  g r a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n .
One formula t h a t  r e q u i r e s  spec ia l  a t t e n t i o n  i s  the  formula f o r  
revenue sha r ing  t h a t  a l l o c a t e s  funds t o  loca l  governments w i th in  a
27This i s  no t  to  say t h a t  in the  h ie ra rc h y  o f  th e  f ed e ra l  govern­
ment 's  goal th e se  l a t t e r  o b j e c t iv e s  a re  lower p r i o r i t y  i tem s,  but only 
t h a t  in the  s p e c i f i c  c o n te x t  o f  g ra n t  programs th e  primary e f f o r t  i s  to  
p lace  money in the  hands o f  loca l  governments to  help so lve  p a r t i c u l a r  
problems.
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s t a t e .  D is t in g u ish in g  between county governments and o th e r  loca l  gov­
ernments ,  one a l l o c a t i n g  v a r i a b l e  i s  a d ju s te d  tax  revenues . Under a 
d ec is ion  know as the  Memphis Rule, i t  was determined t h a t  in those 
s t a t e s  which provided f o r  cit .v t a x e s ,  e . g . ,  s a le s  t a x ,  to  be c o l l e c t e d  
a t  the  county government l e v e l ,  shar ing  funds would be d i s t r i b u t e d  as 
i f  the  c i t y  c o l l e c t e d  tax e s  f o r  i t s e l f .  This d ec is ion  meant t h a t  
c i t i e s  which en te red  in to  coopera t ive  agreements with a governmental 
e n t i t y  t h a t  was more e f f i c i e n t  a t  c o l l e c t i n g  taxes  would not s u f f e r  
a lo s s  o f  revenue sh a r in g  funds.  Although not  p o s i t i v e l y  encouraging 
c o o p e ra t io n ,  the  Memphis Rule meant t h a t  coope ra t ive  e f f o r t s  would not 
be pena l ized .
E f fe c t s  on Government S t ru c tu r e
From the  p ro v is io n s  w r i t t e n  i n to  enabl ing  g ra n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  reg a rd ­
ing r e c i p i e n t s  o f  a i d ,  i t  would appear  t h a t  Congress was, f o r  a t ime,  
o b l iv io u s  to  the  p o s s ib le  adverse consequences of  g ran t s  on governmen­
t a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Unti l  th e  e a r l y  19 6 0 's ,  emphasis was placed  on funding 
s p e c i f i c  fu n c t io n a l  expend i tu res  through r e sp o n s ib le  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  pub­
l i c  o r  p r i v a t e ,  which submitted proposa ls  j u s t i f y i n g  n a t iona l  support .  
Although most g ran ts  r eq u i red  t h a t  a sys tem at ic  plan be included in the 
a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a i d ,  ", . , i t  was most o f te n  spec ia l  purpose planning 
f o r  the  s p e c i f i c  type o f  program being a s s i s t e d  r a t h e r  than comprehen­
s iv e  p lan n in g . 28 Yet,  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  th e  l a t t e r  type o f  planning
28Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental  R e la t io n s ,  Impact o f  
Federal Urban Development Programs, pp. 14-15.
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which i s  necessary  t o  avoid an i n e f f i c i e n t  hodgepodge o f  over lapping  
and c o n f l i c t i n g  programs and to  promote an e f f i c i e n t  d e l iv e ry  system 
to  provide  the  s e rv i c e s  which g ran ts  suppor t .  In o rde r  to  develop 
such a system, e l i g i b i l i t y  requirements  f o r  the  r e c e i p t  o f  g ran ts  can 
play  an important  r o l e .  I t  i s  in t h i s  a rea  t h a t  revenue shar ing  has 
a more p o s i t i v e  impact on coopera t ion  than co n d i t io n a l  g ran ts  have. 
Under revenue sha r ing  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  funds are  a l l o c a t e d  only  to  general  
governmental u n i t s .  This  i s  no t  t r u e  o f  cond i t iona l  g ran t s  which i n ­
c lude general  purpose governments,  spec ia l  purpose governments,  and 
p r o f i t  and n o n - p r o f i t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  as e l i g i b l e  r e c i p i e n t s .  By o f f e r ­
ing g r a n t s  t o  t h i s  wide range o f  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  the  f ed e ra l  government 
has reduced the  i n c e n t iv e  to  so lve  problems j o i n t l y  a t  the  loca l  leve l  
and has made i t  e a s i e r  f o r  local  governments to  a c t  independent ly .  The 
n o n - r e s t r i c t i v e n e s s  o f  co n d i t iona l  g ran ts  and,  in f a c t ,  the  apparent  
advocacy o f  spec ia l  purpose governments was c r i t i c i z e d  by the  Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental  Re la t ions  when i t  repo r ted  t h a t :
A r e l a t i v e l y  new type o f  Federal a id  r e c i p i e n t  has 
a r i s e n  in  r e c e n t  y e a r s —the  spec ia l  purpose u n i t s  of  
government with  independent  o r  semi-independent  s t a t u s .
These new u n i t s ,  a c t u a l l y  induced and sometimes even 
requ ired  by about a q u a r t e r  o f  a l l  Federal programs, 
inc lude  pub l ic  housing and urban renewal a u t h o r i t i e s ,
S t a t e  and loca l  planning agenc ie s ,  local  a rea  r ed ev e l ­
opment o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  development a u t h o r i t i e s ,
S t a t e  and county ru ra l  a rea  development committees,  i r ­
r i g a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s ,  water  users  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  so i l  con­
s e rv a t io n s  d i s t r i c t s ,  S ta te  and county a g r i c u l t u r a l  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  and conse rva t ion  committees,  and S ta te  
and local  Farmer' s  Home A dm inis t ra t ion  committees.
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Despite th e  f a c t  t h a t  most Federal a id  i s  a v a i l a b l e  
to  both general  purpose and spec ia l  purpose u n i t s  o f  l o ­
cal government,  severa l  programs show a s t rong  tendency 
to  bypass general  purpose u n i t s .
As a r e s u l t  o f  encouraging s p e c i a l ,  s in g l e  func t ion  governmental u n i t s ,  
co n d i t io n a l  g ran ts  tend to  reduce the  amount o f  coopera t ion  among gov­
ernments unless  coope ra t ive  agreements a re  made an e x p l i c i t  cond i t ion  
f o r  o b ta in in g  g ra n t s .
The fo rego ing ,  however, does no t  imply t h a t  uncondi t iona l  g ran t s  
a r e  w i thou t  n ega t ive  in f lu e n c e s  on government s t r u c t u r e  and coopera t ive  
e f f o r t s .  As was d iscussed  in the  previous  c h a p te r ,  revenue shar ing  has 
provided funds to  some general  purpose governments which have permit ted  
them to  remain a c t i v e  beyond the  time when normal f i s c a l  co n d i t io n s  
would have forced d i s s o l u t i o n  o r  c o n s o l id a t io n .  Thus, by provid ing  
funds to  suppor t  the  cont inued o pe ra t ion  o f  th ese  governments,  revenue 
shar ing  has been in s t rum enta l  in promoting a governmental s t r u c t u r e  
with more u n i t s  o f  loca l  government than would be t r u e  without  revenue 
sha r ing .  At the  same t im e ,  revenue shar ing  has a l so  been re sp o n s ib le  
f o r  d iscourag ing  n e g o t i a t i o n s  lead ing  to  coopera t ion  by th e  same gov­
ernmental u n i t s .  As a r e s u l t ,  both co n d i t io n a l  and uncondi t ional  g ran ts  
e x e r t  adverse in f lu e n c e s  on coopera t ion .  However, a l though fede ra l  
g ran ts  may be c r i t i z e d  on the  b a s is  o f  promoting spec ia l  u n i t s  o f  gov­
ernment ( in  the  case o f  co n d i t io n a l  g ran t s )  and p e rm i t t in g  general  u n i t s  
o f  government to  con t inue  to  e x i s t  as  independent  u n i t s  r a t h e r  than to
^ A d v i  sory  Commission on Intergovernmental  R e la t io n s ,  The Role o f  
E q u i l i z a t io n  in Federal Grants (Washington, D, C,: U, S. Government
P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1964), pp. 14-15.
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c o n s o l id a t e  ( in  the  case  o f  revenue s h a r i n g ) ,  th e  e l im in a t io n  o f  these  
u n i t s  may not  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e s u l t  in  an in c rea se  in  e f f i c i e n c y  o r  a de­
c re a se  in c o s t .  Richard Gus te ly ,  f o r  example, has found t h a t  when gov­
ernments a r e  c o n s o l id a te d ,  t ^ g e s  and programs a r e  upgraded to  the  h igh­
e s t  l e v e l . 30 Thus, r a t h e r  than  reduce c o s t ,  c o n s o l id a t io n  may have 
j u s t  th e  o p p o s i te  r e s u l t
Another f a c t o r  t h a t  should be cons idered  in t h i s  d i scu s s io n  d e a l ­
ing with governmental s t r u c t u r e  i s  the  e f f e c t  o f  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  on the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between governmental s i z e  and the  type o f  t a x  lev ied  to  
p rovide  revenues.  Due in p a r t  to  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  small geographic 
boundar ies ,  su b -n a t io n a l  u n i t s  o f  government have been r e s t r a i n e d  in 
t h e  use o f  income tax es  and,  i n s t e a d ,  r e l y  on s a le s  and p ro p e r ty  taxes  
as  t h e i r  c h i e f  sources  o f  revenue.  The problems encountered in  levying 
income taxes  a t  t h e  s t a t e  and loca l  l e v e l s  a re  p r im a r i ly  th o se  o f  base 
d e f i n i t i o n  and base m ig ra t ion .  With r e s p e c t  to  th e  former problem, i t  
i s  necessary  to  s p e c i fy  whether  th e  t ax  i s  to  be l e v ied  on incomes o f  
r e s i d e n t s  o f  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  imposing the  tax  o r  on in d iv id u a l s  work­
ing in th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  r e g a rd le s s  o f  where they  l i v e .  The de termin­
a t io n  o f  t h i s  i s s u e  w i l l  a f f e c t  th e  l a t t e r  problem—base m ig ra t io n —by 
making the  j u r i s d i c t i o n  a more or  l e s s  f av o rab le  l o c a t io n  f o r  res idences  
and bus inesses .
With the  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a program o f  fede ra l  g r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  geo­
graphic  l i m i t a t i o n s  t o  the  use o f  income taxes  to  f inance  s t a t e  and
30Richard D. G us t ley ,  "The A l loca t ion  and D i s t r i b u t io n a l  Impact o f  
Governmental C o n so l id a t io n ,"  Urban A f fa i r s  Q u a r t e r ly , XII (March, 1977), 
pp. 349-364.
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loca l  ex pend i tu res  can be evaded. The f ed e ra l  government,  which i s  not 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f f e c t e d  by th e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  depends on a tax  s t r u c t u r e  
dominated by income taxes  f o r  i t s  revenue.  G r a n t s - i n - a i d ,  which a re  
made a v a i l a b l e  from th e  fedev^l tax  system, w i l l  r e s u l t  in loca l  expen­
d i t u r e s  being f inanced  through a ta x  mix p lac in g  g r e a t e r  emphasis on the  
income t a x  than would have been p o s s ib le  w i thout  the  f edera l  g r a n t s .  In 
so do ing ,  g ran ts  help  to  overcome l i m i t a t i o n s  on taxes  which a re  caused 
by th e  small geographic s i z e  o f  governmental u n i t s . 31
Matching Requirements
Matching requirements  appear  to  have a g r e a t  p o t e n t i a l  as a device 
f o r  ach iev ing  coopera t ion  among u n i t s  o f  loca l  government.  As has been 
po in ted  out  in Chapter  IV, matching p ro v is io n s  with  wide l a t i t u d e  a re  
a l r e a d y  included in c o n d i t io n a l  g r a n t  a u t h o r i z a t i o n s .  Ear ly  g r a n t s  t y p i ­
c a l l y  r eq u i re d  f i f t y  pe rc en t  matching on th e  p a r t  o f  r e c i p i e n t  govern­
ments.  The purpose o f  matching was t o  a s su re  a degree o f  f in a n c ia l  
committment,  and the reby  p r o p r i e t a r y  i n t e r e s t ,  in the  fu n c t io n  being 
supported .  L a te r ,  i t  was recognized t h a t  th e  f i f t y  pe rcen t  matching 
p rov is ion  was too g r e a t  f o r  some o therw ise  e l i g i b l e  governments,  and 
v a r i a b l e  matching became more and more common in new r ev ised  l e g i s l a t i o n . ^
31For a d i sc u s s io n  o f  th e  t a x  s id e  i s s u e ,  s e e ,  R, R, Barne t t  and 
N, Topham, "Achievement p r i n t s  and F isca l  N e u t r a l i t y  in  School F inance ,"  
Applied Economics, IX (December* 1977), pp, 331-342,
32Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental  R e la t io n s ,  The Role o f  
E q u i l i z a t i o n , pp. 5-6.
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While v a r i a b l e  matching in  the  p a s t  has been used almost  e x c lu ­
s iv e l y  as a means o f  ea s in g  matching requirements  f o r  poor communities,  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  usage does not  have to  con t inue  to  p rev a i l  in the  f u ­
t u r e .  The matching percen tage  f o r  a loca l  government could e a s i l y  be 
t i e d  to  a p roof  o f  coopera t ion  among a f f e c t e d  loca l  governments.  Also, 
coopera t ion  does not  have to  be t i e d  j u s t  to  th e  program f o r  which 
g ra n ts  have been reques ted .  A graduated downward matching percentage  
could be designed f o r  those  communities w i l l i n g  to  e n t e r  i n to  more 
comprehensive ba rga in ing  agreements on spending requirements  f o r  r e ­
l a t e d  p r o j e c t s  o r  even f o r  i n t e g r a t i n g  revenue systems to  ob ta in  tax  
revenues more e f f i c i e n t l y .
To use v a r i a b l e  matching requirements  e f f i c i e n t l y  in ach iev ing  a 
g r e a t e r  degree o f  coopera t ion  among lower l e v e l s  o f  governments,  i t  i s  
necessary  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  among r e c i p i e n t  governments be recognized 
and taken advantage o f .  Suppose, f o r  example, t h a t  two loca l  l e v e l s  
o f  government a re  producing a good with s p i l l - o u t  b e n e f i t s  under con­
d i t i o n s  o f  non-coopera t ion .  I f  th e  two e n t i t i e s  a re  a l i k e  in  a l l  r e ­
s p e c t s  except  t h a t  one has a g r e a t e r  p re fe re n c e  f o r  the  good with s p i l l - 
ou t  b e n e f i t s ,  i t  can be demonstrated  t h a t  th e  c i t y  with t h e  g r e a t e s t  
p re fe rence  f o r  th e  good.wil l  be more respons ive  to  g ran t  s t im u la t io n  
than  th e  c i t y  with  t h e  sm a l le r  p re fe re n ce  f o r  the  good. The re fo re ,  
t o  accomplish an equal i n c re a se  in p u b l ic  good product ion  by both com­
m u n i t i e s ,  a g r e a t e r  subs idy  ( sm a l le r  matching r a t i o )  w i l l  have to  be 
o f fe r e d  to  th e  c i t y  with  th e  s m a l le r  p re fe ren c e ,
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To demonstrate t h i s ,  Figure 19 has been drawn so t h a t  the  budget 
c o n s t r a i n t s  f o r  two communities a r e  eq u a l ,  but  the  i n d i f f e r e n c e  map 
f o r  the  community on the  l e f t  i n d i c a t e s  a g r e a t e r  p re fe rence  f o r  publ ic  
good than the  i n d i f f e r e n c e  map f o r  the  community on the  r i g h t .  With 
pub l ic  goods being measured h o r i z o n t a l l y ,  each community w i l l  be in 
e q u i l ib r iu m  a t  the  r e s p e c t iv e  p o in t s  o f  tangency between t h e i r  budget 
c o n s t r a i n t s  and t h e i r  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves .  Now, l e t  the  f ede ra l  govern­
ment provide a t h i r t y - t h r e e  and o n e - th i r d  pe rcen t  g ran t  to  su b s id iz e  
p roduct ion o f  the  pu b l ic  good. Budget c o n s t r a i n t s  f o r  the  two commu­
n i t y  w i l l  s h i f t  from AB and A'B to  CB and C'B f o r  the  communities 
i d e n t i f i e d  by the  l e f t  and r i g h t  p a r t s  o f  Figure  19, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  A 
new eq u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  each community which 
w i l l  involve  a g r e a t e r  production/consumption o f  both goods. What i s  
r e l e v a n t  f o r  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n ,  however, i s  t h a t  th e  community on the  l e f t  
w i l l  exper ience  a g r e a t e r  i n c r ea se  in pu b l ic  good product ion  than the  
community on the  r i g h t  because o f  i t s  g r e a t e r  p re fe rence  f o r  publ ic  
goods. I t  i s  c l e a r ,  th e n ,  t h a t  i f  the  f ed e ra l  government wishes to  
induce a given community to  in c re a se  i t s  p roduct ion  o f  a pub l ic  good, 
i t  w i l l  have to  pay a l a r g e r  p ropor t ion  o f  the  good 's  t o t a l  c o s t ,  the  
sm al le r  the  community's p re fe rence  f o r  the  good,
A second i n t e r e s t i n g  case a s so c ia te d  with  v a r i a b l e  matching occurs 
when communities a re  eq u a l ,  except  in t h e i r  e f f i c i e n c i e s  to  produce pub­
l i c  goods, Under th e se  co n d i t io n s  i t  would appear  to  be reasonable  to  
expect  t h a t  the  community with the  g r e a t e s t  e f f i c i e n c y  in producing the  
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an e x p e c t a t i o n ,  however, i s  not  v a l id  uniformly ,  but  only when p r e f e r ­
ence fu n c t io n s  f o r  p r i v a t e  and pu b l ic  goods meet c e r t a i n  c o n d i t io n s .
To demonstrate  t h i s  p o i n t ,  F igure 20 has been drawn with budget con­
s t r a i n t s  AB and CB f o r  two communities.  For both c o n s t r a i n t s ,  the  
maximum ou tpu t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  p r i v a t e  goods i s  the  same. At any level  
o f  p r iv a t e  good product ion  l e s s  than OB, budget c o n s t r a i n t  CB w i l l  p e r ­
mit twice as much pu b l ic  goods to  be produced as budget c o n s t r a i n t  AB. 
Suppose t h a t  t h e  communities have i d e n t i c a l  p re fe re n ce  maps f o r  p r iv a t e  
and pu b l ic  goods and t h a t  the  maps r e s u l t  in  a c o n t r a c t  locus with bud­
g e t  c o n s t r a i n t s  in d i c a t e d  by the  r a y ,  OD. I f  the  government now sub­
s i d i z e s  the  p roduct ion  o f  the  p u b l ic  good with a f i f t y  p e rcen t  g r a n t ,  
budget c o n s t r a i n t s  s h i f t  from AB and CB to  A'B and C' B,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Depending on the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  s lope  o f  OD and th e  budget 
c o n s t r a i n t s  AB, A'B, CB, and C'B, th e  i n c re a se  in  p u b l ic  good product ion  
by the  community with the  g r e a t e s t  e f f i c i e n c y  in producing th e  good may 
be g r e a t e r  th a n ,  equal t o ,  o r  l e s s  than  th e  i n c r e a se  in p u b l ic  good 
product ion  by th e  community t h a t  i s  l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  in producing the  
g o o d . ^  I f  v a r i a b l e  matching i s  to  be used to  ob ta in  the  g r e a t e s t  r e -
33 Given the  r e f e r e n c e  p o in t s  in the fo llowing diagram, when the  
s lope  o f  OD equals  M, the  communities w i l l  respond to  a government 
subsidy by in c re a s in g  t h e i r  outpu* of  th e  pu b l ic  good by the  same 
amount. When the  s lope  o f  OD i s  g r e a t e r  than M, the  community with  
the  g r e a t e s t  e f f i c i e n c y  in  producing the  pu b l ic  good w i l l  i n c r e a se  
i t s  ou tpu t  by the  g r e a t e s t  amount. When the  s lope  o f  OD i s  l e s s  
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sponse to  a fe d e ra l  g r a n t ,  1t  w i l l  be n ecessary  to  determ ine th e  r e l a ­
t io n sh ip s  t h a t  e x i s t  between th e  c o n t r a c t  locus and budget c o n s t r a in t s  
o f  the  r e c ip i e n t  communities.
Of co u rse ,  w ith  a program such as revenue s h a r in g ,  th e  use o f  
matching requirem ents  as an inducement to  coopera tion  i s  m eaningless. 
Funds provided by revenue sh a rin g  were in tended to  be used to  in c re a se  
d e c is io n  making a t  th e  lo ca l  l e v e l ,  and r e c ip i e n t  governments were not 
supposed to  be c o n s tra in e d  by fed e ra l  spending b ia se s .
Conclusions
An e x te n s iv e  body o f  l i t e r a t u r e  e x i s t s  which documents th e  adverse 
e f f e c t s  t h a t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  have on a t t a in in g  a P are to  optimal a l l o c a ­
t io n  o f  re so u rc e s .  When e x t e r n a l i t i e s  e x i s t ,  a f f e c te d  p a r t i e s  may 
e n te r  in to  n e g o t ia t io n s  to  i n t e r n a l i z e  the  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and thus
p u b lic  good w il l  in c re a se  i t s  o u tp u t  by th e  s m a l le s t  amount.
P u iiu c.
For a p roof o f  t h i s  c o n d i t io n ,  see  Appendix A.
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ach ieve  Pare to  o p t im a l i ty .  As was dem onstrated in  a previous c h ap te r  
o f  t h i s  p ap er ,  lo ca l  governmental u n i t s  g en e ra t in g  re c ip ro c a l  s p i11- 
ou ts  can be shown to  reach an eq u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t io n  based on r e a c t io n s  
to  s p i l l  in s  from o th e r  u n i t s .  In th e  case  o f  id e n t i c a l  conm unities , 
agreements to  coopera te  in the  p ro v is io n  o f  goods w ith  s p i 11 ou ts  under 
equal c o s t  sh a rin g  w i l l  j'/tcrease l e v e l s  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  each com­
munity invo lved . In th e  case o f  unequal communities, co o p era tiv e  
agreements with equal c o s t  sh a rin g  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a lo s s  o f  s a t i s ­
f a c t io n  f o r  one community and a gain  in s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  ano ther .
As a m a t te r  o f  p r a c t i c a l i t y ,  communities a re  no t id e n t ic a l  and fo r  
n e g o t ia t io n s  to  take  p lace  to  exhaust u n re a l iz e d  gains, d i f f i c u l t  b a r ­
ga in ing  among communities can be expected . Add to  t h i s  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
f a c to r s  t h a t  e n te r  when d ea lin g  with autonomous governmental u n i t s  and 
th e  su ccess fu l  com pletion o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  i s  even more u n l ik e ly .  Prac­
t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n  such as p re ssu re  group a c t io n  and main­
ta in in g  spheres  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  may be more i n f l u e n t i a l  in d e c is io n  
making than e f f i c i e n c y  through co o p e ra t io n .  Under th e se  c o n d i t io n s ,  
th e  fe d e ra l  government, through i t s  program o f  g r a n t s - in - a id  could 
encourage lo ca l  governments to  a c t  in  such a way as to  e f f e c t i v e l y  
o b ta in  th o se  u n re a l iz e d  g a in s .  For g r a n t s - in - a id  to  ach ieve t h i s  r e ­
s u l t ,  s u b s ta n t ia l  procedural changes would need to  be made in  c r i t e r i a  
fo r  a l l o c a t in g  g ra n t  funds, E s p e c ia l ly  usefu l in  t h i s  regard  would be 
th e  u n iv e rsa l  requirem ent t h a t  comprehensive p lans  f o r  the  use o f  funds 
be made a p a r t  o f  g ra n t  a p p l i c a t io n s .  This would fo rc e  lo ca l  govern­
ments to  recogn ize  and c o n s id e r  e x i s t in g  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Another
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p o t e n t i a l l y  powerful in s trum ent fo r  ach iev ing  coopera tion  i s  th e  e x i s t ­
ing v a r ia b le  matching p ro v is io n  in g ra n t  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Those loca l gov­
ernments which e n te r  in to  co o p era tiv e  agreements could be compensated 
by a reduced percen tage  matching requirem ent fo r  re c e iv in g  g ran t  funds. 
In a d d i t io n  to  th e se  a c t iv e  s te p s  to  promote c o o p e ra t io n ,g ra n t  l e g i s l a ­
t io n  could a lso  be changed so  as to  be more perm issive  in ach iev ing  
co o p era tio n . In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  one o f  the  c h ie f  changes t h a t  could be 
make i s  the  removal from e l i g i b i l i t y  any loca l governmental u n i t  o th e r  
than general purpose governments, This change would re q u ire  sp ec ia l  
purpose governments to  co o rd in a te  p lans with general purpose governments 
to  avoid i n e f f i c i e n t  overlapp ing  and c o n f l i c t i n g  programs.
F in a l ly ,  i t  i s  n ecessary  to  co n s id e r  general revenue sharing  in 
l i g h t  o f  i t s  e f f e c t  on co o p era tio n . While t h i s  type o f  a id  i s  very 
e f f e c t i v e  in  p lac in g  d i s c r e t io n a r y  funds in  the  hands o f  loca l govern­
ments, i t  does not p o s i t i v e ly  enhance co o p era tio n . By prov id ing  loca l 
governments w ith  revenue, w ithout e f f e c t iv e  cond itions , general revenue 
sh a rin g  has encouraged independent r a th e r  than co o p era tiv e  a c t io n  on 
the  p a r t  o f  r e c i p i e n t  governments. From the  p e rsp e c t iv e  o f  t h i s  paper, 
sp ec ia l  revenue sh a rin g  would appear to  be a more e f f i c i e n t  means o f 
t r a n s f e r r in g  funds to  loca l governments. While recogn iz ing  t h a t  sp ec ia l  
revenue sharing  would be le s s  e f f e c t i v e  in promoting P re s id e n t  Nixon's 
"New F edera lism ", o r  d e c e n t ra l iz e d  d e c is io n  making, i t  would perm it more 
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF NECESSARY RELATIONSHIPS FOR EQUAL 
ABSOLUTE RESPONSES BY TWO COMMUNITIES TO 
GRANTS WHEN THE ABILITIES TO PRODUCE 
A PUBLIC GOOD ARE NOT EQUAL
The purpose o f  th is  appendix i s  to  present a proof o f the neces­
sary relation sh ip s among lin es  l y  L2 , L3 , L^, and Lg in Figure 21,
which w ill r esu lt in D Drt being equal to D D . When D D„ equals D D ,
1 2  3 4  1 2  3 4
the ninety degree tr ian g les formed in the figure w ill be iso sc e le s  and 
the vertica l segments o f  each w ill be equal. In the context o f the 
body o f  th is  paper, th is  means that grants-in -aid  w ill resu lt in equal 





The formal proof requires that formulae for lin es  L , L , L , L ,
1 2  3 4
and L be calculated  by the use o f  the two point formula. For L , the 
5 1
ca lcu lation s are as follow s:
I m T  '
i ' J U
By sim ilar ca lcu la tio n s, the formulae for L2> Lg, and are:
33 y
L  3 •
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For L5 , the formula 1s:
s / r t *
I t  i s  now necessary to find the coordinates for the point o f  
In tersection  between Lg and Lj, Lg. L3 , and L .̂ This 1s done by 
se ttin g  L5 equal to  each o f  the other l in e s . For the In tersection  
between Lg and Lj, the follow ing procedure may be used:
a , - i j r t x s m x




j l & .




'  m X t y
1 ,
W X ^ I
In a sim ilar manner, the in tersection  between Lg and L2 » L3 , 
and L4 may be calcu lated  as:
D z : y -
X * X i j  *-
/ » x t +3
D,i Xs
A ? / i
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r \  * v  —
U i j  '  A  "  # 9 X Z
i f  r  ^ s J L L .
Now that the in tersectin g  coordinates have been found, the 
distan ce, D ^ ,  may be found by using the Pythagorean Theorem:
D D  -  ^  Y
u t u Xr I to V z+ 'J *
c **ti wcny, +$z) j
1
fX tC  /*  i t  Jj/ M i } *  V
■W*WT ^ ■ ■ 555555̂*'™*“ _u— MtW**»—
ft/ax. * j , ) C « /t ‘j » ] 1 [Cf»y>-*3>X"9^t)J
j p f z C r * Y z  3> 32S J  + Z M* ^ > ~"W 1 % z , ) J
£ C r n % z + $ n ) C r « Y z + ^ ]  *~
_ f & ' f r ’X '- 'l'> £ " V *^,-  m u  Jt Jf*"
( f o X t + j j }  ^ ' ’ • X t + J i ) ,
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*  P *  >* 'CmX% ^ ,  -  / ^ X t  J  *. >J *'
/ ( W t f f f i i t f r - f o Q ' v - ^ X i f - 0 > X c  V  ~/" X «  9«>a
) C r * y z + ' l T )
r  { [ w x * ^  l 0 l C * \ J * ^  /*x%V V
( / r r # z + 2 t } C . t n X z  + y t )
( m x z - t ' i !  ) C
/ ( f r - a O *  C x l + r » y f
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( * » / * ♦  3 # ;  c * * X z + $ t ' )
(Jrtfx* j ,) f  wiyr  4 j t )
-. . . .
* f /  ) f  * 3 * 5
/ y ix > .  < j z - ^ z - W  /




Now, se tt in g  equal to  D3D4 , th e  required iso c e le s  tr ian g les wi l l  
be estab lished  and the conditions necessary for equal vertica l 














































































































































































































































































ve for m, using the quadratic formula:
-  lo  -  % z
m  -
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